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ABSTRACT
is dissertation is about the nature of perspectival thoughts and the context-sensitivity
of the language used to express them. It focuses on two kinds of perspectival thoughts:
‘subjective’ evaluative thoughts about matters of personal taste, such as Beetroot is deli-
cious or Skydiving is fun, and ﬁrst-personal or de se thoughts about oneself, such as I am
hungry or I have been fooled. e dissertation is a defence of a novel form of relativism
about truth – the idea that the truth of some (but not all) perspectival thought and talk
is relative to the perspective of an evaluating subject or group.
In Part I, I argue that the realm of ‘subjective’ evaluative thought and talk whose
truth is perspective-relative includes attributions of knowledge of the form ‘S knows
that p.’ Following a brief introduction (chapter ), chapter  presents a new, error-
theoretic objection against relativism about knowledge attributions. e case for re-
lativism regarding knowledge attributions rests on the claim that relativism is the only
view that explains all of the empirical data from speakers’ use of the word ‘know’
without recourse to an error theory. In chapter , I show that the relativist can only
account for sceptical paradoxes and ordinary epistemic closure puzzles if she attributes
a problematic form of semantic blindness to speakers. However, in chapter  I show
that all major competitor theories – forms of invariantism and contextualism – are sub-
ject to equally serious error-theoretic objections. is raises the following fundamental
question for empirical theorising about the meaning of natural language expressions:
If error attributions are ubiquitous, by which criteria do we evaluate and compare the
force of error-theoretic objections and the plausibility of error attributions? I provide
a number of criteria and argue that they give us reason to think that relativism’s error
attributions are more plausible than those of its competitors.
In Part II, I develop a novel uniﬁed account of the content and communication of
perspectival thoughts. Many relativists regarding ‘subjective’ thoughts and Lewisians
about de se thoughts endorse a view of belief as self-location. In chapter , I argue that
the self-location view of belief is in conﬂict with the received picture of linguistic com-
munication, which understands communication as the transmission of information
from speaker’s head to hearer’s head. I argue that understanding mental content and
speech act content in terms of sequenced worlds allows a reconciliation of these views.
On the view I advocate, content is modelled as a set of sequenced worlds – possible
worlds ‘centered’ on a group of individuals inhabiting the world at some time. Intuit-
v
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ively, a sequenced world is a way a group of people may be. I develop a Stalnakerian
model of communication based on sequenced worlds content, and I provide a suitable
semantics for personal pronouns and predicates of personal taste. In chapter , I show
that one of the advantages of this model is its compatibility with both nonindexical
contextualism and truth relativism about taste. I argue in chapters  and  that the
empirical data from eavesdropping, retraction, and disagreement cases supports a relat-
ivist completion of the model, and I show in detail how to account for these phenomena
on the sequenced worlds view.
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Truth is a virtue we want our thought and talk to possess. It is good to believe what
is true. It helps our actions if we get the facts right. What we believe and assert thus
trades in truth and falsity – it is truth-apt. is assumption of truth-aptness pervades
contemporary philosophy, and it is the heart and soul of one of the most fruitful projects
in the study of meaning – the project of truth-conditional semantics.
Yet some of the things we believe and assert seem to resist classiﬁcation into the
true and the false. Is it a truth that twelve-tone music is bizarre, that skydiving is fun,
or that beetroot is tasty? If this question has an odd ring, it is perhaps because Truth
with a capital ‘T’ seems to be the wrong dimension of evaluation for these claims. ey
seem to be ‘subjective’ – the assessments of a subject rather than judgments of objective
fact. At the same time, giving up the idea that truth and falsity are central features
of the objects of our beliefs and assertions is a radical departure from well-established
theorising. Moreover, in some sense we do want to call even our most subjective claims
true or false, for instance when we express our agreement by remarking, ‘at’s true.’
Relativism about truth promises to give us both. It secures a place for evaluative
sentences and their contents among the truth-apt, declarative sentences of our language
for which truth-conditional semantics can be given, and it guarantees that evaluative
thought and talk is subjective rather than objectively true or false. As I understand it,
relativism about truth, for a piece of language and thought, is roughly the idea that a
single assertion or belief of this kind can be true relative to one perspective and false
relative to another.
e relativism that is the topic of this dissertation is an empirical thesis about how
we in fact think and talk when we make subjective, evaluative judgments. e core of
the view is a semantic and pragmatic account of our use of expressions such as ‘bizarre,’
‘fun’, and ‘tasty,’ which allow us to talk about matters of personal taste. e main
motivation for relativism comes from facts about our use of such expressions, notably
from cases involving disagreement, eavesdropping, or retraction. Such facts about use,
the relativist maintains, are straightforwardly predicted by relativism. In contrast, none
of the competing theories regarding the semantics and pragmatics of these expressions
makes all and only correct predictions in these cases. Hence, relativism should be
preferred on empirical grounds.
In what follows, I will largely take it for granted that the empirical data gives us suf-

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ﬁcient motivation to take seriously the idea that the truth of expressions about matters
of personal taste is relative to the evaluator’s perspective. Not everyone will agree with
this starting point. Many think that alternative views such as contextualism, objectiv-
ism, or expressivism regarding expressions of personal taste receive enough empirical
support to spare us the need for an idea as radical as the relativisation of truth. Others
object that the very idea of relative truth is incoherent. Although I put these reason-
able concerns to one side, I do not intend to dismiss them. But I submit that the
recent wave of pioneering work on relative truth by philosophers and linguists such as
Andy Egan, Max Kolbel, Peter Lasersohn, John MacFarlane, Mark Richard, Tamina
Stephenson and others has done enough to justify the dual assumption of conceptual
coherence and signiﬁcant empirical support as the point of departure for the present
investigation.
I hope to convince the reader of two points. First, the prospects are bright for ex-
tending this relativism to other areas of thought and talk, areas whose subject matter
has a less ‘subjective’ semblance; in particular to our ascriptions of knowledge of the
form ‘S knows [does not know] that p’. Second, the prospects are bright for integrat-
ing relativism with an account of ﬁrst-personal thought and talk, which crucially also
depends on the subject’s perspective.
e dissertation falls into two parts. Part I explores the empirical prospects for
providing a relativist semantics for knowledge attributions, an area of thought and talk
in which dependence on the evaluator’s perspective is far from obvious. Chapter 
presents a problem for relativism. e case for relativism about knowledge attributions
as championed by MacFarlane (a, b) rests on the argument that relativism
is the only theory that makes the correct predictions for all of the empirical data and
is to be preferred on these grounds to other views, all of which must resort either to
unsatisfactory pragmatic explanations of the troublesome data or to the attribution of
systematic error to speakers. Chapter  argues that this way of motivating relativism
fails. Sceptical paradoxes and epistemic closure puzzles present data that the relativist
can only explain in a satisfactory way if she attributes an implausible form of semantic
blindness to ordinary speakers. Relativism is thus subject to an error-theoretic objection
just like its contextualist and invariantist competitors.
Error-theoretic objections are ubiquitous in the debate on the semantics and prag-
matics of knowledge attributions. eir shape is simple. First, it is shown that a theory
makes the wrong predictions for a particular set of data from speakers’ use of ‘know.’
en it is claimed that the theory’s best account of the data involves the attribution of
systematic error to speakers. Finally, it is claimed that this error attribution is implaus-
ible. Given their ubiquity and simplicity, it is surprising that it is far from clear what
A version of chapter  is forthcoming as ‘Relativism, Sceptical Paradox, and Semantic Blindness’ in Philo-
sophical Studies; cf. Kindermann (forthcoming).
makes an error attribution implausible. But distinguishing diﬀerent error-theoretic ob-
jections in terms of their force is crucial in the dialectical situation the debate is facing.
If every view must have recourse to attributions of systematic error, we need to evalu-
ate and compare the given error theories if we want to come to an adequately reasoned
decision between rival views. Chapter  does just this. I start by establishing in some
detail for which data points invariantist and contextualist theories need to posit error,
even where a pragmatic account of the data is provided. In so doing, I distinguish
between diﬀerent kinds of semantic, pragmatic, and metaphysical error. is allows us
to put the views on the scoreboard, where we can read oﬀ and compare their success in
empirical predictions. I then suggest adequacy conditions for error theories by identi-
fying a number of criteria for the evaluation of kinds of error and their attribution. I
end by using these criteria to suggest a defence strategy for relativists. e moral of
Part I is that while the empirical case for relativism about ‘know’ is less straightforward
than relativists may have hoped, reﬂection on the force of error-theoretic objections
and the adequacy conditions of error theoretic explanations paints a bright picture for
relativism about knowledge attributions. ere is thus good reason to think that the
dependence of truth on the perspective of the evaluating subject is not restricted to
intuitively subjective parts of our thought and talk.
Part II explores the connection between subjective attitudes and de se or ﬁrst-
personal attitudes – attitudes about oneself, which we typically express using the ﬁrst-
personal pronouns ‘I’, ‘me’, ‘my.’ On a widespread version of relativism about subject-
ive attitudes, the content of these attitudes is understood in similar ways to a Lewisian
account of the content of de se attitudes. On the Lewisian account, a de se thought
such as I am hungry has centered content, which is modelled by a set of centered worlds.
Centered worlds are possible worlds ‘centered’ on an individual at a time. us, the
thought I am hungry has a content modelled by the set of centered worlds such that
the center is hungry in the world at the time. A subjective thought such as Beetroot is
tasty has a content modelled by the set of centered worlds such that beetroot is tasty to
the center at the time. But while the centered contents of subjective and de se attitudes
share many similarities, their roles in linguistic communication are crucially diﬀerent.
In Part II, I argue that this gives us reason to modify our account of centered content.
In particular, I argue for what I call sequenced worlds relativism: a novel uniﬁed ac-
count of de se and subjective attitudes and their communication, on which contents are
understood as sets of sequenced worlds – sets of possible worlds ‘centered’ on a sequence
of individuals.
Chapter  motivates and develops the bare bones of the sequenced worlds view. I
begin with a conﬂict between the centered content approach to subjective and de se at-
titudes and the received picture of linguistic communication, which understands com-
munication as the transmission of information from speaker’s head to hearer’s head. I
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then argue that sequenced worlds content provides a solution to the conﬂict that recon-
ciles the insights of both views. In the rest of the chapter, I implement the sequenced
worlds view in a broadly Stalnakerian model of communication and give a semantics for
predicates of personal taste on which sentences like ‘Beetroot is tasty’ express sequenced
worlds contents.
Chapter  and  develop the details of the sequenced worlds view. I show that the
view itself forces no decision between contextualism and relativism upon its supporters
because it is neutral between a nonindexical contextualist and a truth relativist view
of predicates of personal taste. However, subsequent discussion of key pragmatic phe-
nomena that the views are designed to explain shows that the relativist version makes
better predictions. Chapters  and  thus present an argument in favour of sequenced
worlds relativism.
In chapter , I start by presenting the nonindexical contextualist and truth relativist
versions of the sequenced worlds view. I then extend the basic framework to explain
the empirical data from eavesdropping cases and retraction cases. Crucial for the ex-
planation of eavesdropping cases is an account of the relationship between a discourse
and subjects who are not participants in the discourse but nonetheless receive inform-
ation from it. In order to explain retraction cases on the broadly Stalnakerian model
of discourse, I provide an account of how the information accumulated in the course
of the conversation must be updated with the passage of time. I introduce a taxonomy
for retraction cases and show how to account for the withdrawal of information in each
of these cases.
Chapter  continues the development of the sequenced world view. I give an ac-
count of disagreement and explain how we can make sense of the notion of faultless
disagreement. I show that the sequenced worlds model of common ground provides
the resources for an account of the conversational dynamics of agreement and disagree-
ment about matters of personal taste. Next, I discuss some implications of the view
for our practice of ascribing monadic truth, and I address the complex interaction of
predicates of personal taste with tense as well as with modality. is allows us to locate







RELATIVISM AND SEMANTIC BLINDNESS
. Introduction
e case for relativism about knowledge attributions, as made by John MacFarlane
(a, b), rests on the following line of thought. Indexical epistemic contextu-
alism – the view that the content of sentences of the form ‘S knows that p’, and ‘S does
not know that p’ may vary with the epistemic standards salient in the context of use
– is supported by appeal to linguistic data from ordinary speakers’ use of knowledge
sentences: the same speakers tend to accept ‘S knows that p’ as true when uttered in one
context but not when uttered in another context. But contextualism makes incorrect
predictions about, for instance, speakers’ inter-contextual truth ascriptions and their
retraction of knowledge claims. e best explanation of this data available to contextu-
alists involves the attribution of semantic blindness to speakers. Similarly, classical and
subject-sensitive invariantists face troubling data, whose explanation commits them to
some error theory or other. In contrast, MacFarlane claims, relativism can account
for all of the data. Relativism is the only view that avoids the ‘double-edged sword’
of attributing systematic error to speakers (MacFarlane, a, ). at is its main
virtue.
e relativist has a prima facie strong empirical case. Pace MacFarlane, however, I
argue in this chapter that relativism cannot explain all of the data from speakers’ use
of knowledge sentences without the attribution of semantic blindness to speakers. In
section ., I introduce the relativist’s case against contextualism and in favour of re-
lativism. In section ., I present a recent error-theoretic objection against relativism
that appeals to speakers’ inter-contextual judgments of relativised truth ascriptions to
knowledge claims. In section ., I show why the strategy behind this objection fails.
However, there is a simpler semantic blindness objection to relativism that is immune
to the given replies, as I argue in section .. Speakers tend to be puzzled by scep-
tical paradoxes, and relativist explanations of this phenomenon are bound to appeal
to speakers’ semantic blindness. I identify two diﬀerent kinds of semantic blindness
In this chapter, I will not be concerned with MacFarlane’s arguments against traditional and subject-
sensitive versions of invariantism that complete his case for relativism. e presentation of his argument
against contextualism is intended to exemplify his argument-by-elimination strategy and to introduce the
semantic framework.

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involved in the debate: content-blindness and index-blindness. In section ., I con-
sider and reject a reply on behalf of the relativist. Finally, in section . I show that
the objection generalises to ordinary cases of epistemic closure from a variety of data
on which relativists have rested their case.
is chapter thus presents an argument against relativism based on the error-theoretic
objection from sceptical paradox. But to relieve the anxious reader: this is not the ﬁnal
word. As I will argue in chapter , the prospects for relativism look bright once all the
views’ commitments to blindness theses are evaluated and compared.
. Contextualism and the Case for Relativism
On contextualist semantics, the content expressed by an occurrence of ‘S knows that
p’, and ‘S does not know that p’, depends in part on the epistemic standards salient
in the conversational context, where this dependence can be traced to the occurrence
of ‘know’ (Cohen (); DeRose (); Lewis (); cf. Schaﬀer (a)). When
John uses the sentence ‘Bill knows that he has hands’ in an everyday context with low
epistemic standards (L) he expresses, very roughly, the content Bill knows relative to
low standards that he has hands. When Mary is in a context with high epistemic stand-
ards (H), for instance in an epistemology class on scepticism or in a courtroom, she
uses the sentence to express the content Bill knows relative to high standards that he has
hands. e sentence is true as used by John in L, but false as used by Mary in H.
e truth value of knowledge sentences can vary across contexts of use even when the
facts about the knowing subject’s situation do not change. Contextualists motivate the
variability of content by appeal to ordinary speakers’ use of ‘know’. While speakers
accept many knowledge attributions as true in mundane contexts of use, they tend to
give in to, e.g., sceptical considerations that raise the epistemic standards and reject
these attributions as false in such contexts.
Trouble for contextualism comes, among other things, from speakers’ inter-con-
textual truth ascriptions to and retraction of knowledge claims, and from disagreement.
When Mary is in H, say in a conversation about brains-in-vats, she will judge know-
ledge attributions expressed by the sentence ‘Bill knows that he has hands’ false, even
when the attribution is made by John in L. Likewise, speakers in L will judge
knowledge denials, e.g. ‘Bill does not know that he has hands’, false even when they
are made in H. But contextualism predicts that in judging knowledge attributions
is characterisation is simpliﬁed in two respects. First, epistemic standards – the strength of epistemic
position one must be in to count as knowing – come in degrees. ere are more diﬀerent standards and
corresponding contexts than H and L. Second, the propositional form S knows relative to high/low
standards that p is supposed to be neutral between diﬀerent contextualist proposals for the structure of
the propositions expressed.
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and denials uttered in other contexts, speakers are sensitive to the epistemic standards
at play in the context of use.
What is more, speakers will retract earlier knowledge claims when their context
changes in relevant respects. Suppose John sincerely asserts ‘I know that my car is
parked in the driveway.’ Mary points out that car thieves could be roaming John’s
neighbourhood and that his car might have been stolen. She thereby raises the stand-
ards, and it is natural for John to retract his earlier assertion by saying ‘I guess I was
wrong. I did not know that my car was parked in the driveway.’ But according to
contextualism, John is mistaken in his retraction. After all, his earlier assertion is true
in the context of its use. Contextualism predicts that it would be appropriate for John
to reply: ‘I did not say that I know that my car is parked in the driveway. I only meant
that I know by low epistemic standards that my car is parked in the driveway. And that
is still true.’ is, however, is not a natural reply for John.
Finally, speakers are reported to disagree when one of them, in L, asserts ‘S
knows that p’ and the other one, in H, asserts ‘S doesn’t know that p.’ On the con-
textualist semantics, however, the ﬁrst speaker expresses the content that S knows that
p relative to low standards, and the second expresses the content that S does not know
that p relative to high standards. Since these contents are perfectly compatible, speakers
should not be inclined to judge that they disagree. at is, speakers are mistaken in
their disagreement judgments.
Contextualists’ best response to the recalcitrant data is to adopt an error theory:
Speakers are systematically mistaken in their inter-contextual truth ascriptions and re-
traction of knowledge claims. ese mistakes are explained by speakers’ semantic blind-
ness: ‘users of the word ‘know’ are blind to the semantic workings of their language.’
(Hawthorne (, ); cf. DeRose (, )) e kind of semantic blindness
contextualists need to ascribe is what I propose to call content-blindness:
C-
Speakers are blind to the fact that particular sentences (sentences of the form ‘S
knows that p’/‘S does not know that p’) can express diﬀerent contents in diﬀerent
contexts (bar indexical expressions in the substitution instances of ‘S’ or ‘p’).
Contextualists take the content of knowledge sentences to depend on the context of
use, so the kind of semantic blindness they must attribute can be further speciﬁed as
See MacFarlane (a) and Williamson (). Further objections to epistemic contextualist semantics
concern, e.g., disagreement judgments (MacFarlane, b), belief reports (Cappelen and Lepore, ;
Hawthorne, ), the analogy between ‘know’ and gradable adjectives (Stanley, ), the analogy with
indexicals and with quantiﬁcational determiners like ‘all’ and ‘every’ (Schaﬀer and Szabo, forthcoming).
Regarding (dis)agreement reports as evidence for shared content, see Cappelen and Hawthorne ().
Further objections to contextualism concern, e.g., belief reports (Cappelen and Lepore, ; Hawthorne,
) and the comparison of ‘know’ with gradable adjectives (Stanley, ).
 Relativism and Semantic Blindness
use-content-blindness.
Let me settle some terminology. An expression is indexical iﬀ its content at a con-
text depends on features of the context. A sentence is (semantically) context-sensitive
iﬀ either its content or its truth value (or both) at a context depends on features of
the context. us, contextualism about knowledge is the view that sentences of the
form ‘S knows that p’ are indexical – speciﬁcally, that the content of ‘S knows that
p’ depends on epistemologically signiﬁcant features of the context. It is one among
other views that hold that sentences of the form ‘S knows that p’ are context-sensitive.
Content-blindness is ignorance of an expression’s indexicality. 
According to MacFarlane, the attribution of semantic blindness undermines the
contextualist’s cause. Contextualists appeal to the variability of speakers’ intra-con-
textual truth ascriptions in support of their view. But the more data they explain away
by appeal to speakers’ ignorance of the semantic workings of ‘know’, the weaker is
their appeal to speakers’ usage of ‘know’ as evidence in favour of their semantics. For
MacFarlane, the point generalises:
[A] general problem with positing speaker error to explain away facts about
use is that such explanations tend to undermine the evidential basis for
the semantic theories they are intended to support. All of these semantic
theories are justiﬁed indirectly on the basis of facts about speakers’ use of
sentences, and the more error we attribute to speakers, the less we can
conclude from these facts. (MacFarlane, a, )
Relativists piggyback on the case against contextualism. On MacFarlane’s relativist
semantics, the truth value of knowledge sentences can vary from one context of assess-
ment to another: ‘S knows that p’ may be true at (context of use) CU and (context
of assessment) CA1 and false at CU and CA2. Underlying the relativist semantics
is a roughly Kaplanian picture (Kaplan, ). Sentences in contexts of use express
For the above notion of indexicality and a diﬀerent notion of context-sensitivity, see MacFarlane ().
ese views include nonindexical contextualism (Brogaard, ; Kompa, ; MacFarlane, ) and
relativism (MacFarlane, a, b).
On the above notion of context-sensitivity, contingent sentences and tensed sentences count as context-
sensitive. is broad notion of context-sensitivity is useful as an umbrella term for speciﬁc kinds of
context-sensitivity, among which is the sensitivity to the epistemic standards salient at a context.
Akerman and Greenough () propose an alternative way of distinguishing between kinds of context-
sensitivity and corresponding kinds of blindness. ey provide a helpful discussion and comparison of
these kinds of blindness for the case of vague expressions.
For a defence of contextualism from semantic blindness objections see Blome-Tillmann (), Cohen
(a), DeRose (), and Schaﬀer and Szabo (forthcoming).
In this chapter, I will focus on MacFarlane’s version of relativism. Similar relativist semantics for know-
ledge attributions have been proposed by Richard (, ) and Kolbel (). All of the arguments
in favour and against relativism discussed in this chapter apply, mutatis mutandis, to all of these versions.
. Contextualism and the Case for Relativism 
contents. Contents are evaluated at an index (Lewis, ), what Kaplan called a cir-
cumstance of evaluation, to yield truth values. Kaplan took the index (circumstances
of evaluation) to include at least a world and a time coordinate, determined by the
context of use. Relativism can be located in this picture by the following three theses:
. I 
‘S knows that p’ expresses a content that is invariant across contexts of use (bar
indexical expressions in the substitution instances of ‘S’ and ‘p’).
. I 
e index contains an epistemic standards coordinate, to which the truth value
of ‘S knows that p’ is sensitive. More generally, call a sentence index-sensitive iﬀ
its truth value depends on (some coordinate in) the index.
. A 
e truth value of ‘S knows that p’ depends on the epistemic standards salient at
the context of assessment, which may be diﬀerent from the context in which the
sentence is uttered. Put together with , the epistemic standards-coordinate in
the index is determined by the context in which a knowledge claim is assessed.
Relativism about knowledge attributions can thus be characterised as the view that
while the semantic contribution of ‘knows’ to a sentence ‘S knows that p’ does not
make the sentence indexical, the sentence is assessment-index-sensitive: Its truth value
depends on the epistemic standards coordinate in the index, which is determined by
the context of assessment.
Relativism yields an elegant account of the data that troubles contextualism. An
assessor in H is correct in ascribing falsity to ‘Bill knows that he has hands’ as uttered
in L, since it is the standards at play in the assessor’s context that matter to her
truth value ascription. Moreover, relativism predicts that John will retract his earlier
assertion ‘I know that my car is parked in the driveway’ when the context is shifted
to H by Mary in conversation. When John in H assesses his past assertion, it
is appropriate for him to use the standards salient in his present context to judge his
assertion false and to correct himself. Relativism also explains intra-contextual truth
ascriptions. When I judge knowledge sentences uttered in my own context as true
(false), context of assessment and context of use are identical. Relativism’s predictions
in these cases coincide with those of contextualism. Finally, relativists can explain the
I will here ignore the diﬀerences between Lewisian index and Kaplanian circumstance of evaluation. ey
have no bearing on any of arguments discussed in this chapter. I will henceforth use the shorter ‘index’.
Contextualism can also be situated in this picture of semantics: It locates the relevant epistemic standards
in the context of use that combines with a sentence to deliver a content; contents then are evaluated at an
index, which does not include a standards coordinate.
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felicity of disagreement reports of two speakers in relevantly diﬀerent contexts of use,
one of whom grants and the other denies that a subject knows that p, by the fact that,
on account of I , one speaker expresses the negation of the other
speaker’s knowledge claim.
MacFarlane completes the case for relativism by making similar points against tra-
ditional invariantism and interest-relative invariantism. ese views run into trouble
with data, e.g., from intra-contextual truth ascriptions and temporal and modal em-
beddings of ‘know’, respectively. And again, relativism makes correct empirical predic-
tions where invariantist views must wield error theories to their defence. MacFarlane
concludes that since relativism is the only view that respects all of the data without
requiring the attribution of systematic speaker error, it is superior to all other views.
. An Error-theoretic Objection against Relativism
Contextualism and all forms of invariantism each face trouble from cases in which
their view does not predict the assessor’s egocentric sensitivity to epistemic standards
(or stakes) in their inter-contextual judgments of knowledge attributions. One error-
theoretic strategy against relativism, exempliﬁed by Montminy (), presents cases
for which relativism supposedly cannot predict this egocentric focus either. As we will
see in section ., this particular strategy is not promising.
According to the ﬁrst variant of the strategy that Montminy pursues, relativism is
committed to the attribution of systematic speaker error when speakers make judg-
ments about explicitly relativised truth claims, made in other contexts, concerning
knowledge attributions. Montminy has us consider, ﬁrst, the following dialogue in
L:
(.) John: We both know that Neil Armstrong was the ﬁrst man to set foot
on the moon.
Bob: at’s true.
Suppose Mary is in H and is presented with (.). It is natural for her to judge
false not only John’s knowledge attribution but also Bob’s assessment of John’s claim.
is is what relativism predicts. Mary is right in taking the standards salient in her
context as relevant for the assessment of John’s knowledge attribution as well as Bob’s
truth ascription to John’s claim. Mary thinks that John and Bob do not know that Neil
Armstrong was the ﬁrst man to set foot on the moon, and that it is false that they know
this, so Bob’s claim that it is true that they know is false in Mary’s context.
Trouble for relativism is supposed to arise when speakers explicitly relativise their
truth ascriptions. Consider a similar dialogue in L:
. An Error-theoretic Objection against Relativism 
(.) John: We both know that Neil Armstrong was the ﬁrst man to set foot
on the moon.
Bob: at’s true relative to this context.
According to Montminy, Mary in H will judge John’s knowledge attribution false
and she will also judge Bob’s truth ascription false, regardless of the relativisation. is
runs against relativism’s prediction. On relativist semantics, the explicitly relativised
truth ascription made by Bob in L is true at every context of assessment, hence also
at Mary’s.
Relativists hold that there are (at least) two diﬀerent truth predicates. e ﬁrst is
the ordinary English monadic predicate ‘true’. Its application to propositions yields
sentences that are themselves assessment-sensitive. at is, sentences of the form ‘It
is true that p’ or ‘e proposition that p is true’ have truth values that vary with the
context of use and context of assessment. Importantly, monadic ‘true’ is disquotational
in the following sense: Whenever, in a context of assessment, we correctly judge that
S knows that p, we can also judge correctly that it is true that S knows that p, and vice
versa. e equivalence schema It is true that p iﬀ p is true at any CU and CA. Since
‘true’ is assessment-sensitive, the left-hand side will be true (false) at a CU and CA just
in case the right-hand side is true (false) at that CU and CA.
In dialogue (.), Bob is ascribing ordinary monadic ‘true’ to the proposition ex-
pressed by John’s knowledge attribution. In the context of assessment of the dialogue,
L, this truth ascription is correct; ‘at’s true’ is true at CU(J&B) and CA(Low).
However, ‘at’s true’ is false at CU(J&B) and CA(High). Relativists predict correctly
that it is appropriate for Mary in her context of assessment to reject Bob’s assertion as
false.
e second truth predicate is relational. ‘True relative to context C’ relates truth
bearers to contexts in which they are evaluated. It is assessment-insensitive. at is,
the truth value of ascriptions of this truth predicate to sentences or propositions, as
in ‘It is true relative to this context that p’, does not vary with contexts of assessment.
us, the proposition expressed by the following assertion is true relative to any context
of assessment: ‘It is true relative to L that John and Bob know that Neil Armstrong
was the ﬁrst man to set foot on the moon.’ Since this is plausibly what Bob is saying
in (.), relativism predicts that Mary in H will judge the proposition expressed by
Bob’s utterance as true.
Egan et al. () take the bearers of monadic truth to be utterances. I shall here stick with MacFarlane
(b, a) and take ordinary ‘true’ as applying to propositions.
Egan et al. () treat the binary predicate ‘true relative to context C’ as applying to utterances. Mac-
Farlane prefers the metalinguistic predicate ‘true at CU and CA’ used in the formulation of the relativist
semantics, which relates either sentences or propositions with contexts of use and contexts of assessment.
Whatever the exact details, the common denominator here is the explicit relativisation of truth to a con-
text in which the truth bearer is evaluated. I will use ‘true relative to context C’ as a predicate that applies
to truth bearers, be they utterances, sentences(-in-context), or propositions.
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However, speakers in H such as Mary seem to judge explicitly relativised truth
ascriptions to knowledge attributions made in L as false. So on the relativist picture,
they are systematically mistaken in these judgments. e conclusion of this objection
is that relativism, too, is committed to an error theory; the best argument for relativism
fails.
. Relativist Replies
ere are at least two replies available to the relativist in response to this error-theoretic
objection.
() Discarding the data. Relativists may remind us that while ‘true’ is a natural lan-
guage English truth predicate that speakers frequently and competently use, ‘true relat-
ive to context C’, or ‘true at CU and CA’, is a technical, metalinguistic truth predicate
used to formulate relativist semantics for English sentences. To ordinary speakers, Bob’s
assertion of ‘at’s true relative to this context’ will sound stilted and odd, and contrary
to Montminy’s Mary, they are most likely to have no clear truth value judgments.
But even if speakers had clear judgments, we could not just assume that ‘true relative
to context C’ in their mouths expressed the relativist’s technical concept of truth. In
fact, trying to accommodate speakers’ intuitions about this expression would be bad
methodology. By analogy, we would be ill-advised to take into account speakers’ re-
actions to ‘at’s a context-sensitive sentence’ in constructing a semantics for English.
As a result, speakers’ reactions to expressions involving ‘true relative to this context’ do
not constitute data against relativism.
Montminy () does not claim that this ﬁrst objection goes through against the relativist, for roughly
the reasons I give at the beginning of the next section. He does hold, however, that another variant of
the strategy is successful, one on which the claims involving the explicitly relativised truth predicate are
replaced by supposedly extensionally equivalent counterfactual conditionals. I argue in the next section
that that objection does not succeed against the relativist either.
In Kindermann (forthcoming), I mention, in footnote , MacFarlane’s views on norms of assertion from
chapter  of his unpublished book manuscript. At the time the article was published Online First, the book
manuscript available on MacFarlane’s website did not include a chapter on knowledge attributions. In a
more recent draft (February , ), MacFarlane discusses Montminy’s objection in chapter  on ‘knows.’
Much of his response is broadly consonant with the ﬁrst reply I am giving here. We diﬀer, however, in
the response to the part of Montminy’s objection that is concerned with retraction (see footnote  in
Kindermann (forthcoming)/footnote  below for my response). More broadly, my goal in the article and
this chapter is to show that the successful error-theoretic objection that relativists need to worry about
comes from sceptical paradox and epistemic closure puzzles.
Results from Google searches should not serve as conclusive evidence, but the fact that a Google search
for ‘true relative to this context’ (in July ) resulted in only four hits – three papers in philosophy
(including Montminy ()) and one in linguistics – strongly suggests that English speakers are not well-
acquainted with the expression. ‘True relative to context’ oﬀered  hits, all of which were philosophy or
linguistics papers. A feeling of oddity was also the reaction of most philosophers and non-philosophers
when I presented them with dialogue (.).
. Relativist Replies 
Relativists could further argue that there is no ordinary, non-technical English ex-
pression that correctly captures the theoretical concept of relative truth. is would
forestall all attempts to run the error-theoretic objection with everyday expressions that
purport to stand a better chance of expressing relative truth in the mouths of English
speakers. Relativists could give this reply without compromising their claim that or-
dinary speakers can make sense of relative truth as a concept of truth. According to
MacFarlane, we understand the meaning of ‘true at CU and CA’, or ‘true relative to
context C’, if we grasp ‘the role [this predicate] plays in a broader theory of language use:
speciﬁcally, an account of the speech act of assertion’ (MacFarlane, b, ). In
brief, an assertion is a commitment to the truth of what is asserted. is commitment
is honoured by providing adequate grounds for the truth of what is asserted relative to
the context of assessment in which the assertion is challenged. e commitment also
requires that one withdraws the assertion in any future CA in which what is asserted
is shown to be untrue relative to CA. Retraction data, the relativist can conclude,
gives evidence that speakers take themselves to be bound by such a relativised assertoric
commitment. us, even if speakers lack ordinary expressions to express the technical
concept of relative truth, they have an implicit grasp of it.
See for instance MacFarlane (a, ) and (b, -) for further details of the commitment
undertaken by assertions.
Montminy argues that even this connection between the notion of truth at CU and CA and language use
requires the attribution of systematic error to speakers. As he points out, the commitment to withdrawing
an assertion in any future context of assessment in which what is asserted is shown to be untrue relative
to that context of assessment entails (*):
(*) In asserting ‘S knows that p’ (‘S does not know that Q’), one commits oneself to withdrawing the
assertion in any future context CA(High) (CA(Low)) in which what is asserted by ‘S knows that
p’ (‘S does not know that Q’) is shown to be untrue relative to CA(High) (CA(Low)).
Montminy grants for the sake of argument that speakers do in fact withdraw their assertions of ‘S knows
that p’ (‘S does not know that Q’) made in L (H) when challenged in H (L). But he denies
that speakers ‘take themselves to be bound by [(*)]’: ‘the fact that a speaker in L would withdraw her
previous knowledge denial made in H does not entail that when she is in H, the speaker takes
herself to be committed to withdrawing her current knowledge denial, if this denial is challenged in some
future L. As a matter of fact, a speaker in H would reject this commitment, that is, such a speaker
would hold that it would be incorrect to withdraw her current knowledge denial in some future low-
standards context’ (Montminy, , ). Montminy concludes that relativism implies that speakers
are systematically mistaken about their commitments to withdraw knowledge claims.
Relativists can resist this argument in several ways. First, it is not clear that speakers would in fact reject
the commitment to withdraw knowledge attributions (denials) once the standards have risen (fallen).
What could the evidence be for speakers’ rejection of the commitment if it is not their linguistic behaviour
(which, Montminy grants, honours this commitment)? Presumably Montminy has in mind speakers’
explicit judgments about what they take their commitments to be (what they ‘hold’). Pending empirical
evidence, relativists may simply doubt that speakers would make judgments that stand in contrast to their
actual behaviour – after all, they do seem to withdraw. (It has been widely noted that raising standards
is easier than lowering them, which might in part explain why speakers are more reluctant to explicitly
withdraw knowledge denials (because they do not accept switching to L). But this does not threaten
MacFarlane’s claim about the commitment to withdraw, which only says that when speakers are in L,
they will withdraw a knowledge denial that is untrue relative to L.)
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But perhaps the relativist’s blank dismissal of any sort of data involving the use of
vocabulary expressing relative truth is too quick. Montminy agrees that the relativist’s
reply successfully rebuts the objection based on an explicitly relativised truth predicate
in cases like (.). But he maintains that there are perfectly ordinary English locutions
that do express relativised truth claims. e following counterfactual conditionals are
supposed to express in ordinary English the relativist’s thesis that the proposition that
John and Bob know that Neil Armstrong was the ﬁrst man to set foot on the moon is
true relative to John and Bob’s context L:
(.) If it were to be assessed in John and Bob’s context, the proposition that they
know that Neil Armstrong was the ﬁrst man to set foot on the moon would be
true.
(.) If I were in John and Bob’s context, then they would know that Neil
Armstrong was the ﬁrst man to set foot on the moon.
(.) If the stakes were low and no error possibilities had been mentioned, then it
would be true that John and Bob know that Neil Armstrong was the ﬁrst man
to set foot on the moon.
Montminy claims that ordinary speakers like Mary in H would understand (.) –
(.) and reject them as false. But the relativist must hold that (.) – (.) are true,
since they express the relativist’s thesis that the attribution of knowledge to John and
Bob is true relative to John and Bob’s context. e relativist, Montminy concludes,
is after all committed to the claim that Mary’s judgments are systematically mistaken
(Montminy, , -).
I think relativists have good reasons to reject both that (.) – (.) express relativ-
ised truth claims and that Mary’s falsity judgments concerning these conditionals (if
she has any clear judgments) run against relativism’s predictions. On a mainstream se-
mantics of counterfactuals, the antecedent has an eﬀect on the worlds at which the con-
sequent is evaluated for truth and falsity. For instance, on the Lewis-Stalnaker account,
a conditional A > B is true iﬀ B is true at the closest world(s) at which A is true. But
Second, relativists may even grant that speakers do make judgments to the eﬀect it is incorrect to
withdraw a knowledge attribution in H, but deny that speakers’ explicit judgments are relevant for an
account that links the concept of relative truth to speakers’ language use. By analogy, syntacticians would
have to predict widespread error if part of their evidence was speakers’ acceptance or rejection of explicitly
stated grammatical rules which speakers, as a matter of fact, employ in their use of language.
Finally, it is worth pointing out that MacFarlane’s (b) commitment account of assertion is by far
not the only way of linking the concept of relative truth to language use. MacFarlane () argues that
many of the common accounts of assertion corroborate the concept of relative truth as the link between
the compositional semantics and language use as long as a corresponding norm of retraction is added.
And Egan et al. (), Egan (), and Stephenson (a) oﬀer alternative accounts of assertion for
relativists.
. Relativist Replies 
it is an open question whether, when combined with relativism, the antecedent also
aﬀects the epistemic standards coordinate in the index. Relativism has Montminy’s
problem only if the antecedent does aﬀect the epistemic standards coordinate. How-
ever, there seem to be no independent theoretical reasons why this must be the case.
And the alleged data from Mary’s falsity judgments give us pre-theoretical reasons to
think that that the antecedent has no eﬀect on the epistemic standards coordinate with
respect to which the consequent is evaluated. So relativists can make the right pre-
dictions by simply adopting the unamended Lewis-Stalnaker analysis of conditionals:
When Mary assesses the knowledge claim in the consequent at the closest world(s) in
which she is in John’s context, or in which the stakes are low and no error possibilities
have been mentioned, she will still judge this knowledge claim as false relative to her
actual context of assessment H. As a result, (.) – (.) are not extensionally equi-
valent to, and do not express, relativised truth ascriptions, and Lewis-Stalnaker-cum-
relativist semantics of (.) – (.) make the intuitively right predictions concerning
Mary’s (putative) rejection.
() Override. It is worth noting that there is a reply available to relativists even if
they are inclined to take the data from (.) at face value and aﬃrm that ‘true relat-
ive to context C’, as used by ordinary speakers, is the relativist’s metalinguistic truth
predicate. On this assumption, what the data shows is that speakers take their own
current contexts of assessment to override all other contexts of assessment. Adapting
Moruzzi and Wright (), the relativist can capture the phenomenon of overriding
by introducing two principles governing the metalinguistic truth predicate.
Let the relativist’s metalinguistic truth predicate be represented by the dyadic pre-
dicate T(S;CA) relating sentences-at-contexts and contexts of assessment. First-
order truth ascriptions such as Bob’s in (.) are represented by sentences of the form
T(S;CA); second-order truth ascriptions such as Mary’s by T(T(S;CA1), CA2). (Of
course, Mary makes a second-order ascription of falsity; see below.) A context CA1
overrides a context CA2 when the assessment in CA1 of the facts dictates their proper
assessment in CA2. e fact that Mary judges Bob’s use of ‘at’s true relative to this
context’ as false in accordance with the epistemic standards in her own context of assess-
ment, and in spite of the standards at play at Bob’s context of assessment, is captured by
the ideas of (Upward Override) and (Downward Override). Upward Override with
Sentences-at-contexts can be understood as pairs of sentences and contexts of use. We could make contexts
of use explicit and conceive of the truth predicate as a tryadic predicate relating sentences, contexts of use,
and contexts of assessment. To keep the discussion as simple as possible, we will let ‘S’ stand for sentences-
at-contexts.
In the following, I will accept harmless use/mention confusion in favour of better readability.
(Upward Override) and (Downward Override) are derived from Moruzzi and Wright’s idea of trumping
(, x), which they promote for relativism about future contingents. Override contrasts with trumping
in one crucial respect: ‘Being trumped [. . . ] involves that another perspective gets, not to override the
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respect to a sentence S takes place if whenever S is true at a context of assessment CA1
it is thereby true at CA1 that S is true at any context of assessment. In short:
(Upward Override) (8CA1; CA2)(T(S;CA1)  T(T(S;CA2),CA1))
is principle is called ‘Upward Override’ because the direction of dictation is from the
ﬁrst-order truth ascription in CA1 to the second-order ascription in CA1 of truth to
the ﬁrst-order truth ascription in some CA2. Provided that S ranges over knowledge
sentences, (Upward Override) entails that speakers will judge as true that a knowledge
sentence is true relative to any context of assessment CA2 if they judge it true relative
to their own (CA1).
e converse of this principle is (Downward Override). Downward Override with
respect to S takes place if whenever it is true at a context of assessment CA1 that S is
true at a context of assessment CA2, S is true at CA1. In short:
(Downward Override) (8CA1; CA2)(T(T(S;CA2),CA1)  T(S;CA1))
is principle is called ‘Downward Override’ because its direction of dictation is from
the second-order ascription in CA1 of truth to the ﬁrst-order truth ascription in any
CA2 to the ﬁrst-order truth ascription in CA1. Provided that S ranges over knowledge
sentences, (Downward Override) entails that speakers will judge a knowledge sentence
true relative to their own context of assessment CA1 if they judge as true that the
knowledge sentence is true relative to a context of assessment CA2. (Upward Override)
and (Downward Override) together entail that it is inconsistent for a speaker to accept
a knowledge sentence as true relative to their own context of assessment while rejecting
as false truth ascriptions to this knowledge sentence at other contexts of assessment,
and vice versa.
Mary’s second-order falsity ascription to Bob’s ﬁrst-order truth ascription is a con-
traposition instance of (Downward Override). Let SK stand for John’s knowledge
attribution, CM for Mary’s context of assessment, and CB for Bob’s context of assess-
ment. Interpreting falsity as the negation of truth, we get:
(.) T(SK ; CM )  T(T(SK ; CB),CM ))
Loosely speaking, (.) says that since Mary judges John’s knowledge attribution false
from her context of assessment, she also judges that Bob’s truth ascription (in his context
of assessment) to John’s knowledge attribution is false. e epistemic standards in her
context of assessment override those in Bob’s context of assessment.
(Upward Override) and (Downward Override) thus allow the relativist to make the
right predictions for (.). Acceptance of these principles is also compatible with the
mandates of one’s own perspective, but to determine what they are.’ (Moruzzi and Wright, , 
n.)
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other data relativists have been keen on. Firstly, it does not aﬀect the predictions about
intra-contextual truth ascriptions. Secondly, it supports retraction data and makes even
slightly stronger predictions. We retract knowledge attributions or denials if they turn
out to be false from our current context of assessment. Given Override, we also judge
that the knowledge claim was false in our earlier context of assessment (in fact, in any
context of assessment), contrary to our previous judgment. We concede that we were
wrong back then and do not tend to justify our knowledge claim by insisting that it
was true relative to our previous context of assessment. Finally, (Upward Override) and
(Downward Override) leave the data from ordinary disquotational ‘true’ untouched,
since they exclusively target the explicitly relativised, technical truth predicate.
Override principles also lend support to an intuitive diﬀerence between, on the one
hand, discourse featuring knowledge claims and discourse about the contingent future,
and, on the other hand, discourse about matters of personal taste and perhaps moral
and aesthetic discourse. Relativism about knowledge sentences and future contingents
(see Moruzzi and Wright) promote override principles. On the contrary, the idea of
override is questionable in moral and aesthetic discourse and entirely out of place in
matters of personal taste. Consider (.).
(.) John: Watching : A Space Odyssey is fun.
Bob: No, watching : A Space Odyssey is not fun. Still, it may be true
for you that it’s fun.
Accepting on the current strategy that ‘true for you’ in (.) expresses a relativised truth
predicate, relativists can say that it is true relative to John, i.e. the standards of taste at
his context of assessment CJ , and false relative to the standards of taste at Bob’s context
CB , that watching : A Space Odyssey is fun: T(S2001; CJ ) and T(S2001; CB),
where S2001 is the sentence ‘Watching : A Space Odyssey is fun’ in (.). Would
John (or Bob) be tempted to think that because from his context of assessment, it is true
(false) that watching : A Space Odyssey is fun, this must also be true (false) from
any other context of assessment? If override principles held in the case of predicates of
personal taste, then Bob’s assessment of ‘Watching : A Space Odyssey is fun’ as false
would mandate the judgment that from John’s context of assessment, that sentence is
equally false. is prediction, however, seems empirically inadequate. Typical speakers
may concede that while something is not fun for them, it may well be for others. eir
own standards of taste do not mandate what taste judgments others must make. is
is diﬀerent for knowledge attributions. Notice the bizarreness of Bob’s concession to
John in the following dialogue:
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(.) John: I know that Neil Armstrong was the ﬁrst man to set foot on the
moon.
Bob:  No, you don’t know that. Still, it may be true for you that you
know it.
Override principles plausibly hold for relativism about knowledge sentences and future
contingents but are misplaced in the case of discourse involving predicates of personal
taste. Formally, this is easily captured by restricting the range of S in (Upward Over-
ride) and (Downward Override) to sentences with which we make contingent claims
about the future as well as knowledge claims.
Override principles mark the diﬀerence between discourses that typically exhibit
Tolerance and those which do not. Tolerance here captures the idea that speakers can
acknowledge that there might be other perspectives than their own which are (equally)
appropriate; that is, speakers can acknowledge that given diﬀerent relevant features in
other contexts of assessment, what they judge to be true (false) may not be true (false)
from other contexts of assessment. Speakers are likely to be tolerant towards other
perspectives on taste, but not on whether or not someone has knowledge.
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e error-theoretic strategy from speakers’ inter-contextual judgments in sections .
and . appealed to data involving the use of ‘true relative to context C’ and other locu-
tions allegedly expressing relativised truth claims. e replies available to the relativist
correspondingly targeted the use of these expressions to avoid the charge of system-
atic error attribution. However, there is a simpler error-theoretic objection that makes
Cf. Moruzzi and Wright’s () idea of ‘even-handedness’
Override principles commit the relativist to second-order relativism. First-order relativism about know-
ledge sentences is the claim that there is at least one sentence containing ‘know’ which, as used in a context
of use CU , is true relative to one context of assessment and false relative to another:
(REL) (9S;CA1; CA2)(T(S;CA1) ^ T(S;CA2))
Second-order relativism about knowledge sentences is the claim that there is at least one sentence of the
form T(S;CA), where S ranges over, say, knowledge sentences, and which is true relative to one context
of assessment and false relative to another:
(REL2) (9S;CA1; CA2; CA3)(T(T(S;CA1),CA2) ^ T(T(S;CA1),CA3))
Given ﬁrst-order relativism, an instance of (REL2) can be derived from override principles. Suppose for a
knowledge sentence S and two contexts of assessment ca1 and ca2 that T(S; ca1) and T(S; ca2). en
from T(S; ca1) it follows by (Upward Override) that T(T(S; ca2),ca1). And fromT(S; ca2), taking ca2
for both CA1 and CA2, it follows by contraposition on (Downward Override) that T(T(S; ca2),ca2).
A further question is whether ﬁrst- and second-order relativism can coherently be combined with third-
order absolutism, or whether higher-order relativism is required all the way up. It is beyond the scope
of the present work to determine whether higher-order relativism of any sort is a price worth paying for
accommodating data from inter-contextual truth ascriptions.
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no appeal to data involving relativised truth claims and is thus immune to the above
replies. As I argue in this section, the solution to sceptical paradoxes and epistemic clos-
ure puzzles that naturally falls out of the relativist semantics requires the implausible
attribution of a kind of semantic blindness I call index-blindness. Although relativ-
ists have not explicitly addressed sceptical paradoxes, they cannot reject this solution
without signiﬁcant costs, as I show in section ..
Consider the following sceptical argument:
(SA) I don’t know that I’m not a BIV (i.e., a bodiless brain in a vat who has been
caused to have just those sensory experiences I’ve had).
If I don’t know that I’m not a BIV, then I don’t know that I have hands.
————————————
I don’t know that I have hands.
As Schiﬀer (, ) remarks, ‘this argument presents a paradox because it tempts
us to say three things that are mutually inconsistent: its ﬁrst premise is true; its second
premise is true; and its conclusion is false.’ at is, the following three sentences are
mutually inconsistent: ‘I don’t know that I’m not a BIV’; ‘If I don’t know that I’m not
a BIV, then I don’t know that I have hands’; and ‘I know that I have hands.’ Yet each
of these sentences strikes us as intuitively true.
A ‘fully satisfactory’ solution, Schiﬀer continues, must accomplish two things:
First, it must explain why (SA) in fact does not present a paradox. at is, it must
show which one of the three sentences is false, and explain why the argument is in fact
valid. And second, it must explain why (SA) seemed to present a paradox. at is, it
must explain why the false sentence seemed true, and why we were tempted to believe
that the premises are true but the conclusion false.
e relativist semantics has the resources to provide a fully satisfactory solution
to sceptical paradox. Going for the ﬁrst task, relativists may remind us that we assess
knowledge attributions and denials from a context of assessment. Sceptical hypotheses,
as introduced by the ﬁrst premise of (SA), raise the epistemic standards in the context
of assessment to a high level (H), since one must be in quite a strong epistemic
position to rule out that a sceptical hypothesis like the BIV scenario obtains. us, we
assess ‘I don’t know that I’m not a BIV’ as true at CU and CA(High). Importantly, the
epistemic standards are now raised for a context of assessment that encompasses the en-
tire argument (SA). Hence, we must also assess the second premise and the conclusion
of (SA) at CU and CA(High). is allows the relativist to explain why (SA) in fact is
valid, thus capturing the intuitive force of the sceptic’s argument. To understand how,
we need to have a look at the relativist’s notion of validity.
e validity of an argument is commonly understood as necessary preservation of
truth from premises to conclusion. Since truth, on a relativist semantics, is truth at a
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context of use CU and context of assessment CA, validity is necessary preservation of
truth at CU and CA from premises to conclusion. us, (SA) is valid if, necessarily,
whenever the premises are true at CU and CA(High), its conclusion is also true at CU
and CA(High).
 Since both premises and its conclusion are true at CU and CA(High),
(SA) is valid and sound.
is gives relativists a neat explanation of the validity and soundness of (SA). It also
allows them to show that (SA) does not present a paradox. A paradox is ‘a set of mutu-
ally inconsistent propositions each of which enjoys some plausibility when considered
on its own’ (Schiﬀer, , ). Propositions, and sentences, are mutually inconsist-
ent just in case they cannot be true together. Obviously, relativists will relativise truth
here as well. us, a paradox is a set of sentences, or propositions, each of which enjoys
some plausibility when considered on its own but which cannot be true together at any
CU and CA. But there are no contexts CU and CA at which each of the following
three sentences enjoys some plausibility on its own yet they cannot be true together: ‘I
don’t know that I’m not a BIV’; ‘If I don’t know that I’m not a BIV, then I don’t know
that I have hands’; ‘I know that I have hands.’ From any CA(High), the ﬁrst two are
true and plausible, but the third lacks plausibility – it is false at CA(High). From any
CA(Low), the second and third are true and plausible, but the ﬁrst is not.
 Provided
that the ﬁrst premise of (SA) induces CA(High) for the entire argument, and so for the
three sentences of the apparent paradox, ‘I know that I have hands’ turns out to be the
apparently true, but in fact false, sentence – it is false at CA(High). is completes the
ﬁrst part of the relativist solution.
To deliver on the second part, relativists must explain why ‘I know that I have
hands’ seemed true and why it appeared that while the premises of (SA) are true, the
conclusion is false. Why our resistance to accept the sceptical conclusion ‘I don’t know
that I have hands’? e only answer for relativists is this: We intuitively assess the
conclusion from our everyday context in which low epistemic standards prevail, while
we assess the sceptical hypothesis introduced by the premises from a context with ex-
traordinarily high epistemic standards. In (SA), we reason from the premises’ truth at
CU and CA(High) to the conclusion’s falsity at CU and CA(Low). Yet we are ignorant
of our switching contexts of assessment in moving from premises to conclusion, and
its eﬀect on our truth and falsity judgments. In the context of assessment induced by
the premises of the argument (H), the conclusion is in fact true. But we believe it
to be false because we unknowingly fall back to assessing it from L. Likewise, the
Cf. MacFarlane’s deﬁnition of logical consequence (MacFarlane, a, )
Note that to get necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the validity of (SA), it must be the case that,
necessarily, for every CU and CA, if the premises are true at CU and CA, then the conclusion is true at
CU and CA. It is easy to see that for any CA with suﬃciently high standards to make the premises of
(SA) true, the conclusion will also be true.
For simplicity, I assume that all contexts CA(High) and all contexts CA(Low) together exhaust all possible
contexts of assessment.
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premises together with the unnegated conclusion strike us as paradoxical because we
are unaware of the fact that we assess them from diﬀerent contexts of assessment, and
that this inﬂuences our judgments.
e second part of the relativist solution involves the attribution of error to or-
dinary speakers – indeed to anyone who is tempted to think (SA) presents a paradox.
We mistakenly think (SA) gives rise to paradox because we mistakenly switch contexts
of assessment midway. Relativists must explain this error by appeal to a speciﬁc kind
of semantic blindness. For relativists, knowledge attributions are assessment-index-
sensitive. Ignorance of this sensitivity is what leads speaker to their mistaken judg-
ments. ey betray index-blindness:
I-
Speakers are blind to the fact that the truth value of contents expressed by sen-
tences involving a particular expression (‘know’) can vary with a particular co-
ordinate in the index (epistemic standards).
More precisely, we can say that relativists are committed to the thesis that speakers are
epistemically assessment-index-blind. ey are ignorant of the fact that the truth value
of knowledge sentences can vary with the epistemic standards coordinate in the index,
which is determined by the context of assessment. In assessing (SA), they are blind
to the fact that the truth value of knowledge attributions is sensitive to the epistemic
standards coordinate in the index, which is determined by their context of assessment.
Speakers do not realise that when they assess the premises as true and the conclusion
as false, they do so from diﬀerent contexts, and that this aﬀects their assessment.
I have chosen a phenomenology of sceptical arguments according to which, as we reason from premises to
conclusion, we go from corresponding truth judgments to a falsity judgment. Accordingly, the relativist
solution diagnoses a switch of contexts of assessment in the move from premises to conclusion. Noth-
ing hangs on this choice. One might prefer to say that in reasoning through (SA), we come to accept
the sceptical conclusion and only then remember our usual acceptance of the unnegated conclusion in
everyday contexts. ese two judgments then strike us as inconsistent, creating the air of paradox. If we
prefer this diagnosis, what needs explanation in terms of index-blindness is the mistaken feeling of incon-
sistency between one’s truth judgment of the conclusion in the high-standards context of assessment of
(SA) and one’s falsity judgments of ‘I don’t know that I have hands’ in everyday low-standards context of
assessment.
Note that the relativist ‘solution’ to sceptical paradox, like the contextualist’s, does not amount to a refut-
ation of scepticism. On the contrary, the relativist account gives sceptical intuitions their due. is does
not imply that we can never (in no context of assessment) truly attribute knowledge. Whether or not
sceptical standards are reasonable ones to adopt is a question on which the relativist semantics is neutral.
Relativists need a local index-blindness thesis. at is, speakers are imputed with index-blindness only
locally, namely regarding sceptical arguments, situations in which they are confronted with the three
knowledge sentences from (SA), and epistemic closure puzzles, as I argue below. Local index-blindness
must be distinguished from global index-blindness, according to which speakers are blind to the index-
sensitivity of an expression (knowledge sentences) in any situation in which the expression is used or
evaluated. e latter is not needed to explain sceptical paradox, and its attribution would undermine
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e attribution of index-blindness to speakers spoils the relativist’s self-proclaimed
status as a no-blindness-theory and undermines the main advantage of relativism. But
one need not share MacFarlane’s general worry about blindness attributions to ﬁnd
index-blindness an unpalatable consequence of relativism. A more serious problem
with index-blindness is that it is particularly implausible in light of speakers’ reliable
competence in handling other kinds of index-sensitivity. Take as an example the imple-
mentation of temporalism according to which the contents expressed by sentences in
contexts of use vary their truth value with a time coordinate in the index. Consider
the following little argument:
(T) John is asleep at home.
If John is asleep at home, then he is not in his oﬃce.
—————————-
John is not in his oﬃce.
Clearly, the argument strikes us as valid. And we would easily detect a change in the
value of the time coordinate in the index. Suppose Bob wants to convince Mary at
midnight that John never makes it to his oﬃce before am. Bob gets Mary to agree to
premise one and two. If he were then to say, ‘You see, John is not in his oﬃce!’, Mary
would respond that John is not in his oﬃce at the time of their conversation (midnight),
but that this did not show that he is not in his oﬃce mornings before am. Mary is
acutely aware of the fact that she agreed to the premises’ truth at midnight, and she is
happy to concede the conclusion’s truth at midnight. But she will immediately spot the
oddness of Bob’s switching the time coordinate in reasoning from the premises’ being
true at midnight to the conclusion’s being true in the morning. Temporal (use-)index-
sensitivity does not pose a challenge to ordinary speakers. But if more uncontroversial
phenomena of index-sensitivity do not cause speaker error, why should we assume that
sentences involving ‘know’ are index-sensitive despite speakers’ blindness to this index-
sensitivity?
other data in favour of a relativist semantics. Note that the distinction between local and global blindness
is orthogonal to the distinction between content-blindness and index-blindness. e extent to which a
semantic theory needs a local content-blindness thesis is determined by the range of data that this thesis
needs to explain.
A similar case could be constructed for ‘orthodox’ semantics, on which sentences vary in truth value only
with a worlds coordinate in the index.
e objection in this section applies to nonindexical contextualist solutions of the paradox as well. Nonin-
dexical contextualism (Brogaard, ; Kompa, ; MacFarlane, ) shares with relativism the theses
of invariant content and index-sensitivity (cf. theses  and  in section .) but assumes that the epistemic
standards coordinate in the index is determined by the context of use. But the kind of use-index-blindness
required for nonindexical contextualist solutions is by no means more plausible than the one relativists
are committed to.
. Context Confusion without Index-Blindness? 
. Context Confusion without Index-Blindness?
Relativists might reply that their solution does not require attribution of any form of
semantic blindness. Instead, the appearance of paradox can be explained by speak-
ers’ confusion of contexts of assessment alone: Speakers are not index-blind, they are
merely confused about the epistemic standards relevant to their truth value judgments.
Given the nature of sceptical arguments, this confusion is neither surprising nor is its
attribution a theoretical cost for relativists.
e exclusive appeal to confusion of contexts is tempting, but it falls short of ex-
plaining the paradoxical appearance of the sceptical argument. Let us be clear about
the proposal. Speakers are supposed to be confused about the contexts of assessment
they are occupying, yet to be fully competent with respect to the index-sensitivity of
knowledge sentences. Call such speakers context-confused yet index-competent. Due
to their context-confusion speakers do not notice the switch of contexts, which explains
why they arrive at the puzzling combination of truth value judgments.
Now remember what the paradox consists in: We are inclined to accept the premises
as true and reject the conclusion as false (aﬃrm the unnegated conclusion), but we are
also inclined to think that the conclusion’s truth follows from the truth of the two
premises (we are inclined to think that the two premises and the unnegated conclusion
are inconsistent). e problem with the idea of index-competent but context-confused
speakers is that it cannot explain both speakers’ robust truth value judgments and their
sense of inconsistency. Yet both are needed to explain why (SA) appears to present a
paradox.
To see this, notice, on the one hand, that the appearance of paradox only arises from
(SA) if speakers have robust truth value judgments in the ﬁrst place. Speakers judge
the premises true and the conclusion false. So index-competent speakers, whose truth
value judgments are sensitive to the epistemic standards of their context of assessment,
cannot be at a loss about which epistemic standards to use in evaluating (SA)’s premises
and conclusion for truth and falsity. If they were, they would not arrive at robust judg-
ments at all. us, speakers’ truth judgments of the premises are competently informed
by CA(High) and their falsity judgments of the conclusion by CA(Low). ey switch
contexts. On the other hand, to explain why index-competent speakers take the truth
of the premises and the unnegated conclusion to be inconsistent, we must hold that
For illustration, consider a plausible case of a context-confused but index-competent speaker. Suppose
that on a rainy St. Andrew’s Day, John falls into a coma, from which he awakens three weeks later on
a sunny day without any memory of having been in a coma, nor any awareness of time having passed
since St. Andrew’s Day. Suppose John then incorrectly judges ‘It’s raining’ to be true. Given a temporalist
semantics, his judging so can be explained by the fact that John is mistaken about the time of his context
of use. Unaware of time’s passing, he assumes it is still St. Andrew’s Day, when it was raining. e
explanation of John’s mistake in judging need not declare him blind to the time-parameter of the index
(given a temporalist semantics). All John suﬀers from is mislocation in time. He is ignorant of his actual
context, yet he is fully index-competent.
 Relativism and Semantic Blindness
they are judging from the same context of assessment, i.e. they do not switch contexts.
For otherwise index-competent speakers would not get a sense of inconsistency. After
all, the premises’ truth at CA(High) is only inconsistent with the unnegated conclu-
sion’s truth at CA(High). It is not inconsistent with the unnegated conclusion’s truth
at CA(Low). So we must say that index-competent yet context-confused speakers take
themselves to be at CA(High) and CA(Low) at the same time, or that they unknowingly
oscillate between the two contexts. But then we lose an explanation of their unchan-
ging, robust truth value judgments: index-competent speakers only have stable truth
value judgments if they competently pick up on their context’s epistemic standards, i.e.
if they are not oscillating between or confused about their context.
In sum, we only get a full explanation of the appearance of paradox if we drop
the assumption of index-competence and assume a certain degree of index-blindness.
Speakers switch contexts of assessment and thus arrive at their truth value judgments,
and they take these to be inconsistent because they are blind to the fact these judgments
are informed by their contexts of assessment.
. Epistemic Closure Puzzles
As a matter of fact, relativists have not addressed sceptical paradoxes in any detail. So
they might try to dodge the objection from sceptical paradox by rejecting any relativist
solution. As concerns sceptical paradoxes, they might say, relativism has no advantage
over traditional invariantist theories. Whatever works as a solution of the paradoxes for
the latter will do for the former.
is rejection is not promising. Remember that relativists appeal to retraction data
in support of their view. When John is presented with the possibility that thieves might
have stolen his car, he will retract his earlier claim ‘I know that my car is parked in the
driveway.’ Relativists explain this by pointing out that while in the earlier context L
it was right to judge the knowledge claim as true, the standards have been raised to
H, so judged from John’s later context of assessment, the earlier claim is false. Now,
consider this anti-sceptical argument corresponding to (SA):
(AS) I know that I have hands.
If I know that I have hands, then I know that I’m not a BIV.
——————————-
I know that I’m not a BIV.
Perhaps with one exception: Mark Richard seems to advertise relativism as a plausible development, or ﬁx
of, epistemic contextualism and recommends the ‘insight into what is going on in skeptical arguments’
oﬀered by contextualism as one of the view’s attractions (, ). Presumably, then, Richard would
not be tempted to reject the relativist treatment of sceptical paradoxes in section . above.
. Epistemic Closure Puzzles 
e relativist story in line with the solution to sceptical paradox will say that, given the
mention of a sceptical hypothesis, we will switch contexts of assessment from L to
H in moving from premises to conclusion. We will thus ﬁnd the premises true at
CA(Low) but the conclusion false at CA(High). But notice the similarity between the
explanations of retraction data and of this anti-sceptical paradox. e crucial point is
the switch of contexts of assessment. If relativists make so much of their explanation of
retraction data, on what grounds could they refuse the similar explanation in the case
of (anti-)sceptical paradox?
It cannot be the peculiarity of external-world scepticism that supports the relativ-
ist’s potential rejection of the relativist solution. e error-theoretic objection is not
limited to sceptical paradoxes concerning BIVs, evil demons, and the Matrix. It gener-
alises to paradoxes from everyday conversation data about people, things, or activities
– data that relativists are keen on explaining. Consider the following argument based
on Vogel’s () car theft case – data that MacFarlane readily appeals to in support of
relativism:
(C) I know that my car is parked in the driveway.
If I know that my car is parked in the driveway, then I know that it has
not been stolen.
———————————————-
I know that my car has not been stolen.
Such ‘semi-sceptical’ cases (to borrow Vogel’s phrase) are equally puzzling, and similar
formulations of them have been widely discussed in the literature on epistemic clos-
ure. But the relativist solution to external-world sceptical paradox is an equally good
explanation of why we ﬁnd these cases puzzling. So relativists would have to reject
the relativist solution across the board, which undermines their contention to explain
data concerning the use of ‘know’ in everyday situations. But everyday talk about cars,
lotteries, and zebras is the very data with which relativists have made their case.
Other cases include lottery-style cases and Dretske’s zebra case (see Dretske (); Hawthorne ();
Vogel ()).
A simple version of single-premise epistemic closure principle is (EC) (cf. Hawthorne (, -) for
a discussion and reﬁnement of the principle):
(EC) Necessarily, if S knows p and S knows that p entails q, then S knows q.
Note that we can formulate the sceptical argument by explicitly using a contraposition instance of (EC)
and the plausible assumption that one knows that one’s having hands entails that one is not a BIV: ()
I don’t know that I’m not a BIV. () Necessarily, if I don’t know that I’m not a BIV, then either I don’t
know that I have hands or I don’t know that my having hands entails that I’m not a BIV. () I know that
my having hands entails that I’m not a BIV. () erefore, I don’t know that I have hands.
 Relativism and Semantic Blindness
. Conclusion
My purpose in this chapter has been to show that relativism about knowledge sen-
tences requires a semantic blindness thesis to explain the data from speakers’ use of
knowledge sentences. I argued that this cannot be shown by appeal to speakers’ alleged
use of a relativised truth predicate, or of any natural language stand-in for this predic-
ate. Relativists have good reasons to reject the data, and even if they were to accept
it, they could amend their semantics to accommodate the data. I suggested a simpler
way to show the relativist’s need for an error theory. An adequate relativist solution
to sceptical paradoxes and epistemic closure puzzles systematically commits relativists
to the attribution of a particular kind of semantic blindness to speakers: epistemic
assessment-index-blindness, i.e. blindness to the fact that the truth value of contents
expressed by sentences involving the expression ‘know’ can vary with the epistemic
standards coordinate in the index, which is determined by the context of assessment.
is solution falls naturally out of the relativist semantics, and as I argued, its rejec-
tion would undermine the relativist’s explanation of a wide variety of data from speak-
ers’ use of knowledge sentences. But index-blindness is highly implausible in light of
speakers’ robust competence with other kinds of index-sensitivity. Being committed
to index-blindness, relativists lose what MacFarlane advertised as their main advantage
over invariantist and contextualist competitors: the ability to predict the empirical data
while avoiding the ‘double-edged sword’ of positing speaker error.
 
KNOWLEDGE ATTRIBUTIONS AND SPEAKER ERROR
. Introduction
e case for relativism about knowledge attributions, as championed by MacFarlane
(a, b), is based on three claims. First, all competing views of contextualist and
invariantist stripes make some incorrect predictions regarding ordinary speakers’ use of
‘know.’ eir best account of speakers’ use, in the troubling cases, attributes systematic
error, or blindness, to speakers. Second, all of these error theses are implausible. Worse,
there is a principled worry about attributions of systematic error. In MacFarlane’s own
words,
a general problem with positing speaker error to explain away facts about
use is that such explanations tend to undermine the evidential basis for
the semantic theories they are intended to support. All of these semantic
theories are justiﬁed indirectly on the basis of facts about speakers’ use of
sentences, and the more error we attribute to speakers, the less we can
conclude from these facts. (a, )
e third claim is that relativism escapes this problem because it makes the correct
predictions for all use facts and thus need not appeal to speaker error.
In chapter , I argued that this last claim is false. In order to account for our
judgments about sceptical paradoxes and epistemic closure puzzles, the relativist must
attribute a particular kind of semantic blindness, i.e. assessment-index-blindness. at
is, speakers are blind to the fact that the truth value of knowledge sentences can vary
with the epistemic standards coordinate in the index, which is determined by the con-
text of assessment. is attribution of blindness leaves the relativist’s position itself
threatened by the general problem.
So is the relativist back to square one, in no better position than any of the views
that need error attributions? is question receives a positive answer only if all error
attributions are equally implausible. But one need not accept that all error is alike.
It would not come as a surprise if error-theoretic objections varied in their force. It
is easy enough to see how they would do so. Here is the template for error-theoretic
objections.
For the deﬁnition of index-blindness, see section ..

 Knowledge Attributions and Speaker Error
E-  
(E) eory X makes the wrong predictions about some set of facts Y regarding or-
dinary speakers’ use of expression Z.
(E) To account for use facts Y, theory X must appeal to systematic speaker error.
(E) But this attribution of speaker error is implausible.
Where (E) and (E) are true, the force of the error-theoretic objection depends on
(E). (E) ascribes implausibility. But implausibility comes in degrees. Surely, an
extreme view to the eﬀect that no error attribution in semantic theorising is ever any
plausible has little credibility. Humans are fallible, and there may be good reasons why
they may even persistently make systematic errors. Moreover, this extreme view would
provide no positive guidance in deciding between a number of views all of which are
committed to attributing some error or other.
is, however, is exactly the dialectical situation we are facing. As I will argue in
this chapter, all extant views need to attribute error of some kind to account for some
of the data, even where they are supplemented with a pragmatic or other account for
the problematic data. A reasoned decision between competing views thus needs to be
based on the relative costs and merits of their respective error attributions. But while
the philosophy of language has generated extensive debate concerning the adequacy
conditions for semantic as well as for pragmatic theorising, it is far from clear what
the adequacy conditions for error theoretic explanations are. e present chapter is
an attempt to identify criteria for the evaluation and comparison of diﬀerent kinds of
error and their attribution. ese criteria will provide the basis for a reasoned decision
between invariantist, contextualist, and relativist views. ey should also be useful
in other areas of philosophical theorising where error attributions are made with the
intention of accounting for ordinary speakers’ use of the philosophically interesting
expression.
I will proceed as follows. First, I will show that relativism’s competitors – versions
of contextualism and invariantism about knowledge attributions – all need to appeal
to speaker error in their explanation of some use facts, especially in their solution to
sceptical paradoxes (xx.–.). I will identify the kinds of semantic, pragmatic, and
metaphysical error the theories must attribute, and the data points for which they must
attribute error. is will allow us to put all views and their error attributions side to side
on the scoreboard (x.). I will then provide criteria for the evaluation and comparison
See for instance the literature on heuristics and biases in Kahneman et al. () that describes strategies
that people use in probability and frequency judgments. ese strategies are cognitively eﬃcient, often
correct, but they lead to predictable error in a signiﬁcant range of cases.
Some areas where the results of this chapter may usefully be applied are the debates on expressions of
causality, vague expressions in natural language, and ascriptions of free vs forced action.
. Nonindexical Contextualism and Use-Index-Blindness 
of diﬀerent error attributions (x.). Finally, I will suggest a strategy relativists can
pursue in defence of their error attributions (x.).
. Nonindexical Contextualism and Use-Index-Blindness
We saw in chapter , section ., that indexical contextualism, the view that the con-
tent expressed by an occurrence of ‘S knows [does not know] that p’ depends in part
on the epistemic standards salient in the conversational context, has trouble accounting
for speakers’ judgments of knowledge attributions made in contexts in which diﬀer-
ent epistemic standards are salient. Moreover, disagreement and retraction data pose
a problem for indexical contextualism. We concluded that the contextualist’s best ex-
planation of the data commits her to the attribution of content-blindness to ordinary
speakers.
It might be thought that nonindexical contextualism provides a better alternat-
ive, one that preserves the key contextualist insights while avoiding the attribution of
content-blindness. Nonindexical contextualism (Brogaard, ; Kompa, ; Mac-
Farlane, ) can be seen as an intermediate view between indexical contextualism
and relativism. It is the view that sentences of the form ‘S knows [does not know]
that p’ are epistemically use-index-sensitive. at is, there is an epistemic standards
parameter in the index which is determined by the context of use or utterance. More
precisely, nonindexical contextualism can be deﬁned by the following three theses.
. I 
‘S knows that p’ expresses a content that is invariant across contexts of use (bar
indexical expressions in the substitution instances of ‘S’ and ‘p’).
. I 
e index contains an epistemic standards coordinate, to which the truth value
of ‘S knows that p’ is sensitive.
. U-
e truth value of ‘S knows that p’ depends on the epistemic standards salient
at the context of use. Put together with , the epistemic standards-coordinate in
the index is determined by the context in which a knowledge sentence is used.
Nonindexical contextualism thus combines the contextualist’s insight that the truth of
knowledge attributions depends on the epistemic standards salient in the context of use
with the relativist’s insight that the variability is one of truth value, not of content.
e term ‘use-sensitivity’ is used in MacFarlane’s sense. See for instance MacFarlane (, ch.) for
discussion.
 Knowledge Attributions and Speaker Error
Let us examine nonindexical contextualism’s predictions about the core use facts
that have been identiﬁed in the debate as problematic for at least some views. A quick
note before we proceed. I will discuss the same set of core data for each view in order
to keep the discussion focused. is is not to say that for any particular view, these
data exhaust the use facts with which the view may have trouble. I urge the interested
reader to keep an eye on the footnotes for additional discussion.
Basic Variability
Recall that indexical contextualists motivate the variability of content by appeal to or-
dinary speakers’ use of ‘know.’ While speakers accept many knowledge attributions as
true in mundane contexts of use, they tend to give in to, e.g., sceptical considerations
that raise the epistemic standards and reject these attributions as false in such contexts.
It is eminently natural to believe and assert in everyday situations that one knows that
one has hands. But once sceptical considerations are brought forward, it is equally
plausible to give that belief up and take to be true, and assert, that one does not know
that one has hands. What varies here are speakers’ propensities to make knowledge
attributions or denials, as well as their judgments about the truth/falsity (or acceptabil-
ity) of knowledge attributions or denials uttered in the very context they occupy. Call
this data point Basic Variability.
Nonindexical contextualists explain the variability in intra-contextual truth/assert-
ability judgments in the same way as indexical contextualists. On both views, the epi-
stemic standards relevant for the truth evaluation of a sentence in context is determined
by the context in which the sentence is uttered.
Inter-contextual Truth Ascriptions
e shared contextualist claim that the context of use determines the epistemic stand-
ard relevant for judgments of truth/assertability is also responsible for both contextu-
alist views’ failure to predict inter-contextual truth ascriptions. Speakers tend to judge
knowledge claims true or false by the standards salient in their context of evaluation.
Once error possibilities are taken seriously, speaker not only judge that a given sub-
ject does not have knowledge, they also judge knowledge attributions made in contexts
with lower epistemic standards as false. Nonindexical contextualism’s best explanation
of this fact is that speakers are in error when they judge knowledge claims made in
contexts that diﬀer vastly in epistemic standards from those in their own context.
(Dis)Agreement
Nonindexical contextualists have roughly the same resources to explain disagreement
data as relativists. When speaker A in L asserts ‘S knows that p’ and speaker B
in H asserts ‘S does not know that p,’ then there is a content, S knows that p,
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which is expressed in A’s assertion and whose negation is expressed in B’s assertion.
So while both speaker’s claims are true in their respective contexts, their disagreement
can be explained in terms of the incompatibility of their expressed contents. is is a
signiﬁcant advantage over indexical contextualism.
Retraction
Nonindexical contextualism does not make the right prediction about speakers’ retrac-
tion of knowledge attributions. Consider John’s retraction of his earlier claim ‘I know
that my car is parked in the driveway’ after hearing from Mary that car thieves are roam-
ing his neighbourhood (cf. section .). According to nonindexical contextualism, it
would be correct for John to say ‘I guess I don’t know that my car is parked in the
driveway. But when I said before that I do know it, I spoke truly.’ However, this reply
is no more natural than the one that indexical contextualism licenses. Nonindexical
contextualism is committed to the claim that speakers are in error when they instead
say ‘I was wrong,’ ‘I spoke falsely,’ or ‘My earlier assertion is false.’
Inter-contextual Assessment of Truth Ascriptions to Knowledge Claims
In chapter  we considered the dialogue in (.), taking place in L:
(.) John: We both know that Neil Armstrong was the ﬁrst man to set foot
on the moon.
Bob: at’s true.
Nonindexical contextualists can predict that Mary in H judges as false both John’s
knowledge attribution and Bob’s truth ascription. Nonindexical contextualist may as-
sume that ‘true’ is ascribed to propositions and is governed by the equivalence schema
It is true that p iﬀ p. By the equivalence schema, the proposition Bob expresses is true
just in case the proposition John expresses is true. us, Mary in H can truly assert
‘at’s false’ in talking about the proposition Bob expresses just in case relative to the
high epistemic standards in her context, it is false that John and Bob both know that
Neil Armstrong was the ﬁrst man to set foot on the moon.
Sceptical Paradox
Recall from chapter  the sceptical argument.
For discussion of a nonindexical contextualist account of disagreement, see section .. below.
is prediction has some odd consequences for nonindexical contextualism that result from the bifurc-
ation of the truth of utterances and ascriptions of propositional truth (cf. MacFarlane (, -)).
I will postpone discussion of these consequences until chapters  and , where we will investigate the
nonindexical contextualist view in more detail.
 Knowledge Attributions and Speaker Error
(SA) I don’t know that I’m not a BIV.
If I don’t know that I’m not a BIV, then I don’t know that I have hands.
————————————
I don’t know that I have hands.
In chapter , section ., I argued that relativism needs to appeal to semantic blindness
if they are to give a solution to the sceptical paradox – a solution that explains both why
(SA) does not in fact present a paradox and why it seemed to us to be a paradox. e
semantic resources that nonindexical contextualism brings to the table mirror those of
relativism. Unsurprisingly, then, the nonindexical contextualist solution to the paradox
has similar virtues and vices as the relativist solution. It can explain why (SA) does
not give rise to paradox by pointing out that as long as the context of utterance is kept
ﬁxed, the argument is valid but it is not the case that both premises are true while the
conclusion is false. It can also explain the air of paradox by pointing out that speakers
mistakenly switch contexts in moving from premises to conclusion and are unaware of
doing so. is latter claim, however, commits nonindexical contextualism to the claim
that speakers are in error in their use of knowledge attributions in (SA).
In sum, nonindexical contextualists are committed to ascribing error to speakers in
cases of inter-contextual truth ascriptions, retraction, and sceptical paradox. However,
this error is not a form of content-blindness. On the contrary, what speakers are blind
to is the use-index-sensitivity of knowledge sentences. ey ascribe truth and falsity
depending on the epistemic standards in their own current context and thereby ignore
the fact that knowledge sentences are sensitive to the epistemic standards in the index
as determined by the context of utterance. is ignorance of the semantical workings of
knowledge sentences is a form of index-blindness. In chapter , index-blindness was
deﬁned as follows.
I-
Speakers are blind to the fact that the truth value of contents expressed by sen-
tences involving a particular expression (‘know’) can vary with a particular co-
ordinate in the index (epistemic standards).
In particular, we can say that nonindexical contextualism is committed to the claim
that speakers are epistemically use-index-blind. Is this kind of blindness plausible? In
chapter  I argued that epistemic assessment-index-blindness is implausible in light of
speakers’ robust competence regarding non-epistemic forms of index-sensitivity. e
For details see section .. Note that the diﬀerence between nonindexical contextualism’s use-sensitivity
and relativism’s assessment-sensitivity is immaterial to the explanation of at least those cases of sceptical
paradox in which assessor and speaker – context of use and context of assessment – are identical.
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same point also holds for epistemic use-index-blindness. As a result, the view cannot
explain all the data without recourse to an implausible semantic blindness thesis.
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Indexical contextualists, nonindexical contextualists, and relativists are all burdened
with some kind of semantic blindness thesis. Perhaps, then, some form of invariantism
is the way to go.
Invariantists hold that neither the content expressed by ‘S knows [does not know]
that p’ nor its truth value varies with the epistemic standards salient in the context of
utterance. Traditional, insensitive invariantists moreover believe that whether or not a
subject knows does not depend on the knowing subject’s attention to counterpossibilit-
ies, interests, or practical stakes. Traditional invariantists can be further distinguished.
Moderate insensitive invariantists have it that the constant epistemic standards, i.e. the
requirements on our evidence, reliability, etc. to count as knowing, are reasonably low.
We know a lot of things. Sceptical insensitive invariantists think that the epistemic stand-
ards are ﬁxed at an extraordinarily high level, so high in fact that we hardly ever meet
them. In contrast to these traditional views, interest-relative invariantists (also called
subject-sensitive invariantists) such as Fantl and McGrath (, ), Hawthorne
(), Stanley (), and Weatherson () believe that the truth of knowledge
sentences depends on the epistemic standards in the subject’s context, and these are
determined by the subject’s attention to counterpossibilities, interests, and practical
stakes.
Before looking at the views and their predictions one by one, let me make one
observation about all of them.
Basic Variability (all invariantist views)
All invariantist views have at least some trouble with the variability in truth value judg-
ments about knowledge attributions. In everyday conversational contexts we are con-
ﬁdent in ascribing to John the knowledge that he has hands by saying ‘John knows that
he has hands,’ and in these contexts we judge this sentence as true. But when epistemic
standards are raised, in the epistemology classroom or in court, we deny that John
knows that he has hands, even when John’s situation has not changed in any respect.
In the latter context, we think the sentence ‘John knows that he has hands’ is false.
Invariantists cannot account for this variability in intra-contextual truth ascriptions to
knowledge attributions because they hold that epistemic standards are ﬁxed once and
for all by facts about the subject’s situation: Either John meets the standards and knows
or he does not meet them and does not know. Moderate invariantists must claim that
speakers who deny knowledge in sceptical contexts are in error, or they must ﬁnd an
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alternative explanation. Sceptical invariantists are committed to the claim that speak-
ers who attribute knowledge in ordinary contexts are mistaken, or they must ﬁnd an
alternative explanation. Interest-relative invariantists must claim that as long as John’s
situation does not change, one of the speakers is wrong.
Let us now turn to moderate insensitive invariantism, the view that the invariable epi-
stemic standards that a subject has to meet in order to count as knowing are reasonably
low. In response to the view’s problem with basic variability data, Brown (, )
and Rysiew (, ) propose a WAM – a ‘warranted assertability manoeuvre’ – on
behalf of moderate insensitive invariantism. A WAM is the attempt to explain speak-
ers’ judgments about the correctness or incorrectness of knowledge claims by arguing
that these judgments reﬂect not the truth conditions of knowledge sentences in con-
text but their warranted assertability conditions. Brown and Rysiew hold that ‘S knows
[does not know] that p’ literally expresses, simply and invariably, the proposition that
S knows [does not know] that p. e sentence’s truth conditions do not depend on any
epistemically relevant factors at the context of use. But on a given use, the sentence also
pragmatically conveys, via familiar Gricean mechanisms, the content that S is in a very
strong epistemic position with respect to the proposition that p. Brown uses sensitivity
to spell out the notion of strength of epistemic position. On her account, it is prag-
matically conveyed that S’s belief that p matches the facts across a wide range of worlds,
where the context of utterance settles just how wide this range is. Rysiew adopts the
framework of relevant alternatives theory. On his account, what is pragmatically im-
plicated is that S can rule out the contextually salient (but irrelevant) alternatives.
According to both Brown and Rysiew, whether a knowledge claim is warrantedly as-
sertable is a matter of the truth or falsity of its pragmatically conveyed content, which
may vary from one context of utterance to another depending on the conversationally
accepted demands on S’s strength of epistemic position (the range of worlds in which
Two points are important to stress. First, Brown and Rysiew claim that their accounts exploit general
and independently plausible Gricean mechanisms of implicature that are needed for a theory of commu-
nication anyway. So the accounts are theoretically parsimonious. Second, they claim that their accounts
exploit mechanisms that have well-studied precedents. For instance, Brown () cites the Kripke-
Donnellan-Bach approach to deﬁnite descriptions, where in some cases, what is literally said is false but
what is pragmatically conveyed is true. Rysiew and Brown point to cases where what is literally said diﬀers
from a richer, pragmatically conveyed content, as in ‘I have eaten,’ which literally expresses just that the
speaker has eaten at some time in the past but conveys that the speaker has eaten recently. If implicatures
triggered by knowledge sentences have suitable precedents in such implicatures, Brown’s and Rysiew’s
accounts avoid the charge of adhocness.
See (Brown, , –). DeRose (, ) deﬁnes sensitivity as follows: ‘For one’s belief that p to be
sensitive one must not believe that p in the closest not-p worlds.’ More intuitively, one’s belief that p is
sensitive just in case, if it were not the case that p, one would not believe that p.
On Rysiew’s () moderate insensitive invariantism, the alternatives to the claim that p that are relevant
for S to possess knowledge that p are constant and meetably lax, yet in sceptical contexts the salient
alternatives may well exceed the relevant ones. e diﬀerences in detail between Brown’s and Rysiew’s
account do not matter for the argument in this section. For simplicity, I shall stick with Rysiew’s account.
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S’s belief must match the facts, or the range of alternatives that S must be in a position
to rule out). Call the moderate insensitive invariantist view that is complemented by
one of these pragmatic accounts sophisticated moderate invariantism.
It is an open question whether Brown’s and Rysiew’s accounts are linguistically
plausible. In order to account for the data, however, even the best version is com-
mitted to the claim that speakers confuse literal content and pragmatically implicated
content and are even blind to pragmatically implicated content.
Basic Variability
Consider ﬁrst the basic variability data. Moderate insensitive invariantists need to ex-
plain why in H, speakers are inclined to make knowledge denials, and why they
judge knowledge denials true and knowledge attributions false. Brown and Rysiew
claim that speakers’ judgments in H track the contextually variable warranted as-
sertability conditions of knowledge sentences, not their truth conditions. us, a
knowledge attribution made in H pragmatically implicates the false content that
the subject is in a position to rule out the contextually salient error possibilities (which
include possibilities the subject need not be able to rule out to count as knowing).
Note that speakers judge the knowledge claims made in their context to be true or
false, not just warrantedly (un)assertable or acceptable. If speakers, making a know-
ledge attribution in H, were aware of the fact that what they literally say is true
and what they pragmatically convey is false, they could naturally defend their know-
ledge attribution by saying ‘Of course what I implied was false, but what I literally said
was true’ or ‘What I said was true, although I wasn’t warranted in asserting it.’ Yet
this is not what speakers say. Of course, it is unreasonable to assume that speakers’
judgments track the theoretical distinction between semantic and pragmatic content.
Rysiew (, , n.) himself points this out.
But, of course, that our pretheoretical intuitions as to what we’re ‘saying’
are generally insensitive to the semantic/pragmatic distinction is essen-
tial to the view being presented here. And, to the extent that speakers
are reading merely pragmatically-generated information onto the relev-
ant sentences, it’s not that they will utter a sentence that they know to
be false [. . . ] only so as to communicate some further, true information
(e.g., that Smith does not meet certain unusually high epistemic stand-
ards); whether they see themselves as ‘saying’ something true/false will
depend on the perceived truth value of the information that is merely
pragmatically generated.
See Dimmock and Huvenes () for relevant discussion
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It is plausible that speakers’ judgments are not generally sensitive to the semantics/prag-
matics distinction. But Brown’s and Rysiew’s views require a stronger claim, namely
that speakers have no means whatsoever to distinguish between what they say with their
knowledge claims and what they merely implicate. is stronger claim is implausible
and reveals a disanalogy between the implicatures of knowledge claims and typical cases
of pragmatic implicatures. In many of the standard cases of implicature, speakers
are in fact in a position to distinguish between what they literally say and what they
merely pragmatically convey. A case of pragmatic implicature that Brown (, -
) mentions is that of a speaker saying ‘I have eaten,’ which literally says that the speaker
has eaten at some time in the past but which in normal circumstances pragmatically
conveys that the speaker has eaten recently. In a case like this, it is not altogether
unnatural for the speaker to respond to the challenge, ‘Of course you’ve had food before
in your life. What I want to know is whether you’ve eaten recently,’ by saying ‘I know
I didn’t say it literally, but what I meant was that I’ve eaten recently.’ In contrast, it
could not be further from common practice to defend a knowledge denial in H by
saying, ‘Sure, I know that S in fact knows that p. What I meant was that he isn’t in an
even stronger epistemic position.’
Furthermore, pragmatic implicatures have the feature of being cancellable (Grice,
, ). If ‘X is meeting a woman this evening’ typically has the conversational
implicature that the woman in question is not X ’s wife, mother, sister, or platonic
friend, this implicature can on occasion be cancelled by saying ‘X is meeting a woman
this evening. at woman is no one other than his wife.’ In contrast, it is odd at best
to cancel the implicature of a true knowledge attribution made in H by saying, ‘I
know that my car is parked outside. Of course, I cannot rule out that it has been stolen
by car thieves.’
e cancellability of conversational implicature and speakers’ ability to defend their
claims by pointing out what they meant to communicate rather than what they literally
said suggest that although speakers’ truth judgment may not generally be sensitive to
the distinction between semantics and pragmatics, speakers do possess some resources
to keep apart semantic content (‘what is said’) and pragmatically implicated content
(‘what is meant’). Yet they do not appear to be able to keep apart the semantic and
Brown prefers to model the content pragmatically by knowledge claims after Bach’s () cases of ‘impli-
citure’ (such as the ‘I have eaten’ case below). e diﬀerences between paradigm cases of Gricean conver-
sational implicature and cases of Bach’s implicitures should not matter to the points I wish to make. I will
speak of pragmatic implicatures to cover all cases of pragmatically implied rather than literally expressed
content.
Cancellability is widely considered to be one of the most robust properties of what Grice calls conversa-
tional implicatures. For some alleged counterexamples, however, see Weiner (). In contrast to con-
versational implicatures, conventional implicatures are not supposed to be cancellable. Neither Rysiew
nor Brown give any indication claim that the implicatures of knowledge attributions are conventional
implicatures, so I will put that option to one side.
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pragmatically implicated content of knowledge claims in the way that they do with
typical implicatures. Recording just this fact, we may say that sophisticated moder-
ate invariantists are committed to the claim that speakers systematically confound se-
mantic and pragmatic content. In what follows, I will use the slightly overstated title
semantics/pragmatics confusion to refer to just this fact. Semantics/pragmatics confu-
sion with respect to knowledge attributions – as manifest in cancellability facts and
responses to challenges – is implausible. If knowledge claims in fact trigger pragmatic
implicatures in a wide range of cases, these implicatures should give rise to similar use
facts as uncontroversial cases of implicatures do.
Disagreement
Disagreement data shows that speakers in diﬀerent contexts, L and H, can feli-
citously be reported to disagree if one says ‘S knows that p’ and the other says ‘S does
not know that p.’ is would be surprising if our judgments focused on pragmatically
conveyed content, as Brown and Rysiew claim. For in L, it is pragmatically conveyed
that S can rule out a reasonably small range of not-p alternatives, whereas in H it
is conveyed that S cannot rule out an exceptionally wide range of not-p alternatives.
ese claims do not conﬂict, so we should not be led to think the speakers disagree.
To explain disagreement, Brown and Rysiew must hold either that disagreement judg-
ments focus on literal content and truth conditions, and truth judgments on pragmatic
content and warranted assertability conditions, or that we mistakenly take the speakers’
pragmatically implicated contents to be in conﬂict. In the former case, we are implaus-
ibly oscillating between literal and pragmatic content without being aware of it, in the
latter we are blind as to what the pragmatically implicated contents are. us, sophist-
icated moderate invariantism cannot account for disagreement data without appealing
to blindness.
Inter-contextual Truth Ascriptions
Brown’s and Rysiew’s accounts make the wrong predictions about speakers’ inter-contex-
tual truth judgments. Consider a speaker in H, who judges a knowledge attribution
made in L to be false. If that speaker properly understood what is said and implic-
ated by the knowledge attribution in L, she should have no qualm with it. After
all, the knowledge attribution is both true and warrantedly assertable in L. What is
literally said by it is true, and what is pragmatically implicated – that S is in a position
to rule out a reasonably small range of not-p alternatives – is not in conﬂict with the
speaker’s beliefs in H. Here, however, appeal to speakers’ confusion of literal and
pragmatic content is not suﬃcient. To explain speakers’ falsity judgments, Brown and
Rysiew must hold that speakers are blind to pragmatic content. ey are ignorant of
the fact that the pragmatic implicatures of knowledge claims vary in content depending
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on the epistemic standards at the context of utterance. ey take the pragmatic content
implicated by knowledge sentences in other contexts of utterance to be the pragmatic
content these knowledge sentences would implicate were they uttered in the speakers’
own contexts.
Retraction
Speakers also tend to retract knowledge attributions, made in L, in light of raised
epistemic standards by saying ‘I was wrong,’ ‘What I said was false,’ or ‘I take that back.’
Brown’s and Rysiew’s accounts make it a mystery why speakers would retract. After all,
they did not say anything false in L, nor did they pragmatically convey anything false
in L. So they should instead insist that what they said (and implicated) is true. Here,
again, appeal to speakers’ confusion of literal and pragmatic content is not suﬃcient
to explain retraction. Speakers have no reason to retract either literal or pragmatic
content. To explain retraction, Brown and Rysiew must hold that speakers are blind
to the fact that pragmatic implicatures of knowledge claims vary with the epistemic
standards at play in the context of utterance. Although in L they in fact implicated
that the subject is in a position to rule out the alternatives salient in L, they now
take themselves to have implicated that the subject is in a position to rule out the wider
range of alternatives currently salient in H and hence retract their earlier assertion.
Moreover, they are confounding literal and pragmatic content, which explains why
they do not insist that what they said is (literally) true.
Inter-contextual Assessment of Truth Ascriptions to Knowledge Claims
Consider again dialogue (.), taking place in L:
(.) John: We both know that Neil Armstrong was the ﬁrst man to set foot
on the moon.
Bob: at’s true.
On the moderate invariantist semantics, John’s utterance literally expresses a true con-
tent that does not vary with epistemic standards. Bob’s truth ascription is invariably
true, too. us Mary in H is wrong in judging both John’s and Bob’s claims false.
Her error can be explained, however, by appeal to semantics/pragmatics confusion and
pragmatic blindness. Mary takes John to pragmatically implicate what his utterance
would implicate if it were made in her context H, namely that they are both in a
position to rule out all those alternatives, salient in H, in which Neil Armstrong
was not the ﬁrst man to set foot on the moon. is implicature is false, hence Mary’s
judgment. Yet to arrive at her falsity judgment, Mary must not only confuse literal and
See also Dimmock and Huvenes () for relevant discussion
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pragmatic content but also be blind to what the content that is in fact pragmatically
implicated by John in L is. Furthermore, Mary also takes Bob’s assertion to be about
what John’s assertion would pragmatically implicate in H. So she in fact takes him
to ascribe warranted assertability to John’s utterance. She is not aware of this, however,
because she is ignorant of the distinction between the literal and the pragmatic content
of John’s utterance.
Sceptical Paradox
Brown’s and Rysiew’s WAM also aﬀords moderate insensitive invariantism a solution
to sceptical paradox. According to moderate insensitive invariantism, premise one, ‘I
don’t know that I’m not a BIV,’ and premise three, ‘I don’t know that I have hands,’
are false. Hence the sceptical argument – ‘I don’t know that I’m not a BIV./If I don’t
know that I’m not a BIV, then I don’t know that I have hands./erefore, I don’t
know that I have hands’ – is not sound. Simply rejecting speakers’ truth judgment
of premise one, however, does not yield a satisfactory solution in Schiﬀer’s sense. It
does not explain why the argument seems to present a paradox. Adding Brown’s and
Rysiew’s WAM, moderate insensitive invariantist can explain why the argument seems
paradoxical. Premise one mentions a sceptical hypothesis and thereby introduces a
context with high epistemic standards, H. e pragmatically implicated content of
premise one in H is that the speaker cannot rule out an exceptionally wide range
of (not-not-)BIV alternatives. is implicature is true, so we come to judge premise
one as true. Premise two is true and warrantedly assertable in H (as well as in
L). e conclusion is false on the moderate invariantist view. Moreover, we seem
Dialogue (.) in chapter  involved the inter-contextual assessment of a putatively relativised truth ascrip-
tion to a knowledge claim.
(.) John: We both know that Neil Armstrong was the ﬁrst man to set foot
on the moon.
Bob: at’s true relative to this context.
Sophisticated moderate invariantists can respond to (.) in at least three ways. First, they could reject
(.) as proper data (cf. relativism’s ﬁrst reply in section .). Second, they could accept (.) but claim
that ‘relative to this context’ is vacuous, since propositional truth does not vary with any epistemically
signiﬁcant features of contexts. en they can explain Mary’s falsity judgment just like they did for
(.). ird, they could interpret Bob as making a true statement about Bob’s knowledge attribution
being warrantedly assertable in their context. (Warranted assertability conditions vary with context on the
moderate invariantist’s pragmatic story.) Hence, Mary would be wrong in her falsity judgment. is could
be explained by the combination of semantics/pragmatics confusion and pragmatic blindness that led her
to believe that John’s knowledge attribution is false. Being both ignorant of the distinction between truth
and warranted assertability and of the indexical nature of the content that John’s assertion pragmatically
implicates, she judges what John’s assertion would implicate in a H context to be false and thus thinks
Bob is wrong in his ascription.
It is not obvious to me what the warranted assertability of a conditional amounts to. e most plausible
understanding in this philosophical context seems to be that the conditional consisting of the antecedent’s
and consequent’s pragmatically implicated contents is true. For premise two of (SA), the conditional
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to have switched to a context with low epistemic standards, L, where the content
that is pragmatically implicated by the conclusion is that the speaker cannot rule out a
reasonably small range of alternative possible worlds in which she has no hands. is
strikes us as false. Were we still in H, the pragmatically implicated content would
be true, and, if pragmatic content is what our judgments are tracking, we would judge
the conclusion true. In order to explain the appearance of paradox, the sophisticated
moderate invariantist needs to claim that we switch context without being aware of the
switch, and thereby arrive at three judgments we take to be inconsistent: Premise one
is true, premise two is true, but the conclusion is false.
Importantly, this solution involves the attribution of speaker error: We are not
aware of the context-switch. Moreover, the solution must also attribute semantics/prag-
matics confusion to speakers. We come to think of the premises as true and the con-
clusion as false, and we let our intuitions concerning validity and consistency be guided
by these judgments, because we confuse what our assertions literally express with what
they pragmatically convey. And ﬁnally, we must be blind to pragmatic content. If we
were aware of the pragmatic content of the premises, which we judge to be true, we
would not ﬁnd it inconsistent with the unnegated conclusion. In sum, then, adding
Brown’s and Rysiew’s WAM allows moderate insensitive invariantists to provide a solu-
tion to sceptical paradox. But this solution commits the view to a context confusion
thesis and a pragmatic blindness thesis.
To sum up, the various data show that even a sophisticated version of moderate in-
sensitive invariantism involving a pragmatic story must charge speakers with a certain
amount of blindness. Minimally, speakers exhibit what I called semantic/pragmatics
confusion: Speakers confuse, in implausible ways, what their assertions (of knowledge
sentences) literally express and what they pragmatically convey. Moreover, data from
inter-contextual truth judgments and retraction show that sophisticated invariantists
need a stronger form of blindness I have called pragmatic blindness: Speakers are blind
to the fact that the content that their assertions (of knowledge sentences) pragmatically
implicate can vary with the epistemic standards salient at the context of utterance.
consisting of the antecedent’s and consequent’s pragmatically implicated contents in H is the following:
‘If I cannot rule out an exceptionally wide range of alternatives in which I’m a BIV, then I cannot rule out
an exceptionally wide range of alternatives in which I have no hands.’ is conditional is true if we give
it a material implication reading: Both antecedent and consequent are true. However, I ﬁnd fault with a
natural language conditional reading, on which the consequent is supposed to follow, in some intuitive
sense, from the antecedent. Not being able to rule out an exceptionally wide range of BIV-alternatives
does not seem to imply not being able to rule out an exceptionally wide range of handlessness-alternatives.
e latter range, it seems to me, might well not contain any BIV-alternatives.
Williamson () oﬀers an alternative explanation of the data that troubles moderate invariantism. In-
stead of appealing to pragmatic implicatures, Williamson gives a psychological explanation of speakers’
systematic error, appealing to the literature on heuristics and biases (e.g., in Kahneman et al. ()). A
very similar explanation is given by Hawthorne () on behalf of interest-relative invariantism. I will
discuss it in section . below.
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Sceptical insensitive invariantism is the view that the epistemic standards that one must
meet in order know are extremely high. According to Unger (, ), knowledge
implies certainty: In order to know, one must be able to eliminate, or rule out, every
possibility of falsehood (where the domain of ‘every’ is not contextually variable). As
a consequence, (nearly) all of our knowledge attributions are in fact false, contrary
to speakers’ judgments. A variant of the view claims the bar for knowledge is slightly
lower; we know little but not as little as the sceptic claims. e discussion in the present
section is intended to apply to both of these positions, although the focus will be on the
stronger version. Both versions entail that speakers are often in error about what they
know. A quick error theory might attribute the error to semantic blindness: Speakers
widely overestimate the possession of knowledge because they are blind to the semantics
of ‘know.’ In particular, they are blind to the fact that knowing entails that one is able
to eliminate every possibility of falsehood.
Instead of this rather crude and ad hoc error theory, sceptical insensitive invariant-
ists have oﬀered an explanation of speakers’ truth intuitions that exploits the distinction
between literal content (‘what is said’) and pragmatically implicated content (‘what is
meant,’ ‘what is conveyed’). I shall consider two versions, Schaﬀer’s (b) hyperbole
view and Davis’ () loose use view. Both take their cue from Unger ().
According to Schaﬀer, acceptable knowledge attributions are cases of hyperbole.
On the sceptic’s semantics, ‘I know that I have hands’ entails that I can eliminate all
possibilities of handlessness, which exaggerates the range of possibilities I can eliminate,
and which is false. Compare this with uncontentious examples of hyperbole. In saying
‘I’m dying of thirst,’ or ‘at pool is a mile long,’ we are exaggerating for eﬀect. What we
literally say is false. But where we ﬁnd the utterance acceptable, it implicates a truth,
e.g. that I am very thirsty or that that pool is very long by the contextually salient
standards. e hyperbolic eﬀect may be understood in Gricean terms as a ﬂouting of
the maxim of quality, which enjoins one to make one’s contribution true. Since what
is said is false, a hearer who takes the speaker to be cooperative will be led to infer that
the speaker intended to convey something else, namely the information most similar
to what is said which is true and makes the utterance cooperative. Similarly, when we
attribute knowledge in L by saying ‘I know that I have hands,’ what is literally said is
false, but what is meant (conveyed, implicated) is that I can eliminate those possibilities
of handlessness that are relevant in the current context. Since the current context is one
with low epistemic standards, what is meant is true. I am in a position to eliminate the
possibility that I have stumps etc. is explains why in L, we judge the knowledge
attribution true.
As Schaﬀer (b, ) points out, one may also understand hyperbole in terms of Sperber and Wilson’s
theory of Relevance. e details of either account do not make any diﬀerence to the points I wish to
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Davis () explains the basic variability of our truth judgments in terms of dif-
ferences between strict and loose usage of knowledge sentences. Consider a case of
loose use:
(.) T   
A. Wondering how hard the ﬁnal exam was, I ask Mike how long he took to
ﬁnish. He answers ‘Two hours.’ B. When Nora says that she took two hours
and four minutes to ﬁnish the exam, Mike responds ‘You took even longer than
me. It took me two hours and two minutes.’ (Davis, , )
On Davis’ account, if what Mike said in B is true, what he said in A is false. But in
A, Mike used ‘two hours’ loosely. What he meant (conveyed, implicated) is that it
took him about two hours to ﬁnish. Once the conversational purposes require more
precision in B, Mike gives more precise information. In both conversational contexts,
Mike’s utterance is perfectly appropriate. While the literal content of his utterance in
A is false, the implicated content is true.
Knowledge sentences, too, can be used loosely and strictly. Standards of strictness
vary with contexts of utterance and allow for loose usage in L contexts. While what
is said by ‘I know that I have hands’ in L is false, what is implicated is that I am
close enough to knowing for contextually salient purposes, which may well be true.
While Davis rejects the Gricean constraint that pragmatic implicatures be derivable
from the cooperative principle and the conversational maxims, he holds that loose use
still enables us to be cooperative and to eﬃciently contribute adequate information to
the conversation. When the purposes of the conversation do not require us to commit
to a subject’s knowing, it is suﬃcient to use knowledge attributions loosely and com-
municate that the subject is close enough to knowing. When the diﬀerence between
knowing and being close enough to knowing matters to the purposes of the conversa-
tion, we use knowledge attributions strictly. is explains our truth judgments in L
and our falsity judgments in H.
On both the hyperbole and the loose use account, which content is implicated
by an utterance of a knowledge sentence depends in part on the context of utterance.
(Notice the context-sensitive expressions ‘relevant in the current context’ and ‘for con-
textually indicated purposes’ in the formulation of these contents). So we can expect
sophisticated sceptical invariantism – sceptical insensitive invariantism plus one of the
make.
For the diﬀerences between hyperbole and loose use, see Davis (, ).
As the car case (ch. ) illustrates, loose uses of knowledge sentences may be more or less strict. Raising
commonplace error possibilities raises the conversational standards of strictness, so what counted as being
close enough to knowing will not do so anymore. Yet standards of strictness could be raised further. As
far as I can see, it is merely a question of convention where to draw the line between loose and strict uses.
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above pragmatic accounts – to run into trouble with some data that indexical con-
textualists struggled with. e subsequent discussion will mirror the above discussion
of moderate insensitive invariantism at points. My discussion will again focus on the
accounts’ error-theoretic commitments and leave aside other issues concerning their
linguistic plausibility.
Basic Variability
Sophisticated sceptical invariantists, just like sophisticated moderate invariantists, rely
on the distinction between a sentence’s being true or false in a context, and its being
appropriately assertable in a context. On Schaﬀer’s and Davis’ accounts, the latter is
tied up with the truth or falsity of the pragmatically implicated content, the former
with its literal content. While we can grant that speakers’ correctness judgments often
do not discriminate between truth and assertability, we should assume that they can and
will if the diﬀerence is of importance to them. In standard cases of hyperbole, speakers
may take themselves to have asserted something true by saying ‘at pool is a mile
long.’ But when challenged – ‘at can’t be! e brochure says it’s a m, long-course
competition pool’ – speakers are likely to point out that they did not mean that the
pool literally measures a mile, just that it is very long for a community pool. Likewise,
in T    above, Mike would not feel seriously challenged if his
interlocutor said ‘at can’t both be true! You cannot have taken two hours as well as
two hours and two minutes.’ On the contrary, he is likely to clarify that what he meant
before was just that it took him about two hours – two hours and two minutes, to be
exact. However, when speakers are challenged after making a knowledge attribution,
they do not tend to say ‘I didn’t mean to say that I literally know that I have hands,’
or ‘I only meant before that I am close enough to knowing given the purposes of our
conversation back then.’ If these are nonetheless cases of hyperbole or loose use,
then it must be the case that speakers are ignorant of the fact that they are engaging
in a hyperbolic, or loose, use of knowledge sentences. ey are blind to the contrast
between what they said and what they meant, or implicated. But given that speakers do
not manifest this ignorance in standard cases of hyperbole and loose use, its attribution
in knowledge attributions cases is implausible.
For further criticism of the hyperbole view, see Hawthorne (, –).
is point has been made by MacFarlane (a, ).
Schaﬀer (b,  n.) points out that hyperbole can be highly formulaic and non-obvious. But as
MacFarlane (a, ) notes, the problem is not obviousness. Even non-obvious hyperbole must be
deliberate: People would not be exaggerating if they believed what they literally say. And this deliberate-
ness guarantees that speakers, at least when pressed, can diﬀerentiate between what they said and what
they implicated. In Davis’ words: ‘In hyperbole we want hearers to notice the contrast between what was
said and meant.’ (Davis, , ) See also Hawthorne (, ).
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Retraction
Sceptical invariantists may explain speaker behaviour under challenge by pointing to
their sceptical semantics. When speakers who have made a knowledge attribution are
challenged with error-possibilities – ‘But you can’t be sure you’re not a BIV’ – they
come to realise that in fact they do not know that they have hands. So they concede
that what they said before is false, and they retract their claim. Retraction, it may seem,
is strong data in favour of sceptical invariantism.
However, sophisticated sceptical invariantism seems to lose this straightforward
explanation of retraction. Davis (, ) tells us,
Using ‘p’ loosely involves saying that p while meaning only that it is close
enough to being the case that p. In loose usage, the speaker does not
intend to commit himself to what he strictly speaking said. Hence he
cannot be criticised for being sloppy or ignorant.
If speakers using knowledge sentences loosely in L contexts never intend to commit
themselves to what they literally say – that they know that they have hands – but only to
what they mean, and if they cannot be criticised for being sloppy or ignorant, then they
should not give in so easily and concede that they were wrong. After all, they cannot
be criticised for their loose use. What they committed themselves to in the context
of utterance was only the weaker claim that they are close enough to knowing for the
purposes of their conversation at that stage. And that is still true. us, once under
pressure, speakers should be at pains to point out that what they meant is true, even if
strictly speaking, what they said is false. But if speakers do in fact use ‘know’ loosely, it
must be that they do not have recourse to such defensive replies because they are unable
to distinguish between what they said and what they meant. In other words, they are
blind to what they meant.
e same point can be made against the hyperbole variant. Surely, a speaker will
not concede error and retract her claim ‘at pool is a mile long’ after she has been
corrected. Rather, she will admit that strictly speaking, what she said is false, but she
will hasten to add that she was exaggerating and merely meant that that pool is very
long for a community pool. Yet in knowledge cases, speakers do not say that they were
exaggerating. ey retract.
Inter-contextual Truth Ascriptions
Consider once more a speaker in H who has just been convinced by sceptical con-
siderations that nobody knows that they have hands. e speaker will judge an assertion
of ‘I know that I have hands,’ made by a speaker in an ordinary L context, as false.
Sceptical invariantism predicts this judgment, if they assume that speakers’ judgments
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focus on what is said (which is false, in any context), not on what is meant (which
is true, since the utterance was made in L). However, reference to speaker error
is needed to explain falsity judgments, made in L, of knowledge denials uttered in
H. Since an utterance of ‘I don’t know that I have hands’ in H makes strict,
or non-hyperbolic, use of the negated knowledge sentence, what is said is true, and no
implicature is generated. Yet speakers in L may come to judge the knowledge denial
in H false, because they think the utterer does know that she has hands. If scep-
tical invariantists want to exploit their pragmatic story to explain these judgments, they
must claim that speakers wrongly take the knowledge denial in H to have been used
loosely, or hyperbolically, in the way it would have been in the L context. us, it
would pragmatically implicate that the speaker in H is not close enough to know-
ing for the purposes indicated in the L context. e latter implicature is false, hence
their judgment. is explanation, however, requires that speakers be ignorant of the
fact that the negated knowledge sentence in H is used strictly. is ignorance can
in part be attributed to context confusion. Because speakers confuse their own context
with the context of utterance, they take the knowledge denial to be used loosely, or
hyperbolically. It also requires that speakers are blind to what is meant. ey hear a
false implicated content being communicated where there is none.
Disagreement
Sceptical invariantism seems to oﬀer a straightforward explanation of disagreement
judgments. As long as two assertions of ‘S knows that p’ and ‘S does not know that
p’ are about the same subject, time, and proposition entertained by the subject at the
time, they literally express incompatible contents. But this account is in tension with
the sophisticated sceptical invariantist’s claim that in L, we are using ‘know’ loosely,
or hyperbolically, and our truth judgments track the pragmatically conveyed content.
For this would require that a speaker in L makes truth judgments about what know-
ledge attributions in her context pragmatically convey, but makes disagreement judg-
ments based on the (in)compatibility of the literal content of knowledge claims. But
that is implausible. A speaker who intends to engage in hyperbole by saying ‘at pool
is a mile long’ would not take herself to disagree with someone who says that the pool
is not literally one mile long. So if this is the sophisticated sceptical invariantist’s ac-
count of disagreement, she is committed to the thesis that speakers confound literal
and pragmatic content.
Perhaps sophisticated sceptical invariantists can oﬀer a better account of disagree-
ment. ey may hold that a speaker in H, uttering ‘S does not know that p,’ takes
herself to disagree with a speaker in L, who utters ‘S knows that p,’ because she
takes both utterances to be strict (or non-hyperbolic) uses, with contradictory literal
contents. A speaker in L takes herself to disagree with a speaker in H because she
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takes both utterances to be loose (or hyperbolic) uses, with contradictory pragmatically
implied contents. However, this explanation requires that speakers are confused about
each others’ contexts. ey take each others’ utterances to be used in the way that it
would be used in their own context. is ignorance of context might not seem utterly
implausible. Whenever we pedantically correct someone who has used an expression
loosely, we seem to be mistaken about standards of strictness in their conversational
context (cf. the above challenges, ‘at can’t be! e brochure says it’s a m, long-
course competition pool,’ ‘at can’t both be true! You cannot have taken two hours
as well as two hours and  minutes.’). But there is an important diﬀerence between
these cases and knowledge cases. e perceived disagreement in the pool and time
measurement case is ephemeral. It is easily, and often, dissolved by the clariﬁcation
that one of their utterances was a loose use, as in ‘I meant that the pool is very long for
a community pool,’ or ‘I meant that it took me about two hours.’ No such linguistic
moves seem available in the knowledge case. It would be utterly bizarre for the speaker
in L to point out that she does not mean to contradict the knowledge denial by
the speaker in H, since she only meant that she is close enough to knowing for her
purposes. Context confusion in the knowledge case is not ephemeral.
Inter-contextual Assessment of Truth Ascriptions to Knowledge Claims
According to sceptical invariantists, both John’s and Bob’s claims in (.) are false,
so Mary is right in judging them false. What sceptical invariantists need to explain
is why Bob’s utterance seems correct in L. is is just a case of intra-contextual
truth ascriptions, which I discussed above under the heading ‘Basic Variability.’ ere I
argued that sophisticated sceptical invariantists need to appeal to semantics/pragmatics
confusion in their explanation.
Sceptical Paradox
On sceptical invariantist semantics, sceptical arguments like (SA) are valid and sound.
ey are not paradoxical. Adding the pragmatic accounts of Schaﬀer or Davis, sceptical
invariantists can also explain why arguments like (SA) seem to present paradoxes. What
they need to explain is how we come to believe that the conclusion is false. Suppose that
Sophisticated sceptical invariantists have a range of options to account for (.). Reject it, accept it but
claim that ‘relative to this context’ is vacuous, or accept it but claim that Bob is making a true statement
about the warranted assertability of John’s knowledge attribution. e ﬁrst response is straightforward
and motivated by the same reasons as the relativist’s dismissal above. e second response is just what
sophisticated sceptical invariantism has to say about (.). On the third response, Bob is understood to
judge what John implicated, namely that they are both close enough to knowing, for the purposes of their
context, that Neil Armstrong was the ﬁrst man to set foot on the moon. is claim is true. Mary, however,
is ignorant of the distinction between truth conditions and warranted assertability conditions. Since she
focuses on the literal content of John’s assertion, she takes Bob to make a claim about the truth of John’s
assertion. at claim is false, hence her judgment.
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premise one induces a sceptical context. is leads speakers to focus on the premises’
literal contents, which are true. Once they come to the conclusion, however, they focus
on pragmatically implicated content and switch back into a L context, where ‘I don’t
know that I have hands’ is used loosely to mean ‘I am not close enough to knowing for
the indicated (lax) purposes.’ And this is false. Yet they are unaware of their switch of
context and focus and thus take (SA) to generate a paradox.
Unsurprisingly, this explanation involves context confusion. Speakers do not realise
that they switch contexts in moving from premises to conclusion. ey also do not
realise that their focus switches from literal content to pragmatically implicated content.
If they did, speakers would see that the literal contents of the premises and conclusion
are true, and thus the argument sound, while they could clarify that they took the
conclusion to mean that the speaker is not close enough to knowing for the purposes
of the context. But speakers are puzzled by (SA). is clariﬁcation is not available to
them. ey confuse literal and pragmatic content. What is more, they are blind to
the pragmatically implicated content. If the content speakers take the conclusion to
pragmatically implicate was transparent to them, they would see that its negation is not
inconsistent with the premises.
. Interest-Relative Invariantism and Supervenience-Blindness
Interest-relative invariantists, or subject-sensitive invariantists (Fantl and McGrath,
, ; Hawthorne, ; Stanley, ; Weatherson, ) hold that neither
the truth value nor the content of knowledge sentences depends on any epistemologic-
ally signiﬁcant features of the context of utterance or the context of assessment. ey
also do not supplement the invariantist semantics with an account of pragmatic im-
plicatures. However, whether or not a subject S has knowledge of the proposition that
p at a given time depends on more than just the traditional factors – whether S believes
that p, whether the proposition that p is true, whether S has good evidence, whether S is
using a reliable method, and so forth. e truth value of instances of ‘S knows [does not
know] that p’ also depends on the subject’s practical situation, including such factors
as S’s attention to counterpossibilities, interests, and stakes. Metaphysically speaking,
the attention to counterpossibilities, interests, and practical stakes of the subject at a
given time are among the things on which the knowledge relation supervenes. us,
interest-relative invariantists acknowledge that the very features to which contextualists
Not all of these authors wholeheartedly embrace subject-sensitive invariantism. Hawthorne, for instance,
seems to only give it his tentative endorsement, and Fantl and McGrath remain explicitly open towards a
contextualist implementation of their view.
Diﬀerent versions of interest-relative invariantism do not agree on all of the details here. Where the details
matter, I will focus on Stanley’s and Hawthorne’s versions of interest-relative invariantism.
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have drawn attention matter for knowledge, but they urge that it is the features of the
subject’s situation, not the attributor’s, that matter.
Basic Variability & Inter-contextual Truth Ascriptions
Interest-relative invariantism (IRI) can account for the variability in our knowledge at-
tributions in cases which diﬀer with regard to the knowing subject’s practical situation.
But it is quite obvious that IRI’s invariantist semantics does not predict that our intra-
contextual truth ascriptions to knowledge sentences vary from context of utterance to
context of utterance, while the subject’s situation does not change. Nor does IRI make
all and only the right predictions about inter-contextual truth ascriptions. As long as a
subject S’s situation at a time t remains unchanged, including S’s attention to counter-
possibilities, S’s interests and stakes, all utterances of knowledge sentences concerning
the subject S at t and the proposition that p will have the same content and truth value.
Stakes or standards in the context of utterance are irrelevant. Suppose that S’s stakes
at t are low and S is in a suﬃciently strong epistemic position to count as knowing.
en in all contexts of utterance, ‘S knows (at t) that p’ is true, and its negation is
false. Speakers in a context L will be correct in attributing knowledge to S, and
they are correct in ascribing truth to ‘S knows (at t) that p,’ no matter if it is uttered in
their own or some other context. But speakers in a context H will, pace IRI, deny
that S knows (at t) that p, and they will judge ‘S knows (at t) that p’ to be false, both
as uttered in their own context and as uttered in other contexts. So speakers whose
stakes are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from those of the subject are wrong in their knowledge
claims and truth ascriptions to knowledge claims. (I shall use ‘stakes’ to include all
the factors of attention to counterpossibilities, interests, and practical stakes, and will
use ‘L’/‘H’ to contexts with low/high stakes in this wide sense.) If no pragmatic
account is available, an error theory is needed. Attributors in H do not take into
account the stakes in the subject’s situation when these stakes are low. at is, speakers
prove to be ignorant of the fact that knowledge supervenes on the subject’s stakes. Call
this kind of error supervenience-blindness.
Hawthorne (, -) provides an ingenious explanation of our tendency to
deny knowledge when we are in H, even if the knowing subject is in a low stakes
situation and, according to IRI, does have knowledge. Psychological research on heur-
Hawthorne (, ) provides a pragmatic explanation of the fact that attributors in H do not and
cannot truly utter ‘S knows that p’ even when S’s stakes are low and S in fact knows that p. He draws
attention to the knowledge norm of assertion, according to which one should assert that p only if one
knows that p. So if an attributor in H felicitously asserts ‘S knows that p,’ she has to know that S
knows that p. Because knowledge is factive, she will then have to know that p. But since the attributor
is in H, she does not know that p, and is aware of that fact, so she cannot, and does not, felicitously
assert that p. But as MacFarlane (a, -) and Stanley (, ) point out, this only explains why
attributors in H cannot felicitously assert ‘S knows that p.’ It cannot explain why attributors in H
can felicitously assert ‘S does not know that p.’
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istics and biases shows that in our probability and frequency judgments we use a small
number of heuristics that are cognitively eﬀective, often lead to correct judgments but
equally lead to biases that skew our judgments. One such heuristic is the psycholo-
gical availability of relevant events. For instance, ‘recently experienced ﬂoods appear
to set an upward bound to the size of loss with which managers perceive they ought
to be concerned.’ For attributors in H certain not-p counterpossibilities are sali-
ent, or ‘available,’ with their raised stakes. We then tend to pessimistically overestimate
the knowledge-destroying danger of these counterpossibilities and as a result come to
deny knowledge. Moreover, Hawthorne claims, we tend to project our overestimations
of these counterpossibilities onto the subject’s position and come to also deny know-
ledge of the subject, even when the subject’s stakes are low. Call this the Psychological
Pessimism and Projection explanation of error (PPP).
Whatever its credits as a non-ad hoc explanation drawing on psychological features
for which there is independent evidence, PPP does not give a plausible explanation
of the supervenience-blindness IRI is committed to attributing to speakers. For one
thing, when subjects with a basic understanding of probability theory are shown that
and how their judgment is mistaken, they tend accept the correction. Similarly,
if attributors in H tend to pessimistically overproject their own stakes, yet were
otherwise sensitive to subjects’ stakes in their knowledge claims, they should ﬁnd it ac-
ceptable to be corrected by explicit mentioning of the subject’s stakes. Suppose we are
in H and have just judged that S (who is in L) does not know that p. en we
are told: ‘Look, there isn’t much at stake for S, so of course S knows that p.’ We would
presumably ﬁnd this correction utterly bizarre and would stand our ground. When
made explicit, we do not think the subject’s stakes matter to whether or not she knows.
is disanalogy between knowledge attribution cases and probability judgments shows
that PPP, appealing to the distorting heuristics agents use in probability judgments,
does not provide a plausible account of speakers’ blindness to the stakes-features in the
supervenience base.
For another thing, Hawthorne’s PPP only explains why attributors in H judge
that subjects in low stakes situations do not know. However, we can also imagine
attributors in L who judge that a subject in a high stakes situation knows. For
See Kahneman and Tversky () for an introduction and the articles in Kahneman et al. () and
Kahneman and Tversky () for further detail.
Slovic et al. (, ). is passage is cited by Hawthorne (, ).
Nagel (, ) develops alternative psychological explanations of the error non-sceptical invariantists
must ascribe. I learned of her work too late to discuss it in this dissertation.
ey may, under pressure, still make the same mistakes in similar cases. But this point is independent
of the fact that they accept their judgments to be corrected by proper probabilistic calculation. It is
an interesting fact, noted by Kahneman and Tversky (, ) that ‘the reliance on heuristics and the
prevalence of biases are not restricted to laymen. Experienced researchers are also prone to the same biases
– when they think intuitively.’
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instance, we may discuss in the pub whether John, currently a witness in a criminal
trial, knows that he saw his friend Bob, the main suspect, near the crime site around
the estimated time the crime was committed. We know that John said, under oath,
that he knows that he saw Bob. But when asked by the judge whether he could rule
out that he saw Bob’s younger brother Hob that night, John withdraws his claim and
says ‘I don’t know that it was Bob I saw that night.’ In the pub, it is likely that we
are unimpressed by the judges’ overly demanding standards, and, relying on former
conversations with John about what he saw, may insist that of course John knows that
it was Bob whom he saw. So even while there is a lot at stake for John – he is under oath,
and he cares about what happens to his friend – we in L attribute knowledge. But
PPP cannot explain our projection of low stakes onto a high stakes situation because it
involves that we are overly impressed with ‘available’ error-possibilities.
Before we discuss IRI’s handling of other data, it is worth noting that Stanley (,
-) has oﬀered an alternative explanation of the data from inter-contextual truth
ascriptions. According to Stanley, attributors in H have a practical interest of their
own in ﬁnding out whether the information state of the subject S in L is suﬃcient
for them to know that p. So they are in fact trying to ﬁnd out if the counterfactual ‘If S
were in our practical situation, S would know that p’ is true. eir falsity ascription to
‘S knows that p’ reﬂects their judgment of this counterfactual, in whose truth or falsity
they are interested given the practical stakes of their own situation.
Stanley (, ) claims that his error theory for IRI attributes metaphysical
error, not semantic error, and is therefore better than contextualism’s semantic blindness
theory:
[T]he contextualist explanation in terms of general semantic blindness is
considerably more disruptive to our conceptual scheme than the explanation
suggested by IRI. Semantic Blindness involves the dramatic claim that we
are blind to the semantic workings of our language, and we make errors
about the truth value of knowledge ascriptions as a result of that blind-
ness. In contrast, the explanation I have provided of High Attributor-
Low Subject Stakes is not similarly disruptive; I have not attributed to
people a new kind of hitherto unforeseen error. People ignore some of the
metaphysical determinants of knowledge, rather than being ignorant of
Another worry, pointed out by Cohen (b, ), MacFarlane (a, ), Stanley (, ),
and Schaﬀer (, -) is that Hawthorne’s Projection and Pessimism explanation overgenerates and
undermines the data that is supposed to support IRI. For if we are in the grip of pessimism and often
overestimate counterpossibilities, then we might be overestimating the stakes of a subject and deny know-
ledge to the subject even in high stakes cases that motivate IRI in the ﬁrst place. A principled account is
needed that explains why we are overly pessimistic and project in high attributor-low subject stakes cases
but not in high subject stakes cases. See also section . below. For further criticisms of PPP, see Cohen
(b, -), DeRose () and Schaﬀer (, -).
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features of their language. [. . . ] is [Stanley’s explanation of our error in
High Attributor-Low Stakes cases] is certainly an error theory, but it does
not involve imputation to agents of a hitherto unknown form of linguistic
ignorance. (Emphasis D.K.)
If Stanley is right and his point can be generalised to the claim that metaphysical er-
ror attributions are less costly than semantic error attributions, this would give IRI
a signiﬁcant edge over all views that have to attribute semantic error. But unfortu-
nately, Stanley gives no reasons why in general, semantic blindness attributions are
worse – ‘more disruptive to our conceptual scheme’ – than metaphysical blindness at-
tributions. Moreover, contrary to Stanley’s contention, his explanation does involve
the imputation of a form of linguistic blindness. When speakers in H evaluate a
knowledge attribution ‘S knows that p’ to a subject S in a situation with low practical
stakes, they systematically do not evaluate the proposition expressed by ‘S knows that p’
but instead evaluate the counterfactual proposition If S were in our practical situation,
S would know that p. Yet they seem to be unaware of this. If they were aware of the
fact that ‘S knows that p’ does not say, nor implicate, that if S were in the attributors’
practical situation, S would know that p, speakers would not make the judgments they
in fact make. So Stanley needs to attribute a form of linguistic (semantic or pragmatic)
blindness, too (cf. Schaﬀer (, )). In consequence, it seems false that Stanley’s
explanation does not impute to speakers a ‘hitherto unknown’ form of linguistic ignor-
ance. At the very least, the burden is on Stanley to show that there are other cases in
which speakers systematically treat sentences in indicative mood as if they expressed,
or implicated, counterfactual contents.
ere are further problems with Stanley’s explanation. One is that it overgenerates.
If we are likely to confuse the counterfactual with the proposition in fact expressed, we
are likely to do so in other cases, too. Stanley’s account also explains why attributors
in H deny knowledge of subjects in H. But this undermines the original data
in favour of IRI. And another problem with Stanley’s explanation is that it extends to
Low Attributor–High Subject cases, to the eﬀect that attributors should be expected
to judge in accordance with their own stakes. But they do not. Stanley does not give
an account of why in these cases, it is the subject’s high stakes that guides attributors’
judgments (cf. Schaﬀer (, )).
Stanley provides an interesting alternative explanation of the troublesome data to
Hawthorne’s PPP. Given its numerous problems, however, it does not seem to oﬀer
any signiﬁcant advantages over Hawthorne’s explanation. I will therefore continue to
discuss the prospects of IRI when supplemented with Hawthorne’s explanation.
Retraction
Hawthorne’s PPP also explains why speakers retract ﬁrst-person knowledge ascrip-
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tions for the form ‘I know that p’ once they are confronted with undermining error-
possibilities. Assume that the speaker’s stakes at t1 are such that ‘I know that p’ is true
at t1. At t2, an error-possibility is raised, which changes the speaker’s stakes. So from
t2 onwards the speaker does not any more know that p. According to IRI, however, it
is still true that the speaker knew that p at t1. So even if speakers are correct in saying,
‘Okay, so I don’t know that p,’ they have no reason to retract their earlier claim and say
‘Okay, I was wrong. I did not know that p.’ PPP explains why people retract and
deny that they knew at t1. ey project their current situation, in which the stakes are
raised, onto their earlier situation, and because they take their current situation to be
more enlightened, they let their current judgment override their earlier judgment.
Again, however, PPP commits the interest-relative invariantist to the attribution of
supervenience-blindness. From t1 to t2, the supervenience base changes. If speakers
were sensitive to the stakes feature in the supervenience base, and merely as a matter of
psychological automatism projecting their current stakes at t2 back onto t1, then they
would be receptive to correction. But it would be awkward for them to respond to
correction by saying ‘Yes, before you mentioned these error-possibilities, I did know,
but now I don’t.’ To explain the awkwardness of explicitly mentioning the eﬀect stakes
have on our knowledge, IRI requires a supervenience-blindness thesis.
Ignorant Attributor
Another case whose explanation requires the attribution of supervenience-blindness is
the situation in which the attributor is completely ignorant of the subject’s stakes. Here,
IRI predicts that the attributor should have little conﬁdence in her knowledge claims
– after all, she does not know what the subject’s stakes are. (Similarly, an attributor
would not conﬁdently attribute or deny knowledge when she does not know what the
subject’s evidence/justiﬁcation/strength of epistemic position is.) But suppose I am
asked whether my oﬃce mate John, who is present, knows that his car is parked in the
university parking lot. Notice how bizarre it would be for me to answer ‘I can’t say. Hey
Williamson (, -) notes that it is equally natural to say ‘So I was wrong. I don’t know that p after
all,’ and adds that ‘after all’ has the subtle eﬀect implying an admission of error. ‘A bomb disposal expert
might report ‘e bomb is armed’ and then, after disarming it, ‘e bomb is not armed,’ but to say ‘e
bomb is not armed after all’ in the latter circumstances would be to invite the interpretation that one was
admitting an error in the original claim.’
IRI has a straightforward explanation of retraction in ﬁrst-person cases where the stakes were in fact high
from the beginning, and the knowledge attribution was false even when it was made (perhaps because the
subject failed to see just how much was at stake for her, or she unjustiﬁedly ignored counterpossibilities).
In this case, the subject has a genuine insight into what is, and has been from the beginning, at stake and
so correctly withdraws her earlier knowledge attributions as false.
Hawthorne (, ) and Stanley (, -) point out that modal embeddings just like temporal
embeddings of knowledge sentences present a problem to IRI. We do not say things like ‘If I had been
less anxious back then, more committed to p, less worried about alternatives, I would have known p
back then,’ or ‘John knows that he won’t be able to aﬀord health insurance, but if he were discussing the
possibility that he might win the lottery, he would not know this.’
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John, how much does it matter for you right now if your car is parked in the university
parking lot?’ or ‘I can’t say. John, which counterpossibilities are you considering right
now?’ PPP might explain our conﬁdence: We project our own stakes onto the subject’s
situation. But again, our projection should not make us frown when the relevance of
the subject’s stakes is pointed out to us. To explain the oddity of the reply ‘at depends
on what’s at stake for John,’ IRI needs to appeal to supervenience-blindness.
Disagreement
IRI has a simple invariantist semantics, which is untainted by any variable pragmatic
story. So they have an easy explanation of why we take two speakers in diﬀerent contexts
to disagree when one says ‘S knows that p,’ and the other says ‘S does not know that p’:
e proposition that one speaker expresses is in conﬂict with the proposition the other
speaker expresses.
Inter-contextual Assessment of Truth Ascriptions to Knowledge Claims
IRI predicts that Mary is wrong in H in judging both John’s knowledge attribution
in (.) and Bob’s claim ‘at’s true’ in their low stakes context as false. Interest-relative
invariantists can explain Mary’s judgments by appeal to their PPP explanation of High
Attributor-Low Subject cases. Mary projects her own stakes onto John and Bob’s situ-
ation and thus judges that they do not have knowledge. Accordingly, she judges that
Bob’s truth ascription is false. Once more, however, PPP does not fully explain the
supervenience-blindness, as Mary would not be receptive to correction in the way she
would be with her judgments of probability and frequency.
Sceptical Paradox
Interest-relative invariantist do not, to my knowledge, explicitly address (SA). But it is
not diﬃcult to see what they can and should say about (SA). In considering IRI’s op-
tions for providing a fully satisfactory solution to sceptical paradox, we must distinguish
between ﬁrst-person versions of the sceptical argument (SA) and third-person versions
(see section ., or section . above). Consider ﬁrst the ﬁrst-person version, (SA),
where subject and attributor are identical (we as readers are invited to let ‘I’ refer to
ourselves). To explain (SA), interest-relative invariantists can mimic the contextualist-
Regarding dialogue (.), interest-relative invariantists have two options. ey can reject (.) as improper
data, or they can accept. If they accept it, they can explain it in the same way as they explained (.),
namely by appeal to PPP and supervenience-blindness. For IRI, ‘in this context’ will not do any signiﬁcant
work here. It might, on the one hand, refer to John and Bob’s context of utterance; then it is vacuous
since knowledge attributions, and truth ascriptions to knowledge attributions, are not context-sensitive
on IRI. ‘In this context’ might, on the other hand, refer to John and Bob’s practical situation; then it states
a feature on which John and Bob’s knowledge supervenes, just like ‘at’s true given our evidence’ does.
In either case, Bob’s claim in (.) is true and, as the latter interpretation makes obvious, an explanation
of Mary’s falsity judgment will need to attribute supervenience-blindness to Mary.
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relativist strategy and say that the ﬁrst premise raises the stakes. Hence the speaker
(reader) does not know that she is not a BIV. e stakes are now raised for the speaker’s
(reader’s) situation that encompasses the entire reasoning in (SA), which guarantees that
the argument is valid and sound. (Remember that by ‘stakes’, I am referring to factors
that include attention to counterpossibilities such as the BIV hypothesis.) However,
as speakers (readers) we ﬁnd (SA) paradoxical because in moving to the conclusion,
we somehow take the stakes to have dropped. Accordingly, we judge the conclusion
false. Yet we are unaware of our changed, mistaken conception of the stakes. at is,
we are supervenience-blind. We get puzzled because we are ignorant of the fact the
supervenience base for knowledge includes stakes-features.
e trouble with this explanation is that it seems ac hoc. How and why would we,
mistakenly and unconsciously, take the stakes in our context to suddenly be lowered?
While it is easy to raise the stakes, it is usually very hard to deﬂect the force of sceptical
considerations and lower the stakes. Of course, this is an explanatory burden that IRI
shares with all of the above accounts. But IRI already appeals to PPP, which cites a
heuristic that can skew our judgments where risk-raising considerations are psycholo-
gically available. Adding to this a psychological explanation that declares our judgments
skewed where stakes-lowering considerations are psychologically available seems to give
IRI an explanatory tool that is too powerful and moreover lacks independent evidence.
Consider next a third-person version of the sceptical argument, where the subject,
John, is absent from the attributor’s (the reader’s) speech context:
(SA) John doesn’t know that he’s not a handless BIV.
If John doesn’t know that he’s not a BIV, then John doesn’t know that he has
hands.
——————————————-
John doesn’t know that he has hands.
In (SA), the supervenience base remains unchanged, assuming that John is not in the
context in which we reason through (SA)) and the claims concern John’s epistemic
state at the same time. John is either in H or in L. If he is in H, then
the argument is sound and IRI needs to explain why it seems paradoxical to us. If
John is in L, then the ﬁrst premise and the conclusion are false, and IRI needs to
explain why we take the ﬁrst premise to be true. In both cases, a projection story is
needed. We project our stakes onto John’s situation. As we reason through (SA), we
judge the premises true (given that our supervenience base now contains high stakes).
Again, interest-relative invariantists need a diﬀerent projection story than PPP here. PPP claims that we
are overly impressed with sceptical considerations. While this explains why we judge the premises true,
it makes implausible that we would unreﬂectively let our stakes change to low stakes as we come to the
conclusion, or that we would be impressed with the judgments we frequently pass in low stakes situations.
. e Views on the Scoreboard 
Our stakes change to L as we reach the conclusion, and we thus judge it false. IRI’s
solution of third-person sceptical paradoxes, where subject and attributor are in distinct
practical situations, suﬀers from the same adhocness charge as its solution to ﬁrst-person
versions.
. e Views on the Scoreboard
It is time to summarise the ﬁndings of this chapter and put them side to side with
the results of chapter  on the scoreboard (see Table . below). e use facts on the
vertical axis include basic variability data, inter-contextual truth ascriptions, retraction,
disagreement, inter-contextual assessment of truth ascriptions to knowledge claims,
and sceptical paradox. Note that the latter category also includes epistemic closure
puzzles, as I argue in section ., although in the present chapter we focused on the
sceptical argument itself. Let me emphasise again that this list of data points is not ex-
haustive. But it represents the core data theories of knowledge attributions are expected
to explain.
Two observations from Table . bear emphasising. First, no view straightforwardly
predicts all of the data without recourse to a semantic, pragmatic, or supervenience-
blindness thesis. Most of the views even need some form of blindness for the majority of
the data. Surprisingly, perhaps, attributions of speaker error are ubiquitous. Second,
relativism is no exception, contrary to MacFarlane’s advertisement. While relativists
predict most data correctly, their account of sceptical paradoxes and epistemic closure
puzzles commits them to the attribution of assessment-index-blindness. Hence, none
of the views can aﬀord the argumentative strategy that their view is to be preferred on
the grounds that it altogether avoids the attribution of error.
Another problematic set of data for IRI is the behaviour of ‘know’ in temporal and modal embeddings.
For instance, in a given context speakers tend to apply the same epistemic standards in their judgments
of present-tense knowledge attributions and past-tense knowledge attributions. It is somewhat bizarre to
say “I don’t know that my car is parked outside, but a moment ago before I considered the possibility that
car thieves are roaming the neighbourhood, I did know that my car is parked outside.’ Similarly, it is odd
to say ‘I know that the bank is open on Saturdays, but if it was of great practical importance whether the
bank is open on Saturdays or not, I wouldn’t know it.’ Yet IRI predicts that these assertions are ﬁne, since
in the subject’s situation in the past (counterfactual situation) the stakes were low enough (high enough)
for her (not) to know. See for instance Blome-Tillmann (), DeRose (), Hawthorne (, ),
MacFarlane (a, -), and Stanley (, -) for discussion.
Note also that I have not discussed the indexical contextualist solution of sceptical paradox on which the
relativist solution in chapter  is modelled. e reader may extrapolate from the objection to relativism
that the indexical relativist solution commits the view to the attribution of content-blindness. See DeRose
() and Schiﬀer ().
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. On the Evaluation and Comparison of Blindness Attributions
e discussion in the present and previous chapter contained error-theoretic objec-
tions against indexical and nonindexical contextualism, relativism, and sophisticated
versions of invariantism. Together these objections show that all views are stuck with
the attribution of some error to account for some data. If we want to make a reasoned
decision between the views, we need to need to distinguish the objections by their force.
We need to get clear about how to evaluate and compare the attribution of diﬀerent
kinds of error, or blindness. In this section, I oﬀer ﬁve criteria for the evaluation of
attributions of diﬀerent kinds of error.
Before we look at the criteria, it will be instructive to register the responses to error-
theoretic objections that are available to all theories of knowledge attributions.
. Argue that error attributions are a theoretical cost that is favourable to the costs
incurred by other views
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. Make error plausible by ﬁnding precedents
. Make error plausible by providing an independently motivated psychological
explanation of the error
. Argue that every theory must attribute error
e ﬁrst strategy is one that I will deliberately bracket here. Clearly, the attribution of
error may be an acceptable cost in light of a view’s other theoretical virtues, especially
if the view outranks all competitors with regard to these virtues. e importance of
empirical adequacy as one theoretical virtue among others is an issue to which theorists
in the debate take diﬀerent attitudes. e goal of my discussion here is to provide
grounds for the adjudication between views purely in terms of how they fare with re-
spect to their empirical predictions about use.
e second strategy of ﬁnding precedents of the attributed error in the use of ex-
pressions that allegedly exhibit the same semantic or pragmatic features is has been
popular with indexical contextualists. Precedence is one of the evaluative criteria
below, so I postpone the discussion of this strategy.
Hawthorne’s PPP is an instance of the third strategy. We will come back to psy-
chological explanations below.
e fourth strategy is employed for instance by DeRose (, -) in defence of
indexical contextualism. DeRose argues that while the attribution of semantic blind-
ness is undesirable, it is a commitment that invariantist theories incur as well. ‘Either
way, many speakers are ‘bamboozled by their own words.” (DeRose, , ) e
fourth strategy is also the one I have been pursuing on the relativist’s behalf in this
chapter. But pointing out that every theory is subject to the same problem is not
suﬃcient as an argument in favour of a view over the competition. e view’s error
attribution must also be shown to be less implausible than the competition’s error the-
ories. DeRose, for one, seems pessimistic about the prospects of arguing in favour of
the attribution of one kind of blindness over another:
For instance, Stanley (, -) rejects slavish adherence to empirical adequacy: ‘e fact that IRI
[Stanley’s version of IRI] gives a charitable explanation for all intuitions except High Attributor–Low
Subject Stakes is not a prima facie concern for the interest-relative invariantist. Recall that these intuitions
are not intended simply to be data for an epistemological theory, as the grammaticality of various sentences
may be taken to be data for a syntactic theory. Rather, the role of my appeal to our intuitions about these
particular cases is to make vivid our commitment to the conceptual connections between knowledge and
practical reasoning.’
Among the other theoretical virtues, theoretical simplicity is surely crucial. One metatheoretical prin-
ciple along these lines can be found in Grice, dubbed the Modiﬁed Occam’s Razor: ‘Senses are not to
be multiplied beyond necessity.’ (Grice, , ) In a more general fashion, Schaﬀer (b, -)
cites as a principle of ‘standard linguistic methodology’: ‘Linguistic machinery should not be complicated
without necessity.’
For speciﬁc desiderata for theories of knowledge attributions beyond the explanation of our usage, see
for instance Hawthorne (, -).
See for instance Blome-Tillmann (), Cohen (b, a), and Schaﬀer and Szabo (forthcoming).
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ere may be some reason for thinking it’s more problematic to suppose
that many speakers are blind to the context-sensitivity of their own words
than to suppose that many are blind to the context-insensitivity of their
own words. But it’s not easy to see how to give any credible argument for
such an asymmetry, and it’s perhaps best not to stretch to anticipate how
such an argument might go. (DeRose, , )
I am less pessimistic. Error attributions, I would like to suggest, can be evaluated with
respect to the following ﬁve criteria.
C         
. P: Can the kind of error be found in other other areas of thought
and talk?
. Q   : How cognitively serious is the error?
. P  : How much data is explained only by appeal to error?
. S: Does the error theory explain those and only those kinds of cases for
which it is needed?
. E: If a psychological/cognitive explanation of the kind of blindness
is oﬀered, how good an explanation is it?
Let me illustrate these criteria by way of examples.
P. Schiﬀer () argued against indexical contextualism that the attri-
bution of what I call content-blindness to speakers is implausible because speakers are
not prone to the same kind of error in their use of other indexical expressions. e dia-
gnosed error is implausible because it lacks precedents of the right kind. Indeed, sev-
eral authors have attempted to defend contextualism’s attribution of content-blindness
by arguing that the same error is found with expressions whose semantic workings are
similar to ‘know.’ us Cohen (b, a) and Blome-Tillmann (), under-
lining the similarity between ‘know’ and gradable adjectives, point out that similar use
patterns occur with ascriptions of ﬂatness or emptiness and that contextualist theories of
gradable adjectives must attribute the same kind of error as contextualism about ‘know.’
Schaﬀer and Szabo (forthcoming) argue in defence of contextualism that while speak-
ers’ use of core indexicals and gradable adjectives fails to exhibit patterns of blindness,
the similarity in use and blindness patterns between adverbial quantiﬁers, epistemic
modals and ‘know’ supports their claim that ‘know’ shares the A-quantiﬁcational fea-
tures of these expressions.
Similarly, Schaﬀer (, ) objects to Stanley’s semantic error explanation of High Attributor-Low
Subject Cases (cf. section .) that this error has no precedents. ‘At least, some independent evidence is
needed that we actually are prone to such confusions.’ (Emphasis D.K.)
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One has to be careful with P as a criterion for evaluating the plausibility
of a theory’s error attributions. Whether or not the existence of precedent error makes
its attribution more plausible depends on the independent evidence we have for the
presence of the semantic or pragmatic mechanism in the type of expression after which
‘know’ is modelled. For instance, if it turns out that ‘know’ and adverbial quantiﬁers
share certain patterns of use that contextualist theories do not correctly predict, then
the error attributions the contextualist needs for the use of ‘know’ are only made more
plausible if there is independent strong evidence in favour of contextualism about grad-
able adjectives or adverbial quantiﬁers. ere might very well be. But if not: Two bad
theories do not make one good theory.
Q   . Indexical and nonindexical contextu-
alists are each committed to attributing speaker error in cases where speakers retract
earlier knowledge attributions in light of error-possibilities. us, these views predict
that John is systematically mistaken in saying ‘I guess I don’t know that my car is
parked in the driveway. But what I said before is true./But when I said before that I
do know it, I spoke truly.’ To explain retraction, nonindexical contextualists ascribe
use-index-blindness, according to which speakers are blind to the fact that the truth
of the contents of knowledge sentences depends on the epistemic standards salient in
the context of utterance. Indexical contextualists ascribe content-blindness, according
to which speakers are blind to what they said – the content of their knowledge at-
tribution. Are both error attributions equally (im)plausible? It might be argued that
content-blindness involves a graver cognitive error to speakers. Not only are they wrong
about the truth or falsity of their earlier knowledge claim, they are also mistaken about
what they were saying.
It should be noted that Q   , like any other
criteria, cannot be used in isolation to deliver a verdict. Prima facie the attribution of
a more serious cognitive malfunctioning is less plausible than the attribution of a less
serious cognitive malfunctioning. But this need not be the case if there is compelling
independent evidence for the presence of the more serious malfunctioning.
P  . Here we can simply take a look at the scoreboard. For how
many data points is the error theory needed? We can see that, for instance, nonindex-
ical contextualism attributes a less pervasive blindness than, say, sophisticated sceptical
invariantism. What does this tell us about the plausibility of an error attribution? On
the one hand, there is MacFarlane’s ‘general problem’ that ‘the more error we attribute
to speakers, the less we can conclude from these facts [about speakers’ use of ‘know’].
(MacFarlane, a, ) Clearly, an all-pervasive error theory leaves little evidence in
favour of a view. On the other hand, a simple the less, the better verdict might not always
be right. It might lend plausibility to an error theory that similar cases are accounted
for by appeal to the same kind of blindness. In the same vein, if a kind of blindness
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is needed to account for only one or two data points, one might wonder why speakers
do not seem susceptible to the same kind of error in very similar kinds of cases. Like
the other criteria, pervasion of error cannot adjudicate between kinds of blindness in
isolation from the other criteria.
S. Where a view provides a substantial error theory, the latter should explain
speakers’ use in all and only those cases where the view otherwise makes incorrect pre-
dictions. ere are two ways in which the attribution of error can fail to have the right
scope.
(i) Overgeneration: e attribution of a kind of blindness explains more than those
kinds of cases for which it is designed. Schaﬀer (, -), for instance, points out
that Hawthorne’s PPP for High Attributor-Low Subject cases equally provides explan-
ations for the original data that motivated IRI (the ‘High’ cases in which subject and
attributor are both in high-stakes contexts). is undermines the support for IRI:
‘[T]he sort of projection error Hawthorne has in mind would equally explain away any
residual intuition we have to deny knowledge to the subject in the original High. Per-
haps the high-stakes subject does know [pace IRI’s prediction], but we intuit otherwise
because we overestimate the possibility that he is at risk. is would thus undermine
the original case for IRI.’
(ii) Undergeneration: e attribution of a kind of blindness does not explain all of
the cases for which it is needed. For instance, it might explain the original cases it is
designed for but does not cover slightly modiﬁed cases for which the view also makes
incorrect predictions. us, Schaﬀer argues against Hawthorne’s PPP that it cannot
explain a High Attributor-Low Subject case in which it is part of the case’s description
that the subject, Sam, ‘has little at stake.’ Schaﬀer writes:
In the case as described it is quite clear that only you are at risk of bank-
ruptcy. Sam is safe. We can test for this by asking both whether Sam
knows and whether Sam is at risk. If you answer that Sam does not know
and is not at risk, then your basis for denying him knowledge cannot be
the sort of projection error Hawthorne posits. (Schaﬀer, , )
E. is last criterion is admittedly vague. What makes for a good psy-
chological explanation is a complicated question I cannot hope to answer here. Gen-
eral epistemic virtues such as empirical correctness, simplicity, testability, fertility, and
conservativeness are certainly relevant. For our purposes, it may suﬃce to record that
the plausibility of an error attribution that is based on a particular psychological ex-
planation of the error will depend on the plausibility of that story as a psychological
explanation.
Schaﬀer attributes this objection to Williamson (). See also Cohen (b, ), MacFarlane (a,
-), and Stanley (, ). Schaﬀer also presents a similar overgeneration objection to Stanley’s
semantic blindness explanation (Schaﬀer, , ).
. Relativism Rescued? 
Unfortunately, there is no simple algorithm that takes us from some views’ per-
formance with respect to these criteria to a clear ranking of the views. ere are two
obstacles. e ﬁrst is that it is far from clear how to weigh the criteria against each
other. To illustrate, suppose that a view does well on all criteria except S, because
it overgenerates signiﬁcantly. Is that view to be preferred to a view that does well on
all criteria except P, because the attributed error is hitherto unforeseen? Or
is a high score on P to be considered more important than a high score on
S? Second, decision-making is hampered by the fact that whether or not a view
fares well with respect to a criterion can sometimes not be answered in isolation from
other criteria. For instance, we saw above that some theoryT that needs to posit error
for only a few data points (P) may seem preferable to a theory T that posits
error for a signiﬁcantly larger range of data points because T simply leaves more empir-
ical evidence that supports it. But if T can be combined with a plausible psychological
explanation (E) that supports all and only the data points it is needed for
(S), whereas it would not explain why the error occurs only in the cases in which
theory T posits error, T’s higher pervasion of error does not make the theory less
plausible. It will thus be a delicate question, and one on which theorists may disagree,
how to interpret and weigh the criteria in any given case.
. Relativism Rescued?
At last, let me use these criteria to sketch a strategy of defence for relativism. Before
I do so, a caveat is in order. Even though the argument for relativism is one for the
plausibility of its error attribution relative to the error attributions of the competing
views, I cannot hope to give a fair evaluation of each competing view that makes re-
lativism’s superiority obvious. I can only give comparative hints and suggest how the
case for relativism will go. I will go through the criteria in their opposite order.
On E. Relativists have not given a psychological explanation of index-
blindness. I will not be able to present a full error theory on behalf of relativism here.
is would require an explanation ofwhy otherwise competent speakers are index-blind
in sceptical paradox and epistemic closure cases. In the meantime, then, a verdict on
E will have to wait.
On S. Relativists have recourse to index-blindness to explain all and only scep-
tical paradoxes and epistemic closure cases. Does their explanation under- or overgen-
erate? Again, this question cannot be answered before relativists provide a speciﬁc ex-
planation of why index-blindness occurs in these cases. e prospects of such an ex-
planation vis-a-vis S will depend on whether or not it explains the error by appeal
to facts about our cognitive processes that can be found in cases like (SA) but not in
other cases where relativism predicts no error.
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On P  . Relativists need index-blindness only in their account
of sceptical paradoxes and epistemic closure puzzles. In comparison, every competitor
theory needs a blindness thesis for a variety of data. If less (pervasive error) is better,
then relativists have by far the best record on P  . ere is a lot of
data that supports the relativist view, for which competitors need error theories.
As pointed out, there is some reason not to evaluate P   in isola-
tion from other criteria such as S. Overall, an error theory that provides a convin-
cing explanation of why errors would be committed in just the relatively large range of
cases may be more plausible than an error theory that makes it a mystery why speakers
would systematically fail to get it right only in particular kinds of cases. Since relativists
have not provided a full error theory, the ﬁnal judgment on P   must
wait. In the meantime, relativists are at no disadvantage. Most views have not given
full error theories either, and where they did (PPP), it signiﬁcantly over- and undergen-
erated and so did not support the pervasion of error IRI is committed to attributing.
On Q   . To impute index-blindness to speak-
ers is to specify the kind of error involved, but it is not to explain why this error occurs,
nor is it to give an account of the potential cognitive malfunctioning involved. As long
as such an explanation is wanting, it is diﬃcult to reach a verdict regarding Q
  .
In absence of a full error theory, however, one point can be made. Relativists need
to explain why error occurs with sceptical paradoxes and epistemic closure puzzles. So
it is likely that in the explanation, speciﬁc facts about whatever is going on in our
reasoning of (SA) and similar cases are important. But all theories are united in their
need to explain some error or other being performed by competent speakers in cases
like (SA). So it is likely that all theories will refer to these facts in their fully worked-out
error theories. Moreover, if it is correct that content-blindness is indicative of a greater
cognitive shortcoming than index-blindness, the relativist has a prima facie plausible
case that the cognitive shortcoming they have to posit is less serious than, for instance,
the one indexical contextualist must posit.
On P. In section ., I argued that the attribution of index-blindness
is implausible because there seem to be no precedents. Less controversial forms of
index-sensitivity, time- and world-index-sensitivity, pose no similar challenge to speak-
ers. Relativism’s score on P looks bad. It is not clear, however, whether
its score is worse than other views’ score on P. Let us consider indexical
contextualism and let us grant for the moment that Blome-Tillmann and Cohen (or
Schaﬀer and Szabo) succeed in showing that a lot of the error patterns with ‘know’
are also manifest in our use of gradable adjectives (or A-quantiﬁcational expressions
such as epistemic ‘might’ or adverbs like ‘always’). Remember that the only error the
relativist has to attribute is error arising from sceptical paradoxes and epistemic closure
. Relativism Rescued? 
puzzles. Do gradable adjectives (A-quantiﬁers) cause the same appearance of paradox
with competent speakers as ‘know’ does? It seems doubtful. Consider (SAF).
(SAF) is lab desk isn’t ﬂat. It’s got some bumps.
If this lab desk isn’t ﬂat, then that meadow isn’t ﬂat.
—————————
at meadow isn’t ﬂat.
(SAF) resembles the original (SA) in relevant respects. Premise one raises the standards
for ﬂatness, premise two is an indicative conditional with negated ﬂatness ascriptions
in antecedent and consequent, and the conclusion follows by modus ponens. Con-
textualists may want to argue that (SAF) causes puzzlement just as (SA) does. at is,
competent speakers who feel the pull of the argument may worry that accepting the
conclusion is in conﬂict with a lot of their everyday ﬂatness ascriptions and may as a
result want to deny the conclusion while still accepting the premises. I actually doubt
that (SAF) causes this puzzlement in competent speakers. But even if it does, there is
still a diﬀerence between the two arguments. Speakers have simple resources to resolve
the conﬂict they may feel between accepting the conclusion in the context of (SAF) and
denying it in ordinary contexts. It is natural to clarify one’s acceptance of the conclu-
sion in (SAF) by modifying it: ‘Well, that meadow isn’t ﬂat by the standards needed
in the lab, but it’s perfectly ﬂat by normal standards,’ or ‘at meadow isn’t ﬂat for a
lab desk, but it is ﬂat for a meadow.’ In contrast, similar modiﬁers for ‘know’ are not
naturally available to competent speakers. It takes thorough exposure to epistemology
to not balk at an assertion of ‘Well, I don’t know that I have hands by strict standards,
but I perfectly know it by ordinary standards.’ But if this is so, indexical contextualists
still owe proper precedents for the systematic error arising from cases of sceptical para-
dox. ese are the only the cases for which the relativist lacks precedents of error. It is
hence not clear whether the relativists is worse oﬀ than the indexical contextualist.
In sum, relativism has prima facie advantages over the competition regarding P-
  , seems to stand a good chance of scoring at least as high as, say, in-
dexical contextualism on Q   , and does no worse
than indexical contextualism with respect to P. A full defence of relativism
with respect to the error attributions it needs to make will require an explanation of
why speakers systematically manifest index-blindness in sceptical paradox cases. An ex-
planation of this kind is likely to appeal to speciﬁc facts about sceptical paradox cases.
Since all views need to explain some error or other in these cases, the need for such an
explanation puts relativism at no disadvantage.
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. Conclusion
Chapters  and  together provide an argument that all theories of knowledge attribu-
tions – relativist, contextualist, or invariantist – make some incorrect empirical predic-
tions. None of the views escaped attributing error to speakers in their account of the
problematic data. I identiﬁed the kinds of error each view is committed to attributing
to competent speakers. In particular, I argued that even sophisticated versions of invari-
antism that provide pragmatic explanations of the data are stuck with the attribution
of what I called pragmatic blindness.
e fact that all views attribute error left us with the need to evaluate and com-
pare the views’ error theories and the kinds of error they involve. Despite the ubiquity
and importance of error-theoretic objections in the debate on knowledge attributions,
clarity on such evaluative criteria has been wanting. I suggested ﬁve criteria, which I
labelled P, Q   , P  -
, S, and E. While these criteria do not quite provide an algorithm
for our decision process between views inﬂicted with error theories, they help us get
clearer on the force of error-theoretic objections and provide us with ﬁrmer grounds
for a reasoned decision. I concluded on a positive note for relativism, suggesting that
pending a full error theory, relativism does not fare worse than competing views on
many criteria.
Part II




PERSPECTIVE IN CONTEXT: SEQUENCED WORLDS
. Introduction
ere is, or appears to be, a conﬂict between, on the one hand, the perspectival nature
of many of our attitudes and, on the other hand, the received picture of linguistic
communication. According to this picture, there is a single content which the speaker
believes, expresses in speech, and which hearers come to believe if they understand
and trust the speaker. But it is diﬃcult to see how this picture ﬁts with a natural
account of two kinds of perspectival attitudes: so-called de se attitudes, i.e. attitudes
about oneself, and attitudes about ‘subjective’ matters such as personal taste, like the
belief that liquorice is tasty. According to this account, mental attitudes have so-called
centered content – roughly, content whose truth depends on an individual at a world
and time. I will argue that the conﬂict between the received picture of communication
and the centered content view of perspectival attitudes can be resolved without giving
up either of these attractive views. e solution I will propose is a uniﬁed theory of
mental attitudes and linguistic communication on which content is modelled not in
terms of centered worlds but as a set of sequenced worlds – roughly, possible worlds that
are ‘centered’ on a sequence of individuals at a time.
It has long been argued that de se attitudes – attitudes about oneself – are a dis-
tinctive category of thought, irreducible to either de dicto or de re thought. On Lewis’s
elegant and inﬂuential proposal, the content of a thought one would express by using
the words ‘I am hungry’ is a set of centered worlds, where a centered world is a possible
world ‘centered’ on an individual at a time. To believe that I am hungry is to locate
oneself in the set of centered worlds whose center is hungry. A number of philosoph-
ers and linguists have recently argued that the content of thoughts about ‘subjective’
matters such as personal taste must also be understood as centered content. To believe
that liquorice is tasty is to locate oneself in the set of centered worlds to whose center
liquorice tastes good.
How do we communicate these self-locating beliefs? e standard picture of com-
munication says, very roughly, that we exchange information by simply passing it on,
from speaker’s head to hearer’s head. But this widely endorsed picture is in conﬂict
See, for instance, Casta~neda (, ), Perry (, ), and Lewis (a)
See, for instance, Egan et al. (), Egan (, a), Lasersohn () and Stephenson (a)

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with self-locating belief. If I believe that I am hungry, and I say to you, ‘I am hungry,’
you do not come to believe the content I believe. For that would be for you to believe
that you are hungry. Instead you come to believe another content, namely that I am
hungry.
e conﬂict at hand suggests that we reject either the natural standard picture of
communication or the elegant Lewisian account of self-locating belief. In this chapter,
I will argue that neither is necessary. I will begin by stating the self-locating account
of belief and other attitudes (x.), the received picture of linguistic communication
(x.), and the conﬂict between these two views (x.). en I will develop the se-
quenced worlds framework in a broadly Stalnakerian picture of communication, and I
will show that it aﬀords an attractive reconciliation of the two views (xx.–.). I will
give a semantics for predicates of personal taste and for personal pronouns that yields
the desired sequenced worlds content in communication (xx., .). I will then turn
to a brief discussion of competing solutions to the conﬂict (x.) and will close by an-
swering objections to the sequenced worlds account (x.). In chapters  and , I will
introduce relativist and contextualist versions of the model and the empirical data on
which a decision between these versions turns, and I will explore some of the pragmatic
and semantic details of the sequenced worlds model.
. Centered Content
.. Attitudes De Se
De se attitudes are thoughts about oneself when one thinks about oneself in the ﬁrst-
person way. ey are thoughts one would typically express with a sentence containing
a st-personal pronoun (‘I’, ‘me’, ‘my’).  David Lewis famously argued that the objects
of de se attitudes are (or determine) not possible worlds propositions but sets of centered
worlds. At least three kinds of motivation have been given for the distinctiveness of de
se thoughts – that is, for the irreducibility of de se attitudes to either de dicto or de re
attitudes. Let me quickly rehearse what I consider the strongest motivation: similarity
arguments (to borrow Egan’s (b) term).
De se attitudes are often understood in a wider sense to include de nunc attitudes – thoughts about one’s
location in time such as the thought that the meeting starts now – and thoughts about one’s location in
space such as the thought that this is the Mt. Tallac trail. For simplicity, I will here focus on the narrow
class of de se attitudes that are characteristically expressed by using st-personal pronouns.
e second type of considerations in favour of a distinctive category of de se thought come from arguments
that purport to show that while one may know all relevant standard (possible worlds) propositions, one
may still lack knowledge about oneself (see for instance Lewis’s (a) two gods case and Perry’s ()
case of Lingens in the Stanford Library). e third kind of motivation comes from the semantics of
attitude verbs like ‘expect,’ ‘want,’ and ‘imagine’ that take inﬁnitival complement clauses as in ‘Joe wants
to meet Obama.’ eir truth conditions have been shown to be sensitive to the ascription of de se attitudes
(see, e.g., Morgan () and Chierchia ()).
. Centered Content 
Mad Heimson believes that he is Hume, a belief he would express by saying ‘I
am Hume.’ Hume, of course, also believed of himself that he is Hume. Hume and
Heimson share a belief, they are doxastically similar, which explains similarities in their
actions (given that their desires and background beliefs are similar). ey introduce
themselves as ‘David Hume,’ get angry when they hear Hume being badmouthed, sign
with ‘David Hume,’ and so on. But there is no relevant possible worlds proposition that
both Heimson and Hume believe that would explain this doxastic similarity. Why not?
Heimson and Hume are worldmates. So any candidate possible worlds proposition is
either true at their world or false at their world. If it is true, then both Heimson and
Hume have a true belief. If it is false, both Heimson and Hume have a false belief. But
Hume is right in believing that he is Hume because he is Hume. Heimson is wrong in
so believing. So the shared object of their beliefs, which explains their similarities in
action, cannot be a possible worlds proposition.
Lewis concludes that the shared object of Heimson’s and Hume’s beliefs is the prop-
erty being Hume, which each of them self-ascribes. Equivalently, the object of their
beliefs is the centered content that is the set of centered worlds whose center is Hume.
A centered world is a possible world ‘centered’ on an individual inhabiting the world
at some time. Just like possible worlds can be understood as ways the world might
be, centered worlds can be understood as ways one might be in the world, as possible
locations in logical space, or as perspectives one might have. Formally, a centered world
can be represented by an ordered triple hw; t; xi consisting of a world w, a time t, and
an individual x inhabiting w at t. e triple determines the individual’s spatiotem-
poral location in w and every other fact concerning the individual in w at t, including
her attitudes towards matters of taste. I will also sometimes speak of an individual x’s
location determined by the triple hw; t; xi as x’s perspective (in w at t). Intuitively, a
perspective is a subject’s viewpoint, which includes where she is, what the distance is to
things around her, what she can see from her position, as well as what she thinks and
feels about things.
On a standard possible worlds account, one’s overall belief state determines a set of
possible worlds, the possible worlds compatible with what one believes. Analogously,
on the centered worlds account, one’s overall belief state determines a set of centered
worlds, the set of centered worlds compatible with what one believes. A centered world
Perry (, ) draws the lesson that Hume and Heimson believed diﬀerent propositions and that
their doxastic similarity was to be accounted for by their shared ‘belief state’ – roughly, the ﬁrst-personal
mode of presentation of the propositions. For reasons to prefer Lewis’s analysis over Perry’s account, see
Lewis (a, -, -).
e term centered world was originally coined by Quine ().
Alternatively, a centered world can be represented by an ordered quintuple hw; x; y; z; ti of a possible
world w and the space-time coordinates x, y, z, t. For some metaphysical diﬀerences between the two
conceptions of centered worlds underlying these ways of picking them out as well as for some problems
of each conception, see Liao ().
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hw; t; xi is compatible with what one believes iﬀ one’s beliefs do not rule out the possib-
ility that one is x in w at t. One believes a centered worlds content p iﬀ every centered
world compatible with what one believes is contained in p. Hume believes that he is
Hume iﬀ every centered world compatible with what he believes is a member of
(.) HUME : fhw; t; xi: x is Hume in w at tg.
His belief in HUME at some time t1 is correct iﬀ in addition, his actual location at t1,
h@; t1;Humei, is a member of HUME.
Lewis speaks of belief as self-ascription of properties. On centered worlds talk,
belief is self-location in a set of centered worlds. Since properties correspond to sets of
centered worlds, we will switch back and forth between these two ways of talking.
On the centered worlds account, all attitudes have centered content. However, not
all centered contents are de se contents. Following Egan’s (, ) terminology, we
can call a centered content p boring if it does not distinguish between locations in a
world. More precisely, p is boring iﬀ for every world w and pairs ht1; xi, ht2; yi such
that individual x inhabitsw at time t1 and y inhabitsw at t2, p contains hw; t1; xi iﬀ it
contains hw; t2; yi. Because boring centered contents distinguish between worlds but
not between locations in a world, they are equivalent to possible worlds contents. De
se contents do distinguish between locations in a world. ey are interesting. A centered
content p is interesting iﬀ there is a world w and pairs ht1; xi, ht2; yi of individuals
inhabiting w at times t1 and t2, respectively, such that p contains hw; t1; xi and does
not contain hw; t2; yi.
A quick note on belief de re. For Lewis (a), belief de re is ‘other-ascription’ of
properties and receives a descriptivist analysis in terms of self-ascription. Very roughly,
to believe de re of Goethe that he is the author of Faust is (i) to be uniquely acquainted
with Goethe in a particular way and (ii) to self-ascribe the property of being uniquely
thusly acquainted with someone who is the author of Faust. For simplicity, I will try
to avoid talk of attitudes de re. Where needed, I will depart from Lewis and adapt a
standard non-Lewisian analysis on which the content of the belief that Goethe is the
author of Faust is the boring centered worlds content fhw; t; xi: Goethe is the author
of Faust in w at tg.
Here, ‘@’ denotes the actual word.
A property determines its extension at possible worlds and times. Given a world and time, it determines
the set of individuals that instantiate the property at that world and time. A property can thus be thought
of as a function from worlds and times to sets of individuals. is function is equivalent to a function
from world-time-individual triples to truth values. e set characterised by the latter function is a set of
world-time-individual triples hw; t; xi such that x instantiates the property at t in w (cf. Lewis (a,
)).
See Nolan (), however, for objections to the claim that one can do with centered worlds whatever
one can do with possible worlds.
. Centered Content 
.. Attitudes Towards ‘Subjective’ Matters
Egan et al. (), Egan (, a), Lasersohn () and Stephenson (a)
have recently argued that attitudes towards ‘subjective’ matters like personal taste are
best understood as having interesting centered contents, too. Intuitively, the truth of
claims about what is tasty, fun, or entertaining depends not just on what the objects
concerned are like, but on some subject not made explicit. e degree to which we
diﬀer in our beliefs about matters of taste seems to support this subjective dimension
of taste judgments and stands in stark contrast to the convergence in the judgments
about objective matters which we pass with comparable conﬁdence. On the centered
worlds account, to believe that some cookie is tasty is to locate oneself in the set of
centered worlds to whose center the cookie tastes good:
(.) COOKIE : fhw; t; xi: the (contextually salient) cookie tastes good to x in w at
tg.
COOKIE is the set of centered worlds to whose center the cookie in question tastes
good; it is the set of perspectives on which the cookie in question tastes good. COOKIE
can be true of one person but false of another. If the cookie happens to taste good to
Ben, he is right in believing COOKIE, while Anna is wrong in believing COOKIE, if
the cookie does not taste good to her. COOKIE is an interesting centered content.
In self-ascription talk, to believe COOKIE is to self-ascribe the property of being an
x such that the cookie tastes good to x. Just what the property is that I am self-ascribing
when I believe of something that it is tasty is a substantial question. e options Egan
(a) discusses include being disposed to enjoy this cookie, having gustatory capacities
and sentiments that are robustly disposed to interact with this cookie in a way that produces
gustatory experiences of an intrinsically desirable sort, being someone whose suitably idealised
self would be disposed to enjoy this cookie, and being a member of a group typical members
of which are disposed to enjoy this cookie. I will here remain neutral on the metaphysics
of tastiness – on the question of what experiencer and experienced object have to be
like for the object to be tasty to the experiencer.
Egan et al., Egan, Lasersohn and Stephenson have coupled their pledge for centered
worlds content with a relativistic semantics for predicates of personal taste such as ‘tasty’
and ‘fun.’ I will turn to semantic questions in section . below.
.. Egocentricity and Other Similarities
ere are important diﬀerences between de se beliefs and beliefs about matters of per-
sonal taste. For the moment, however, notice their similarities. Crucially, both kinds of
belief are beliefs in interesting centered contents and follow an egocentric belief norm:
E Believe p only if you yourself are correctly located by p.
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Importantly, E requires only the believer’s correct location to be con-
tained in p. An agent’s de se belief that she is hungry is correct as long as that agent
is hungry, even if she were to be the only person in logical space ever to be hungry.
Similarly, an agent appropriately believes that some cookie is tasty as long as she herself
is such that the cookie tastes good to her, even if she were the only person ever to enjoy
its taste.
E also applies to belief in boring centered contents, even though
intuitively, the appropriateness of one’s belief that, say, snow is white depends on more
than just one’s own location. However, an agent is correctly located by a boring centered
content if and only if she and all of her worldmates are correctly located by it. us
it is only the appropriateness of believing interesting centered contents that depends
merely on the location of the attitude holder.
e ﬁrst-person orientation of beliefs about taste explains the general availability
of the inference from a belief that X is tasty to a belief that X is tasty to me. e inference
is available because on the view, my belief that some food is tasty entails my belief that
the food is tasty to me. In fact, on the centered worlds framework, the beliefs have the
same content, viz. fhw; t; xi: the food is tasty to x in w at tg.
In addition to the interestingness of content and the egocentricity of belief, de
se attitudes and attitudes about taste also have in common an account of believing
alike in terms of shared content. When Ben and Anna each believe, I am hungry, their
similar disposition to act is explained by the shared interesting centered content of their
beliefs. Likewise, when they each believe, is wine is tasty, they are disposed to similar
behaviour (given similar background beliefs and desires); they are reaching for their
glass frequently, will not refuse a reﬁll, etc. eir similar disposition can be explained
by their believing alike, which is accounted for by the shared content: fhw; t; xi: the
(contextually salient) wine is tasty to x in w at tg.
e most important diﬀerence between the two kinds of interesting centered con-
tents concerns their role in communication. We will turn to this diﬀerence in section
.. At the level of mental attitudes, one diﬀerence is worth pointing out. ere is
a second notion of believing alike, captured in agreement reports regarding people’s
beliefs, which sets de se attitudes apart from taste attitudes. When Ben and Anna both
believe, is wine is tasty, we can report that they agree that the wine is tasty. But
when they both believe, I am hungry, there is nothing they agree about, despite the
On the sequenced worlds analysis of belief I propose in section ., my belief that X is tasty entails the belief
that X is tasty to me but the two beliefs need not have the same content. e analysis distinguishes between
belief in a solitary context and belief in a conversational context. In a solitary context, my beliefs that X
is tasty and that X is tasty to me have the same content. But in a conversational context, the beliefs will
not have identical contents (on one natural way of understanding identity of contents in the framework).
However, even in a conversational context, the content of my belief that X is tasty entails the content of
my belief that X is tasty to me, thereby explaining the availability of the inference from the former to the
latter.
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shared content of their beliefs. We will need an explanation of why these two interest-
ing centered contents come apart with respect to our intuitions of believing alike qua
agreement. is issue will be addressed in section . below.
. e Lockean Picture of Communication
Received wisdom paints a simple and attractive picture of linguistic communication as
the transfer of information. is picture is famously expressed by John Locke:
ey suppose their words to be marks of the ideas in the minds also of
other men, with whom they communicate: for else they should talk in
vain, and could not be understood, if the sounds they applied to one idea
were such as by the hearer were applied to another, which is to speak two
languages. But in this men [. . . ] think it enough that they use the word,
as they imagine, in the common acceptation of that language; in which
they suppose that the idea they make it a sign of is precisely the same to
which the understanding men of that country apply that name.
(An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, book III, ch. , x)
e picture attributed to Locke and arguably endorsed by Frege and much of th
century philosophy is this: a speaker succeeds in communicating when she has an idea
in her head and uses the words that express this idea in language and arouse in the
hearer the very same idea. e speaker’s mental content is, as it were, transported from
her head to the hearer’s head, who comes to share this content.
On the Lockean picture, one kind of content plays the following three roles:
. S’  : what the speaker believes and intends to commu-
nicate
. S  : what the speaker’s (assertoric) speech act literally ex-
presses
. H’  : what the hearer comes to believe, if she understands
and trusts the speaker
For the attribution of the ‘Lockean’ picture of communication to Locke, as well as to Frege, and for a
defence of the picture against criticism, see Pagin (). Interestingly, Frege has been interpreted by
some to be committed to the view that contents (‘thoughts’) expressed by sentences involving indexicals
like the ﬁrst-person pronoun ‘I’ are private, non-shareable and incommunicable, contrary to the shareable
nature of thoughts that Frege stresses in his writings (see for instance Kripke () for this interpretation).
First-personal thoughts being of a particular concern in this chapter, I will have to leave it open whether
Frege can correctly be claimed to endorse the Lockean picture of communication.
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So if I believe that snow is white and intend to tell you, and I assert the right words,
‘Snow is white,’ I express my very belief. If you understand what I assert and trust me,
you come to have a belief with the same content as I.
Every theory of communication needs to say what plays these three roles. It also
needs to say how S’  , S  , and H’
  are related:
B- : the connection between the speaker’s belief con-
tent and the content of the speech act
S- : the connection between the speech act’s content
and the hearer’s belief content
e Lockean picture again oﬀers a straightforward account: ese connections are
simply the identity relation. Note that S   is what the expressions
used in a speech act semantically express. It coincides, roughly, with what Grice calls
what the speaker says rather than with Grice’s what the speaker means, which may involve
pragmatically implicated content.
. e Conﬂict
ere is prima facie evidence that we do communicate our self-locating beliefs. If mad
Heimson, not without a certain reputation among his contemporaries, were to ask,
‘Who am I?’ and received the answer, ‘You are Heimson,’ it seems that he would be
told just the piece of de se information that could set him straight. But this datum is
in conﬂict with the Lockean picture. Suppose Ben has the de se belief that he is hungry
and says to Anna, ‘I am hungry.’ e Lockean picture predicts that he is expressing
the interesting centered content of his belief, which Anna will come to believe if she
understands and accepts his assertion. at is, Anna will come to locate herself in the
content and will thus believe de se that she is hungry. But what Ben communicates is
obviously some other information – information Anna grasps if she comes to have a
belief to the eﬀect that the speaker, Ben, is hungry. Call this problem the de se problem.
e problem for self-locating belief on the Lockean picture gets worse. It may
seem that the right conclusion to draw from the de se problem is that hearers systemat-
ically infer an appropriate self-locating belief centered on themselves from the fact that
A complete account of linguistic communication will have to account for pragmatically conveyed inform-
ation, disambiguation, indirect speech acts and other pragmatic phenomena as well. Here, I am interested
only in that part which accounts for the connection between mental content, linguistically expressed con-
tent, and compositional semantic theory. By a ‘theory of communication,’ I shall mean, following Lewis
(, ), a systematic restatement of speakers’ common knowledge of their practice of linguistic
communication.
See Torre () for reasons to think that communication of de se information is possible.
is problem was ﬁrst raised by Stalnaker (, -).
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the speaker asserted a content centered on himself. For instance, Anna may infer the
centered content such that the center is being addressed by someone hungry from the
fact that Ben asserted the centered content such that the center is hungry. But this is
not what happens in the communication of self-locating beliefs about matters of taste.
Suppose Ben believes that some cookie is tasty and says to Anna, ‘is cookie is tasty,’
thereby expressing the centered content COOKIE.
(.) COOKIE : fhw; t; xi: the (contextually salient) cookie tastes good to x in w at
tg.
What kind of thing will Anna come to believe if she understands and trusts him? She
will not just come to locate herself in a content such that the center is addressed by
someone to whom the cookie tastes good. On the contrary, if Anna accepts the claim,
she will come to have the very self-locating belief that Ben has, viz. a belief with the
centered content such that the cookie tastes good to the center. For Anna to accept an
assertion of ‘is cookie is tasty’ is for her to locate herself in a cookie-liking location.
Centered worlds de se content and centered worlds content about matters of taste
play incompatible roles in communication. With successful assertions about taste, the
hearer comes to believe the same centered content as the speaker. With successful
assertions about oneself, the hearer does not come to believe the same centered content.
Call this problem the incompatibility problem.
It may seem that we have to give up either the centered content belief model or
the Lockean picture of communication. But this would be hasty. In the next sections,
I will propose an account that preserves the simplicity of the Lockean picture and the
self-locating nature of belief by modifying the notion of centered content.
. Sequenced Worlds Content
A centered world represents a possible way one individual may be. at is enough for
belief as self -location, but not for communication. In communication, we are not just
trying to locate ourselves individually. We are trying to locate ourselves as a group.
We are trying to arrive at a common view about our collective location and everyone’s
position in it. And for that, the possible ways diﬀerent individuals may be need to
be represented. If I tell you ‘It’s my turn,’ I am talking about myself in terms of my
own possibilities. If I tell you, ‘It’s your turn,’ I am talking about you in terms of your
possibilities. e fundamental problem with centered worlds content on the Lockean
picture of communication is that the single center needs to represent sometimes the
speaker, sometimes the addressee, and sometimes both.
e problem can be solved by introducing a sequence of centers. A sequenced world
is a world centered on a number of individuals. It represents a possible way that a plural-
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ity of individuals might be without conﬂating their individual possibilities. Formally,
a sequenced world is a triple consisting of a world, a time, and a sequence of indi-
viduals inhabiting the world at the time. A sequenced worlds content p is the set of
hw; t; hx1; : : : ; xnii-triples such that p is true at hw; t; hx1; : : : ; xnii. Lewis thought
of centered worlds contents as properties of individuals. Similarly, sequenced worlds
contents can be thought of as properties of ordered n-tuples of individuals.
I will here present a sequenced worlds model of communication that is a devel-
opment of Ninan’s (b) and Torre’s () accounts, which use sequenced worlds
content to solve the ﬁrst of the above problems – the de se problem. What I will show
is that a suitably developed sequenced worlds model provides a solution to the whole
problem. It yields a uniﬁed account of belief and communication for de se contents as
well as contents about matters of taste.
S’  , S  , and H’  -
 are now sets of sequenced worlds, with one slot in the sequence for each con-
versational participant. Whose possibilities each slot represents must be stable in com-
munication. Otherwise the problem would persist. If the ﬁrst center, say, were to
represent Ben’s possibilities when he believes the content, but were to represent Anna’s
possibilities when she comes to believe the content, their individual possibilities would
again be conﬂated. In order to stabilise what the content of speech acts and beliefs held
during conversation represents, we relativise it to a conversational context c, a triple of a
world wc, time tc, and an ordered list of conversational participants in wc at tc. Call
the ordered list of conversational participants the conversational sequence. It is determ-
ined by the conversational facts. Who the participants to a conversation are depends
on the mutually recognised intentions of speaker and audience. e order of the list of
conversational participants does not matter, as long as we keep it stable for the entire
conversation.
Let us see how this helps with de se communication. We stipulate that for the
conversation between Ben and Anna in wc at tc, hwc; tc; hBen, Annaii is the conver-
sational context. en the content of Ben’s assertion of ‘I am hungry’ is the sequenced
Lewis (a, ) himself provided the idea of worlds with multiple centers but did not use them to
account for centered communication: “Besides possible individuals, world-sized and smaller, there are
still other possibilities: joint possibilities for two or more individuals. ese are ordered pairs, triples,
etc. . . . or even inﬁnite sequences of possible individuals, all from the same world. An ordered pair of
compossible individuals, for instance, is a way that a pair of individuals might possibly be.” (See also
Lewis (, -))
e model I develop here is close to Ninan’s in key respects. Any shortcomings of the model are, of course,
my responsibility. e model diﬀers from Torre’s in technicalities and one important philosophical respect:
Torre gives up the Lockean picture of communication.
e set of conversational contexts is a proper subset of the set of sequenced worlds – those sequenced
worlds in which the individuals of the sequence are in a conversation with each other. For a given moment
in a conversation, there are as many formal objects I call conversational contexts as there are ways of
combining the participants into an ordered sequence.
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worlds content HUNGRY:
(.) HUNGRY: fhw; t; hx1; x2ii: x1 is hungry in w at tg
HUNGRY says, roughly, that the ﬁrst center x1 is hungry. Given the conversational
sequence hBen, Annai, Ben’s possibilities are represented by the ﬁrst center, and Anna’s
possibilities by the second center. So for Ben to believe HUNGRY is for him to believe
de se that he is hungry. For Anna to believe HUNGRY is for her to believe de te – ‘of
you’ – that Ben is hungry. It is not for her to believe de se that she herself is hungry. So
if Ben believes what he says and if Anna understands and accepts Ben’s assertion, he and
Anna will come to believe the same sequenced worlds content HUNGRY. However,
their doxastic states are not exactly the same, as they dispose them to diﬀerent actions.
(We will come back to this diﬀerence in section ..) is solves the de se problem.
Talk about taste need not distinguish between centers in the same way that de
se communication must. If Ben successfully communicates ‘is cookie is tasty’ to
Anna, they will each come to locate themselves in a cookie-liking location. On the
sequenced world picture, we get this result if taste contents place conditions on every
center. Let us again take hwc; tc; hBen, Annaii as the conversational context. If Ben
believes and asserts ‘is cookie is tasty’ in c, he expresses the sequenced worlds content
COOKIE&:
(.) COOKIE&: fhw; t; hx1; x2ii: the cookie tastes good to hx1; x2i in w at tg
If communication is successful and Anna accepts Ben’s assertion relative to the con-
versational sequence hBen, Annai, she comes to locate herself in the set of sequenced
worlds such that the cookie tastes good to all centers. And that seems right. If Ben
wishes to establish that the cookie is tasty by asserting ‘is cookie is tasty,’ he has
succeeded if they both locate themselves among the cookie-likers. is solves the in-
compatibility problem: de se and subjective sequenced worlds contents do not play
incompatible roles in communication. e communication of either is successful in
case the hearer comes to believe the same content the speaker believed and expressed
in speech.
Belief in COOKIE& is diﬀerent from purely egocentric belief whose correctness
depends only on one’s own correct location. Anna should believe COOKIE& only
if she believes that the cookie tastes good to the speaker and that it tastes good to
herself. e latter belief egocentrically concerns her taste, the former is safe as long
as she takes Ben’s assertion to be sincere. Sequenced worlds content on the Lockean
picture captures the fact that success in the communication of subjective, evaluative
claims involves acceptance of a common perspective on the matter.
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. Belief in Context
Sequenced worlds content, on the Lockean picture, is what is expressed and believed
by speaker and audience. To believe a sequenced worlds content in a conversational
context is to have a belief with a content whose sequenced worlds have sequences with
as many individuals as there are parties to the conversation. It is to locate oneself as well
as everyone else in the conversation; it is to locate the group of which one is a member,
in a way that allows for the respective perspectives of the members to diﬀer. In Lewis’s
terms, believing a centered worlds content is ascribing a property to oneself. Believing a
sequenced worlds content in conversation is ascribing a property to the group of which
one is a member.
e notion of believing a sequenced worlds content must be relativised to a con-
versational context and a believer. Here is why. Suppose Lingens says to his cousin
Ortcutt, ‘I am tired of reading.’ If he is communicating successfully, then relative to
the conversational context hwc; tc; hLingens, Ortcuttii they will both end up believing
TIRED:
(.) TIRED: fhw; t; hx1; x2ii: x1 is tired of reading in w at tg
But even when Lingens and Ortcutt believe the same sequenced worlds contentTIRED
relative to the conversational context, there is still an important diﬀerence between their
belief states. eir beliefs will dispose them to diﬀerent actions – perhaps a disposition
to stop reading for Lingens, and perhaps a disposition to say, ‘Why don’t you take a
break?’ for Ortcutt. is diﬀerence in belief states is accounted for by relativising belief
to agents in conversational contexts. e complete account of sequenced worlds belief
is as follows:
-B    
An agent A n-believes a sequenced worlds content fhw; t; hx1; : : : ; xuii:
p(w; t; hx1; : : : ; xui)g in the conversational context hwc; tc; hy1; : : : ; yuii iﬀ
(i) A = yn 2 fy1; : : : ; yug
(ii) there are relations R1. . .Ru such that in wc at tc, yn is uniquely R1-related
to y1, . . . , and yn is uniquely Ru-related to yu (where Rn is the identity re-
lation) and yn’s standing in R1. . .Ru to y1 : : : yu establishes a conversation
between y1 : : : yu
(iii) every sequenced world hw0; t0; hx01; : : : ; x0uii compatible with what A be-
lieves in wc at tc is such that p(w0; t0; hx01; : : : ; x0ui) = .
Informally, -B     says that an agent n-believes a
sequenced worlds content p in a conversational context just in case (i) the agent is the
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nth member of the conversational sequence, (ii) the agent stands in relations to every
member of the conversational sequence which establish a conversation between them,
and (iii) the agent believes that she might be the nth member of a group of which p is
true.
-B     entails that Lingens -believes TIRED
in the conversational context hwc; tc; hLingens, Ortcuttii just in case (i) Lingens 2
fLingens, Ortcuttg, (ii) there are conversation-establishing relations R1 and R2 such
that in wc at tc R1 uniquely relates Lingens to himself (identity) and R2 relates Lingens
to Ortcutt (e.g., the addressing relation), and (iii) every sequenced world hw0; t0; hx01; x02ii
compatible with what Lingens believes in wc at tc is such that x01 is tired of reading in
w0 at t0. A sequenced world hw0; t0; hx01; x02ii is compatible with what Lingens believes
in wc at tc if Lingens thinks in wc at tc that he might be the member x01 of a group
hx01; x02i in w0 at t0 whose members are related by R1, R2.
ere is nothing mysterious about an agent’s believing a sequenced worlds content
in a conversational context, once we accept centered worlds content and individual self-
location. We can, if we want, translate sequenced worlds belief into centered worlds
belief. Put simply, the idea is that to ascribe a property to the group of which one is
a member is equivalent to self-ascribing the property of being a member of a group
that has this property. For Ortcutt to believe the sequenced worlds content p ex-
pressed by Lingens’ assertion of ‘I am tired of reading’ in the conversational context
hwc; tc; hLingens, Ortcuttii is for him to be addressed by Lingens and to believe the
centered worlds content p’ = fhw; t; xi: there is a y, x is y’s addressee in w at t, and
p(w; t; hy; xi)g. More generally, the following equivalence holds:
S      
An agent A n-believes a sequenced worlds content fhw; t; hx1; : : : ; xuii:
p(w; t; hx1; : : : ; xui)g in the conversational context hwc; tc; hy1; : : : ; yuii iﬀ
(i) A = yn 2 fy1; : : : ; yug,
(ii) there are relations R1. . .Ru such that in wc at tc, yn is uniquely R1-related
to y1, . . . , and yn is uniquely Ru-related to yu (where Rn is the identity re-
lation) and yn’s standing in R1. . .Ru to y1 : : : yu establishes a conversation
between y1 : : : yu
(iii) A believes the centered worlds content fhw; t; xi: there are individuals
x1; . . . , xu such that x is uniquely R1-related to x1, x is uniquely R2-
related to x2, . . . , and x is uniquely Ru-related to xu in w at t, and
p(w; t; hx1; : : : ; xui)g.
For n 6= m, n-believing and m-believing in a conversational context are two diﬀer-
ent doxastic states, with diﬀerent potential eﬀects on action. If Lingens and Ortcutt
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communicate successfully, both come to have beliefs with the same sequenced worlds
content p. However, in the conversational context hwc; tc; hLingens, Ortcuttii, Lin-
gens will come to -believe p, which probably disposes him to stop reading, while Ort-
cutt will come to -believe p, which will not dispose him to such action. S
      makes this evident: When Lingens -
believes and Ortcutt -believes p, they believe the same content p, but for each the
centered worlds belief equivalent to his belief in p is diﬀerent. We will come back to
the connection between doxastic states and action dispositions in section ..
A word of clariﬁcation on S     
. e equivalence between sequenced worlds belief and centered worlds belief
can be read in three ways. First, as stating an equivalence between two equally basic
and theoretically useful notions of belief. Second, as stating a reductive explanation
of believing a sequenced worlds content in terms of believing a centered worlds con-
tent. e fundamental notion of belief then is individual self-location. ird, the
equivalence can be read as stating a reductive explanation of belief in centered worlds
content in terms of belief in sequenced worlds content. e fundamental notion of
belief then is collective self-location, or group-location. On the last option, individual
self-location is a special case of collective self-location where the group consists of only
one member. I am inclined to think the fundamental notion is group-location, but
I will not oﬀer independent arguments here. Suﬃce it to say that taking sequenced
worlds belief and sequenced worlds content as fundamental supports the Lockean as-
sumption that communication essentially involves the sharing of a single content. If
centered worlds belief is fundamental and speaker and hearer in successful communica-
tion have beliefs with diﬀerent centered worlds contents, introducing a shared content
at the non-fundamental level of sequenced worlds belief hardly goes a long way towards
saving the Lockean picture.
. Assertion and the Common Ground
.. Common Ground
On the sequenced worlds model, S’  , S  ,
and H’   are one and the same sequenced worlds content. us
B-  and S-  are given by the
identity of these contents. e basic Lockean idea that one piece of information travels
from speaker’s head to hearer’s head is preserved.
e sequenced worlds model also ﬁts naturally with a Stalnakerian implementation
of the Lockean picture. I will ﬁrst sketch Stalnaker’s original account and then make
the changes needed to accommodate sequenced worlds content.
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According to Stalnaker, linguistic communication is primarily a matter of updating
and establishing a body of shared information – the common ground. Speech acts
serve to inﬂuence this body of information in various ways. In particular, the essential
eﬀect of assertion is to add the asserted content to the common ground. e attitude
that speakers strike towards the common ground is the attitude of presupposition:
. . . the presuppositions of a speaker are the propositions he takes for gran-
ted as part of the background of the conversation. A proposition is pre-
supposed if the speaker is disposed to act as if he assumes or believes that
the proposition is true, and as if he assumes or believes that his audience
assumes or believes that it is true as well. (Stalnaker, , )
Presupposition, in this sense, is a public attitude: one presupposes a proposition p only
if one presupposes that everyone else in the conversation also presupposes p. A speaker’s
presuppositions are represented by the speaker’s context set: the set of possible worlds
compatible with what the speaker presupposes. (Propositions, for Stalnaker, are also
sets of possible worlds; a speaker’s context set is the intersection of the propositions
she presupposes.) ere is a context set for each participant in a conversation, but
when things go as they should, all participants make the same presuppositions and the
speakers’ context sets coincide with the conversation’s context set. e common ground
is represented by the conversation’s context set, which is the intersection of the pro-
positions in the common ground. A conversation is defective when the conversation’s
participants do not all make the same presuppositions.
Assertions are proposals to add information to the common ground. When an
assertion of p is understood and accepted by all participants in a conversation, its con-
tent p becomes presupposed in the conversation, and its eﬀect is to eliminate all the
non-p worlds from the conversation’s context set. “To engage in conversation is, essen-
tially, to distinguish among alternative possible ways that things may be.” (Stalnaker,
, ) An assertion’s primary contribution is to narrow down what the participants
commonly take to be the possible relevant ways the world might be.
Stalnaker’s views on the pragmatics of communication are developed in his , , , and ,
among others.
In the default case, the common ground will be common knowledge or common belief. But it need not
be. Interlocutors may take diﬀerent non-public attitudes towards what is presupposed, depending on the
purpose of the conversation. When the purpose is to establish truth, the attitude is, plausibly, knowledge
or belief; when speakers are interested in exploring a hypothetical situation, the mutually recognised non-
public attitude is supposition; asf. What the right non-public attitude to take is, may itself be a matter of
negotiation between interlocutors. I will for the most part focus on the default case where the common
ground is common belief. Even when presupposition entails belief, however, the converse is not true.
Given the public nature of presupposition, a speaker typically believes a variety of things she does not
believe her audience to believe, or she may believe that her audience believes them but not that they
believe that she believes them, etc.
 Perspective in Context: Sequenced Worlds
On the sequenced worlds model, the conversation’s context set is a set of sequenced
worlds whose sequences have as many centers as the conversation has participants. To
engage in conversation is to distinguish between alternative ways that the conversational
participants might be, where this does not require that they all share the ways they
individually might be. Intuitively, the purpose of conversation is the coordination of
individual perspectives, sometimes with the result of sharing a perspective, sometimes
with the result of having one’s individual perspective noticed.
Assertions serve this purpose, if successful, by adding the sequenced worlds content
they express to the common ground. When in the common ground, that content is
presupposed by all conversational participants. We can deﬁne the notion of speaker
presupposition for a context set containing sequenced worlds on the basis of n-belief
in a conversational context:
S SW
A speaker S n-presupposes a sequenced worlds content p in a conversational
context hwc; tc; hx1; : : : ; xuii iﬀ S = xn 2 fx1; : : : ; xug and S is disposed to
act as if she n-assumes or n-believes p, and as if she n-assumes or n-believes that
for all xi 2 fx1; : : : ; xug, xi i-assumes or i-believes p as well.
If a sequenced worlds content p is part of the common ground in the default case
where the common ground is common belief, every participant in the conversation xn
n-believes p.
e Stalnakerian model with sequenced worlds content vindicates the Lockean idea
that one content is what is expressed by the speaker and believed by all participants if
communication is successful. At the same time, belief on the model still involves self-
location, although belief in a conversational context involves locating not just oneself
but the conversational group of which one is a member. e model solves the de se
problem and the incompatibility problem by keeping centers and individual possib-
ilities separated where necessary and allowing for joint possibilities to be established
where this is, intuitively, the eﬀect of assertion. us, the conﬂict between the Lockean
picture of communication and the self-locating belief model can be resolved without
giving up either of them.
.. Assertion and Acceptance
We saw that belief in context is location of the conversational group of which one is a
member. e correct belief-norm is thus not E but a group-centric norm
that requires the group to be correctly located in the believed sequenced worlds content.
What about assertion and acceptance of sequenced worlds content in conversation?
Our model of communication should tell us under which conditions it is felicitous for
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speakers to assert a sequenced worlds content p, and when it is a good idea for hearers
to accept p into the common ground.
Clearly, egocentric norms will not make the right predictions. To see this, let us
consider one mainstream approach to norms of assertion, which states the crucial neces-
sary condition for felicitous assertion in terms of truth of the asserted content. First,
it will be helpful to distinguish between two kinds of perspective at which a content
may be true.
I  P = hw; t; xi
An individual perspective P represents the perspective of a single individual (her
and only her location and world view) in the world w at the time t.
T ’  P = hwc; tc; hx1; : : : ; xnii
e perspective of a conversation is hwc; tc; hx1; : : : ; xnii, where wc and tc
are the world and time at which the conversation takes place, and the sequence
of individuals hx1; : : : ; xni is determined by the conversational sequence for
the conversation. It represents the individual perspectives of all conversational
participants x1; : : : ; xn in wc at tc.
Let us say that a sequenced worlds content is true from an individual perspective just
in case it correctly represents the location of that individual – no matter the location of
the other individuals in the sequence. We can then state the following egocentric truth
norm of assertion:
 Stephenson (a) endorses an egocentric belief norm of assertion. MacFarlane () and Kolbel
() endorse an egocentric truth norm equivalent to the one stated here (they do not account for
interesting de se content, however), and so do Lasersohn () and Egan et al. (), with some quali-
ﬁcations. For Lasersohn only ‘autocentric’ uses of predicates of personal taste, those on which the asserter
takes herself to be the relevant ‘judge,’ are governed by an egocentric norm. Utterances with ‘exocentric’
uses of predicates of personal taste, those on which the asserter takes someone else as the relevant ‘judge,’
are assertable only if the sentence used is true in the context and relative to the perspective of the con-
textually determined experiencer. In Lasersohn’s own words: “we typically assert from an autocentric
perspective. at is, in making an assertion, we regard it as in some sense justiﬁed iﬀ it is true relat-
ive to that context corresponding to the concrete situation of utterance in which we ourselves serve as
judge. . .Under certain circumstances, we may also adopt an exocentric perspective, assessing sentences for
truth relative to contexts in which someone other than ourselves is speciﬁed as the judge, or regarding our
assertions as justiﬁed by virtue of their truth relative to such contexts.” (Lasersohn, , )
Egan et al. seem to take an egocentric norm of assertion as the default: “e correct norm [of assertion]
is that one should only say something that’s true when evaluated in the context you are in.” (Egan et al.,
, ) (ey provide ample evidence following this statement that ‘you’ here picks out the asserter.)
However, Egan et al. add that the speaker’s context need not always correspond to what I call her individual
perspective: “We assume here that contexts can include more than just the speaker. If Vinny the Vulture is
speaking to a group of humans he arguably cannot say ‘Rotting ﬂesh tastes great’. e reason is that rotting
ﬂesh does not taste great to the group of speakers in the conversation, most of whom are humans.” ()
e proposal of this chapter is to make the ‘context’ that includes not just the speaker but all parties to
the conversation the default.
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E  
AE A speech act content p is appropriately assertable in context c only
if p is true from the speaker’s individual perspective Pc in c.
AE may seem to make the right predictions for de se assertions. Intuitively, Heim-
son may assert ‘I am Heimson’ only if the center-slot representing Heimson correctly
locates him. But AE fails to make the correct predictions for de te assertions.
It does not prohibit speakers to tell anyone except Heimson, ‘You are Heimson,’ as it
should. e speech act content expressed by ‘You are Heimson’ places a constraint only
on a center diﬀerent from the center representing the speaker. So as long as someone
in the world and at the time of the conversation is Heimson, the speech act content is
true from the speaker’s individual perspective.
e right norms of assertion and acceptance, which go hand in hand with belief
in context as group-location, are group-centric norms. ey are here stated as truth
norms:
G-  
AG A speech act content p is appropriately assertable in context c only
if p is true from the conversation’s perspective in c.
AG A speech act content p is acceptable in context c if p is true from
the conversation’s perspective in c.
Suppose Ben tells Heimson in a context of utterance c, ‘You are mad.’ Let the conver-
sational context be hwc; tc; hBen, Heimsonii so that the speech act content of Ben’s
assertion is fhw; t; hx1; x2ii: x2 is mad in w at tg. e conversation’s perspective Pc is
hwc; tc; hBen, Heimsonii. According to AG, Ben’s assertion is appropriate only
if fhw; t; hx1; x2ii: x2 is mad in w at tg is true from hwc; tc; hBen, Heimsonii. is
is as it should be. Ben should make the assertion only if – and Heimson should accept
the assertion if – Heimson is mad at the time and world of speaking.
Truth norms may be understood as default norms. e purpose of the conversation may determine
stronger norms where the purpose is to establish common knowledge, or weaker norms where the purpose
is to establish, e.g., common supposition or common pretence (cf. fn.  in section ..). For instance,
when the mutually recognised attitude towards the common ground is common pretence, the norms of
assertion and acceptance are as follows:
A A speech act content p is appropriately assertable for a speaker S in context c where
pretence is the purpose of the conversation only if p is true at all the worlds com-
patible with what S pretends to be the case.
A A speech act content p is acceptable for an addressee A in context c where pretence
is the purpose of the conversation if p is true at all the worlds compatible with what
A pretends to be the case.
Note that to assess whether fhw; t; hx1; x2ii: x2 is mad inw at tg is true from hwc; tc; hBen, Heimsonii,
one need not be able to identify x2 de re as Heimson. We use the names ‘Ben’ and ‘Heimson’ to state
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For talk about taste, the group-centric norms entail that, for instance, ‘is cookie
is tasty’ is assertable only if the cookie tastes good to speaker and audience. is is
because all interlocutors have to be correctly located in the content, which says of each
one of them that the cookie is tasty to them.
But this prediction might seem too strong. Why should a speaker have to make
sure that she and her audience have a common outlook on taste in order to guarantee
that her assertion about the cookie’s tastiness is appropriate? Is not the subjectivity of
taste claims better captured by an egocentric norm like AE?
I will postpone full discussion of the appropriateness of bare taste assertions to
chapter , where we will see that the sequenced worlds view can account for the sub-
jectivity of taste claims. For now, notice a counterintuitive consequence of purely ego-
centric truth norms. As MacFarlane (, ) observes, an egocentric truth norm
licenses asserting bare taste claims such as ‘Schnitzel is tasty’ just when it licenses mak-
ing assertions about what is tasty to the speaker herself, such as ‘Schnitzel is tasty to
me.’ is is because the former is true from the speaker’s own perspective whenever
the latter is. However, there are many conversational situations in which asserting the
explicitly relativised taste sentence is natural but asserting the bare taste claim is odd,
as in (.c) and (.c).
(.) a. Ben: Schnitzel is tasty.
b. Anna: No, it’s not tasty! It is bland.
c. Ben: Well, it’s tasty to me, at least.
(.) a. Ben: Schnitzel is tasty.
b. Anna: No, it’s not tasty! It is bland.
c. Ben: ? Well, it is tasty.
Ben’s assertion in (.c) amounts to a ‘partial retraction’ of his ﬁrst assertion. e
group-centric norm predicts that (.c) is felicitous but (.c) is not, since from the
conversational perspective at the time of Ben’s second assertion, it is true that Schnitzel
tastes good to Ben while it is not true that Schnitzel tastes good to Ben and Anna. e
egocentric norm, on the contrary, predicts that both (.c) and (.c) are felicitous,
since from Ben’s perspective at the time of his second utterance, it is both true that
Schnitzel is tasty and that Schnitzel is tasty to Ben himself. Of course, an explanation
of the conversational impropriety of (.c) may appeal to other norms than the norm of
what the conversational sequence is merely for convenience. All that is needed to determine whether some
content is true from the conversational perspective is the ability to keep participants apart and consistently
track them in derivations of content from context. For participants in one-to-one conversations, the ability
to distinguish between oneself and not-oneself and to track them, respectively, suﬃces.
Cf. Pearson (forthcoming, x.) on ‘partial retraction’ and what Schaﬀer () calls ‘entrenchment’ for
a related phenomenon. e example in (.) is adapted from Pearson (forthcoming, x.).
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assertion. But the example shows at the very least that egocentric truth norms are blind
to conversational circumstances that transcend the speaker’s individual perspective.
. A Semantic Proposal
Understanding S   in terms of sequenced worlds was the key to
solving the de se and incompatibility problems in a way that reconciles the self-locating
account of belief with the Lockean picture of communication. But so far I have merely
claimed that S   is sequenced worlds content. I have not yet shown
what the relation is between sentences – such as ‘is cookie is tasty’ and ‘I am hungry’
– and this kind of speech act content. For the sequenced worlds model to be plausible,
it needs to be completed with a semantics of predicates of personal taste and of personal
pronouns and an account of how the semantics determines sequenced worlds speech
act content.
e sequenced worlds model does not require a radical departure from existing
semantic proposals. For instance, the standard Kaplanian treatment of personal pro-
nouns can be combined with a modiﬁed version of Stephenson’s (a) semantics for
predicates of personal taste to make room for sequenced worlds content. Other options
are available, but for concreteness I will introduce a combination of the above in this
section. In the next section, I will show how this semantics delivers sequenced worlds
speech act content.
Our starting point is a Kaplan-style intensional semantic theory on which exten-
sions are assigned relative to a context c and an index i. An expression’s semantic
value is a function from a context and an index to an extension; we will also say that
an expression’s semantic value at a context and index is an extension. A context c is a
possible occasion of use of an expression, which determines at least a world, a time,
a speaker and addressee(s), and a location. Formally, we will model a context as a se-
quenced world hw; t; hx1; : : : ; xnii, where x1 represents the speaker and x2 through
xn represent the addressees. An index i is a sequence of independently shiftable fea-
tures of context, called coordinates. In the semantics we need, the index is a triple
hw; t; hx1; : : : ; xnii. e index is the ﬁrst modiﬁcation of Stephenson’s system,
which has hw; t; xi-triples as indices. e double brackets ‘J K’ denote the interpreta-
For instance, a semantics with sequenced worlds indices can also be formulated by modifying Lasersohn’s
(; ) semantics for predicates of personal taste (see footnote  in section . below for some
details).
For a clear exposition of an ‘orthodox’ version of the system with possible worlds as the only coordinates
of the index, see Heim and Kratzer (, ch.) and von Fintel and Heim ().
e index may or may not be a sequenced world depending on whether a possible situation corresponds
to the combination of world, time, and individuals. For instance, h@,  June , hFrege, Russellii is
a sequenced world but h@,  June , hFrege, Russellii is not, since Frege and Russell inhabited @ in
 but not in . Both triples, however, can be values of the index.
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tion function, a three-place function that maps an expression, a context and an index
to an extension.
e extensions of standard one-place predicates like ‘hungry’ depend on the world-
and time-coordinate of the index, but not on any individual in the sequence.
(.) JhungryKc;i = [ye. y is hungry in w at t],
for i = hw; t; hx1; : : : ; xnii
Predicates of personal taste (PPTs) such as ‘tasty’ and ‘fun,’ on Stephenson’s view, are
two-place predicates. ey are functions from an experiencer and experienced object
or individual, and a context and an index, to truth values.
(.) JtastyKc;i = Jtaste goodKc;i = [ye.[ze. z tastes good to y in w at t] ]Jtaste terribleKc;i = [ye.[ze. z tastes terrible to y in w at t] ]JfunKc;i = [ye.[ze. z is fun for y in w at t] ]
Read ‘[ye. y is hungry in w at t]’ as ‘the function which maps every ye to  (truth) if y is hungry in
w at t, and to  (falsity) otherwise.’ e subscript ‘e’ indicates y’s semantic type. e is the semantic type
of individuals, s stands for worlds, i for times, and t for truth values; combinations such as et, or he; ti,
stand for functions from the ﬁrst type (e) to the second (t).
I shall for the most part restrict my attention to paradigm examples of predicates of personal taste such as
‘fun’ and ‘tasty’. e demarcation of a class of predicates of personal taste from aesthetic and other evalu-
ative predicates is diﬃcult, as Lasersohn () observes. MacFarlane () gives his semantics only for
‘tasty’. Lasersohn (, ), Schaﬀer (), and Stephenson (a) limit their analyses to ‘tasty’,
‘taste good/terrible’, and ‘fun’. (See Lasersohn (, x.) for a non-deﬁnitional demarcation of predic-
ates of personal taste based on the interaction of perspective with scalarity.) Cappelen and Hawthorne
() extend this list to include examples like ‘spicy’, ‘funny’, ‘delicious’, ‘disgusting’, ‘nauseating’ and
also ‘ﬁlling’. Richard (, ) gives an indication of what he considers predicates concerning matters
of taste to be when he writes: ‘A likely place to look for relative truth, it seems, is in matters of taste.
Our detailed conceptions of who is handsome, who sexy, what is hip, what L, what is boring, what
perverted—these typically diﬀer.’ Richard subsequently develops his relativist semantics for standard ex-
amples of gradable adjectives like ‘rich’ and ‘tall’, and endorses truth relativism for all vague expressions
(Richard, , ). For reasons related to faultless disagreement, Richard believes that at least some
claims about taste require an expressivist rather than relativist treatment. Moltmann () includes ‘de-
licious’, ‘pleasant’, ‘nice’ and intends her semantics to cover moral predicates, aesthetic predicates, and
gradable adjectives such as ‘tall’, or ‘rich’. Egan (a) gives an account of disputes of aesthetic taste in
general, but makes no claims concerning the semantic details of his key examples such as ‘good’, ‘beau-
tiful’, ‘tasty’, ‘fun’, ‘elegant’, ‘ugly’, ‘disgusting’. Egan et al. () are mainly concerned with epistemic
modals but claim that relativist theories are also plausible for expressions such as ‘huge’, ‘being the same
colour‘, and ‘taste [good/bad]’ (, ).
Stephenson does not discuss the scalar aspect of many predicates of personal taste like ‘tasty’ and ‘fun’,
and I will also be neutral on the question of how to account for the gradable nature of PPTs. e analysis
in this section is compatible with Richard’s () relativist proposal that gradable adjectives have their
comparison class determined by the context of use and thus express contents that are speciﬁc with respect
to comparison class. Equally, elements of the degree analysis of gradable adjectives (Kennedy, , )
are available to the relativist, although the details will have to be left for future work. See Lasersohn (,
x.) for a brief discussion of the scalarity of PPTs. See also footnote  in section . below for discussion.
 Perspective in Context: Sequenced Worlds
e entries for PPTs do not directly make their extensions dependent on the individuals
in the index. However, in ﬁrst-personal uses of PPTs, i.e. in bare taste claims such as
‘is cookie is tasty’ which are based on the asserter’s taste preferences but which do
not have an overt experiencer argument in the sentence’s surface structure, there is a
covert, phonologically null nominal item ‘PROC’ at the appropriate level of logical
form. Simplifying the logical form, and ignoring tense and the contribution of the
copula, (.) has the following structure.
(.) is cookie is tasty.
[ is cookie ] [ is tasty PROC ]
PROC takes as its reference the sequence of centers in the index:
(.) JPROCKc;i = hx1; : : : ; xni,
where the index i = hw; t; hx1; : : : ; xnii.
PROC is the second modiﬁcation of Stephenson’s system, in which the nominal item
PROJ refers to the single judge given by the index. Like PROJ, PROC is ‘not a pronoun
in the sense of being able to be bound or controlled, nor is it an indexical since it takes
its reference from the index rather than the context of use.’ (Stephenson, a, )
PROC thus introduces dependence of ﬁrst-personal uses of PPTs on the individuals in
the index into the system. e meaning of (.) is computed in (.).
(.) Jis cookie is tastyKc;i =JtastyKc;i (JPROCKc;i) (Jthis cookieKc;i) =  iﬀ
the cookie tastes good to hx1; : : : ; xni in w at t
Treating PPTs as two-place predicates provides a straightforward handling of uses of
PPTs with an overt prepositional phrases such as ‘for Ben’ in (.).
(.) e roller coaster is fun for Ben.
Stephenson assumes that in expressions like ‘fun for Ben’, or ‘tasty to Anna’, the pre-
positions ‘for’ and ‘to’ make no semantic contributions. at is, their semantic value
is the identity function on individuals.
(.) JforKc;i = [ye. y]
e meaning of (.) is computed in (.).
(.) Je roller coaster is fun for BenKc;i =JfunKc;i (Jfor BenKc;i) (Jthe roller coasterKc;i) =  iﬀ
the roller coaster is fun for Ben in w at t
. A Semantic Proposal 
Finally, there are uses of PPTs, sometimes called ‘exocentric’, which have no overt ex-
periencer but in which the context of use makes a particular individual salient, as in
(.).
(.) Anna: How does Bill like the rides?
Ben: Well, the merry-go-round is fun, but the water slide is a little too
scary.
In uses like (.), the logical form contains a silent referential pronoun ‘prox’ referring
to the individual x, which takes its reference from the context of use c.
(.) JproxKc;i = x
e logical form, at the appropriate level, of ‘the merry-go-round is fun’ in (.) is
(.) with the meaning of (.).
(.) [ e merry-go-round ] [ is fun proBill ] ]
(.) Je merry-go-round is funKc;i =JfunKc;i (JproBillKc;i) (Jthe merry-go-roundKc;i) =  iﬀ
the merry-go-round is fun for Bill in w at t
Like uses of PPTs with overt prepositional phrases, these ‘exocentric’ uses are non-ﬁrst-
personal; their semantic value at a context and index is not dependent on the individuals
in the index.
Personal pronouns like ‘I’/‘me’ and second person singular ‘you’ receive a standard
Kaplanian treatment.
(.) JIKc;i = the speaker/agent of cJyouKc;i = the addressee of c
So Ben’s utterance in (.) has the meaning given in (.).
e example is adapted from Lasersohn (, ).
In section .., it was claimed that the inference from a belief that X is tasty to a belief that X is tasty to
me is generally available. ‘Exocentric’ uses of PPTs may appear to be a counterexample to this claim. If
Anna comes to believe what Ben says in (.) – ‘e merry-go-round is fun’ – she can not infer that the
merry-go-round is fun for herself. But note that while it is true that Anna cannot make this inference, the
‘exocentric’ use of PPTs in (.) and other examples does not constitute a counterexample to the general
availability of the inference from a belief that X is tasty/fun to a belief that X is tasty to/fun for me. In section
., we will see that the content expressed by ‘exocentric’ uses has an experiencer argument diﬀerent from
any center. If made fully explicit, the content of taste beliefs corresponding to ‘exocentric’ uses is not that
X is tasty/fun, but that X is tasty to/fun for Y, where Y may be non-identical to the believer. In (.), Anna
will come to believe that the merry-go-round is fun for Bill. us beliefs corresponding to ‘exocentric’ uses
of PPTs do not constitute counterexamples to the availability of the inference from a belief that X is tasty
to a belief that X is tasty to me.
 Perspective in Context: Sequenced Worlds
(.) Ben: I am hungry.
(.) JI am hungryKc;i = JhungryKc;i (JIKc;i) =  iﬀ Ben is hungry in w at t
We now have all we need for a compositional semantic theory for simple sentences
expressing claims about taste and de se attitudes.
. Speech Act Content
How do we get the sequenced worlds speech act content we need from the semantic
values given above? In short, by taking the diagonal of a sentence’s Kaplanian character.
In what follows, I will give a deﬁnition of S   that is a generalisa-
tion of Ninan’s deﬁnition of utterance content (b, ). Let us start with sentences
expressing de se attitudes.
Kaplan took ‘what is said’ – the speech act content expressed – by an assertoric
utterance of a sentence in context to be the function from index to truth values. Let us
call this content, in our system, the Kaplan horizontal:
Kaplan horizontal of  at c: i:JKc;i =
fhw; t; hx1; : : : ; xnii: JKc;hw;t;hx1;:::;xnii = g
As mentioned above, Stephenson’s semantics for PPTs is not the only option. A relativist semantics with
sequenced worlds indices can also be formulated by reworking Lasersohn’s semantics for predicates of
personal taste. Lasersohn (, ) treats PPTs as -place predicates whose denotation at a context
and index may vary with the ‘judge’-coordinate j of the index. With suitable notational adjustments, his
entry for ‘tasty’ is as follows:
JtastyKc;hw;t;ji = xe. x tastes good to j in w at t
is entry can straightforwardly be extended to make room for a sequence of judges:JtastyKc;hw;t;hj1;:::;jnii = xe. x tastes good to hj1; : : : ; jni in w at t
For Lasersohn, the preposition ‘to’ in in ‘tasty to Ben’ is an operator on the judge-coordinate that shifts it
to Ben. Replacing j again with a sequence of judges, we get the following entry for ‘tasty to Ben:’Jtasty to BenKc;hw;t;hj1;:::;jnii = JtastyKc;hw;t;Beni = xe. x tastes good to Ben in w at t
Lasersohn does not give ‘exocentric’ uses of PPTs a diﬀerent semantic treatment but accounts for them
in the pragmatics. Speakers assume a contextually salient perspective that is diﬀerent from their own and
evaluate the taste claim relative to the world-time-judge triple formed by the world and time of utterance
and the individual whose perspective is salient.
is latter feature of an extended Lasersohn semantics and pragmatics stands in tension with the Stal-
nakerian model of communication I presented in section .. Stephenson’s treatment of ‘exocentric’ uses
of PPTs requires no changes to that model, which makes her semantics the better ﬁt.
Sequenced worlds contents can be characterised as sets of sequenced worlds and as the characteristic func-
tions of such sets. For indices that take sequenced worlds with sequences of n individuals, i:JKc;i is
the characteristic function of the set fhw; t; hx1; : : : ; xnii: JKc;hw;t;hx1;:::;xnii = g. e two formu-
lations are essentially equivalent, and I will use both.
. Speech Act Content 
Given the standard Kaplanian semantic values of the pronouns ‘I’/‘me’ and ‘you,’ their
reference is resolved in the derivation of the Kaplan horizontal from context. us, the
Kaplan horizontal of (.) is (.).
(.) i:JI am hungryKc;i = fhw; t; hx1; : : : ; xnii: Ben is hungry in w at tg
But (.) is not the interesting sequenced worlds content which, as we saw above, is
communicated by assertions involving ﬁrst-personal pronouns. Fortunately, the Ka-
plan horizontal is not the only speech act content deﬁnable from the semantics. As
Lewis () showed, the intensional semantic theory does not determine one unique
candidate for the role of speech act content. To be sure, it it is convenient if the con-
tent that is the input to intensional operators – i.e., here the Kaplan horizontal – is also
the content expressed in communication. But speech act content need not be identical
to the content that combines with intensional operators to yield a sentence’s semantic
value in context. It is this freedom that allows us to deﬁne the right interesting se-
quenced worlds content from the semantic value of sentences containing ﬁrst-personal
pronouns.
Suppose Ben utters ‘I am hungry’ in a conversation with Anna, where the conver-
sational sequence is hBen, Annai. As we saw above, the interesting sequenced worlds
content he communicates is HUNGRY, repeated in (.).
(.) HUNGRY: fhw; t; hx1; x2ii: x1 is hungry in w at tg.
In this particular case, the speech act content HUNGRY is the Kaplan diagonal of the
sentence ‘I am hungry’ as asserted by Ben. e Kaplan diagonal of a sentence  is the
set of contexts at which  is true.
Kaplan diagonal of : c:JKc;c =
fc: JKc;c = g =
fhw; t; hx1; : : : ; xnii: JKhw;t;hx1;:::;xnii;hw;t;hx1;:::;xnii = g
Recall that a context c is modelled by a sequenced world. So the Kaplan diagonal
is a sequenced worlds content. Recall also that when a sequenced world represents a
context, the ﬁrst individual of the sequence, x1, represents the speaker of the context. ‘I
am hungry’ is true at all contexts in which the speaker is hungry, which is just the set of
contexts hw; t; hx1; : : : ; xnii such that x1 is hungry in w at t. So the Kaplan diagonal
of Ben’s assertion in a conversation with one addressee is HUNGRY, as required.
e Kaplan diagonal is the right speech act content of ﬁrst-personal assertions only
in the case where the speaker happens to be the ﬁrst individual in the conversational
Ninan (a) oﬀers a clear and illuminating exposition of Lewis’ point, as well as the various options for
deﬁning speech act content in a Kaplan-style intensional semantics.
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sequence. e Kaplan diagonal is a set of contexts, and the sequenced worlds represent-
ing contexts have by convention always the same individual-slot represent the speaker
of the context – we have picked the ﬁrst slot, x1. So given the conversational sequence
hBen, Annai, Ben’s assertion of ‘I am hungry’ will be accepted by Anna in case she
thinks Ben, the ﬁrst member of the conversational sequence represented in the context
by x1, is hungry. But given that ‘I’ always picks out the speaker of the context, which
we ﬁxed as x1, the Kaplan diagonal of Anna’s assertion of ‘I am hungry’ is also the set
of sequenced worlds such that x1 is hungry in w at t, i.e. HUNGRY. Yet for Ben and
Anna to presuppose HUNGRY, relative to the conversational sequence hBen, Annai,
is to accept that Ben is hungry. And that is clearly not the eﬀect of Anna’s assertion of
‘I am hungry.’
What Anna in fact says is that the center representing her, relative to the conver-
sational sequence, is hungry: fhw; t; hx1; x2ii: x2 is hungry in w at tg. We can get
this content from the Kaplan diagonal by simply swapping around the centers. So in
conversations with just two interlocutors, speech act content is the Kaplan diagonal in
case the speaker is the person that comes ﬁrst in the conversational sequence, and it is
the Kaplan diagonal with the centers swapped around in case the speaker comes second
in the conversational sequence.
Generalising this rule for conversations with more than two interlocutors, it is help-
ful to introduce the notion of an m-inverse:
For any sequenced worlds contents p and q, q is the m-inverse of p iﬀ for all se-
quenced worlds hw; t; hx1; : : : ; xnii andm n: hw; t; hx1; : : : ; xm; : : : ; xnii 2
q iﬀ hw; t; hxm; : : : ; x1; : : : ; xnii 2 p.
us, if the person that comes second in the conversational sequence makes an assertion
of a sentence , the speech act content is the -inverse of the Kaplan diagonal of , as
above. In general, an assertion of  by the mth member of the conversational sequence
expresses the m-inverse of the Kaplan diagonal of  – that is, the Kaplan diagonal with
x1 and xm swapped around. We can thus give the following deﬁnition of speech act
content:
S  SW
In a conversational context hwc; tc; hx1; : : : ; xm; : : : ; xnii the content of an
utterance of  by xm is the m-inverse of the Kaplan diagonal of .
e notion of an m-inverse is a generalisation of Ninan’s notion of inverse, which he deﬁnes for sequenced
worlds content with only two centers in the sequence.
In the special case where the speaker comes ﬁrst in the conversational sequence – as Ben above – the speech
act content is the -inverse of the Kaplan diagonal. Since swapping x1 around with itself is vacuous, the
-inverse of the Kaplan diagonal just is the Kaplan diagonal, as desired.
. Speech Act Content 
S  SW also yields the desired content for ﬁrst-personal taste claims.
Since such taste claims do not put any condition on one center of the sequence that they
do not put on every other, swapping centers around is vacuous. And since PPTs in ﬁrst-
personal uses do not introduce dependence on context of the intension of the whole
sentence, S  SW is in fact equivalent to the (m-inverse of the) Kaplan
horizontal of the sentence. e speech act contentSW of Ben’s assertion of ‘Liquorice is
tasty’ in a conversation with Anna is (.):
(.) hw; t; hx1; x2ii:JLiquorice is tasty PROCKhw;t;hx1;x2ii;hw;t;hx1;x2ii
= fhw; t; hx1; x2ii: JLiquorice is tasty PROCKhw;t;hx1;x2ii;hw;t;hx1;x2ii = g
= fhw; t; hx1; x2ii: liquorice tastes good to hx1; x2i in w at tg
Two comments on S  SW are in order. First, it is important to realise
that S  SW, as we have deﬁned it, diagonalises over entire contexts.
It thereby aﬀects the interpretation of all context-sensitive expressions. So whenever we
use, say, a demonstrative expression, we communicate contents in which the reference
of this expression is not determinately resolved. For instance, in a conversation between
two people, an assertion of ‘is is Steve’ expresses the speech act contentSW in (.):
(.) fhw; t; hx1; x2ii: the object demonstrated in hw; t; hx1; x2ii is Steve in w at
tg
One might object that it is implausible that an assertion of ‘is is Steve’ expresses
the content in (.). For standard context-sensitive expressions other than ‘I’/‘you’,
one might want to stay true to one’s philosophical commitments to Kaplan’s direct
reference view of ‘this’ and ‘that.’ It is worth noting that these commitments are not
incompatible with the sequenced worlds model. Diagonalising in a way that aﬀects
all pronouns, demonstratives and other context-sensitive expressions alike is not the
only option. Appendix .A at the end of this chapter outlines two ways of diagonal-
ising that leave the reference of demonstratives and other context-sensitive expressions
unchanged. Diagonalising over entire contexts is not forced on us.
ere is, however, reason to think that standard demonstratives and other context-
sensitive expressions make contributions to speech act content as in (.). e class
of cases in which we need to diagonalise, in which horizontal content cannot be what
is communicated, is wider than so far discussed. We often use demonstrative and other
context-sensitive expressions when there is no common knowledge of all the features
relevant to resolving the reference of these expressions in the context of use. Consider
two cases from Perry ().
A hiker who is lost in the wilderness is looking at a lake and a mountain and does
not know whether he is facing Gilmore Lake and Mt. Tallac or Clyde Lake and Jack’s
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peak. He is ignorant of the spatial location of his context. Suppose he is then told, ‘is
is Gilmore Lake and that is Mt. Tallac’, and thus comes to know where he is. Prior to
this assertion, the context set – the set of contexts that he and his interlocutor mutually
accept as possibilities for their actual context – contains contexts that are located within
sight of Gilmore Lake and Mt. Tallac and contexts located near Clyde Lake and Jack’s
peak. So when the hiker is told, ‘is is Gilmore Lake and that is Mt. Tallac’, he is
unable to derive the Kaplan horizontal, since for some contexts compatible with what
he presupposes, ‘this’ and ‘that’ refer to Gilmore Lake and Mt. Tallac, and for some
contexts, ‘this’ and ‘that’ refer to Clyde Lake and Jack’s peak. However, he can derive
the diagonal content such that what the speaker demonstrates ﬁrst is Gilmore Lake and
what the speaker demonstrates second is Mt. Tallac. e diagonal will allow him to
eliminate all the contexts from the context set that are located near Clyde Lake and
Jack’s peak, and he will come to know that what he is looking at is Gilmore Lake and
Mt. Tallac.
Similarly, consider Perry’s professor who knows that the departmental meeting
starts at noon but does not know that, as he is thinking about whether or not it is
time to go to the meeting, it is noon. So when he is told, ‘e meeting starts now,’ he
won’t be able to retrieve the Kaplan horizontal, since due to his ignorance the context
set contains contexts in which it is noon and contexts in which it is some time other
than noon. However, he is in a position to derive the diagonal such that the meeting
starts at the time of speaking, which allows him to eliminate from the context set all
contexts other than those in which it is noon.
ere are thus cases of de hic and de nunc communication in which diagonal con-
tent is the only plausible communicated information.
But is it plausible to assume that diagonal content is always the content expressed
in speech, even in cases of perfectly smooth communication, where there is no rel-
evant contextual ignorance? is concerns the second important comment: S
 SW entails that the content expressed in communication is always (the m-
inverse of ) diagonal content. Note that while diagonal content is the only plausible can-
didate for speech act content in cases in which there is ignorance among interlocutors
as to the features of context relevant to resolving the reference of demonstratives and
other context-sensitive expressions, it is harmless to posit diagonal content in cases of
smooth communication, in which there is no such ignorance among interlocutors. In
these cases, a theory on which horizontal content is communicated and our theory on
which diagonal content is communicated make exactly the same predictions. is is
best seen by considering a simple example. Suppose James says to Liz, ‘Sam isn’t
here’ at a point in the conversation where it is mutual knowledge that the location of
the conversation is the British Library, London. en the context set will contain only
Heim () provides a proof of this result.
. Competing Solutions 
contexts hw; t; hx1; x2ii in which x1 and x2 are located in the British Library in w at
t. e Kaplan horizontal of James’s assertion is
(.) fhw; t; hx1; x2ii: Sam is not in the British Library in w at tg.
e (-inverse of the) Kaplan diagonal of James’s assertion is
(.) fhw; t; hx1; x2ii: Sam is not in the location of hw; t; hx1; x2ii in w at tg.
If Liz understands James’s assertion and trusts him to be truthful, the eﬀect of James’s
assertion will be an update of the context set by intersecting it with the assertion’s
content. Now, the update with (.) and the update with (.) have exactly the
same eﬀect, for the context set prior to the assertion contains only contexts located
in the British Library. So intersection with (.) will eliminate all of the British-
Library contexts in which Sam is in the British Library, and intersection with (.)
will eliminate all of the British-Library contexts in which Sam is in the British-Library
context. In both cases, the post-assertion context set will only contain British-Library
contexts in which Sam is not in the British Library.
In conclusion, diagonalisation is needed for various cases of de se, de nunc, and de hic
ignorance, and theories that posit horizontal content make exactly the same empirical
predictions as our theory on which communicated content is always diagonal content
for conversations in which there is no such ignorance. Given this equivalence, we
should prefer the simpler theory that makes diagonalisation the general rule: S
 SW.
. Competing Solutions
e sequenced worlds model shows that the conﬂict between the Lockean picture of
communication and the self-locating belief model can be resolved without giving up
either. But there are other accounts that solve the conﬂict by giving up either the Lock-
ean picture or the self-locating belief model. I will here discuss some of these accounts
and point out some of their respective disadvantages. With the notable exception of
Egan (), none of these views provide a uniﬁed account of the communication of
both de se and subjective attitudes. I will suggest ways to extend the existing accounts
of the communication of de se attitudes to that of subjective attitudes. Some of my
criticisms will concern the prospects of such extensions. Before I begin, let me repeat
that both the self-location account and the Lockean picture are very attractive accounts
of mental attitudes and linguistic communication, respectively, so saving the core of
both of them should be seen as a major advantage of the sequenced worlds over all of
these competitors.
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.. Centered Belief Content without Lockean Communication
... Boring Speech Act Content
Egan (, , a) solves the problem of the conﬂict by denying that in de se
communication, interesting centered content is transmitted along Lockean lines. At
the level of thought, both de se and taste attitudes have interesting centered content.
But only the contents of taste beliefs get communicated directly, de se contents do
not. Assertions about oneself express boring centered contents – equivalently, possible
worlds contents. First- and second-personal singular pronouns have their well-known
Kaplanian semantics, on which they contribute the speaker, or the addressee, to the
content expressed. So when Ben at noon thinks de se that he is hungry, and says, ‘I
am hungry,’ he expresses the boring centered content fhw; t; xi: Ben is hungry in
w at noong. Egan endorses a common ground model of conversation on which the
context set is a set of centered worlds. Successful taste assertions update with interesting
centered contents, de se claims with boring centered contents.
To account for the fact that de se communication can result in the acquisition of
de te or de se beliefs on the hearer’s part, Egan must complement this account. As
it stands, an addressee of Ben’s assertion of ‘I am hungry’ only acquires the boring
centered content that Ben is hungry. If she is to gain a piece of de se information,
she must infer it from the perfectly ordinary information about the world she receives.
On the completed account, then, speech is not the direct expression of de se thought,
and what is said is not what hearers come to believe when they acquire a de se belief.
S’  , S  , and H’  
are not the same, and explanations of B-  and S-
  will turn out to be rather complex. All core tenets of the Lockean
picture are abandoned.
e view needs to be further complicated to account for many cases of de se com-
munication. What does Anna learn when Ben introduces himself by saying ‘I am Ben’?
Not the necessary but uninformative proposition that Ben is Ben, which is the boring
centered content the Kaplanian semantics delivers. Egan (a, ) suggests that
hearers come to acquire the diagonal content of the sentence by exploiting the prag-
matic mechanisms described in Stalnaker (). On Egan’s account, the diagonal
of Ben’s assertion is something like the interesting content fhw; t; xi: the speaker in
A boring centered worlds content p does not distinguish between locations in a world: p is boring iﬀ for
every world w and pairs ht1; xi, ht2; yi such that individual x inhabits w at time t1 and y inhabits w at
t2, p contains hw; t1; xi iﬀ it contains hw; t2; yi. See section ...
Moss (forthcoming) endorses a very similar account of de se communication, without taking a stance on
discourse about matters of taste. Stephenson (a) endorses a very similar account of discourse about
taste, without taking a stance on de se communication.
Stalnaker (, -) was the ﬁrst to sketch this account of de se communication for the Lewisian and
criticised it on the grounds that it must deny that speech is the straightforward expression of thought.
. Competing Solutions 
hw; t; xi is Ben in w at tg, from which Anna infers the de se content such that the
center is being addressed by Ben.
ere are also some worries about the conception of common ground in terms
of centered worlds. If conversation is the joint project of carving out possibilities,
whose possibilities does the context set represent? Ways the speaker might be, or ways
the hearer might be? One possibility, suggested by Egan (p.c.), is that the context set
represents the speaker’s possibilities relative to the speaker and the hearer’s possibilities
relative to the hearer. But this leaves it unclear what we are agreeing on in disputes
about taste, if the speaker proposes an update of her possibilities and the hearer accepts
an update of his possibilities.
Alternatively, the context set could represent the possibilities of the conversational
group, possibilities all members of the group share. is is Stephenson’s proposal
(a, ). But on this view, centered worlds play two distinct roles in private
attitudes like belief and the public attitude of presupposition towards the common
ground: representing possibilities for the individual attitude holder, and representing
possibilities for the conversational group. While private belief is still self -location, the
base attitude in presupposition (belief or assumption according to Stalnaker) must be
group-location. e view needs to explain how speakers come to make the step from
self- to group-location if they are to propose or accept changes to the common ground
purely on the basis of their private beliefs.
... Speaker-Centric Speech Act Content and Recentering
Another way to solve the de se problem, endorsed by Heim () and Weber (),
is to hold on to the expression of de se thought in speech but deny that hearers come
to believe what is said. at is, S   is identical to S’ 
 but not to H’  . e picture is this. When Ben says
‘I am hungry,’ the asserted content is the interesting centered content of his belief:
fhw; t; xi: x is hungry in w at tg. e hearer arrives at the content she ends up
believing by recentering : From the speech act content and her beliefs about how she is
related to the speaker, she infers the de se content fhw; t; xi: x is addressed by someone
hungry inw at tg. In general, recentering is an operation that takes a centered content
p and outputs a centered content q = fhw; t; xi: x bears relation R uniquely to y, and
p(w; t; y)g, where R is a relation which is determined by the context of utterance and
by which the addressee identiﬁes the speaker.
is account, too, was ﬁrst mentioned by Stalnaker (, -), who criticised it for the indirectness
it imputes on communication.
e recentering operation, as a result of which hearers comes to self -ascribe a property q where the speaker
self-ascribed p, is essentially what for Lewis amounts to the ascription of a property to others (Lewis, a,
).
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Recentering makes evident that the account also gives up the Lockean picture:
e speaker believes and asserts one de se content, hearers infer another. And because
hearers may be related to the speaker in diﬀerent ways – e.g., only one of them can
be the addressee of the singular pronoun ‘you’ – each hearer may infer a diﬀerent de se
content.
One drawback of the view is that the Stalnakerian model of common ground must
be given up because there is no single content that speaker and audience come to pre-
suppose as a result of successful communication. For the same reason, the account of
disagreement in conversation has to be more complicated than the simple story avail-
able to other options, on which two speakers disagree in case there is a single content
that one accepts and the other rejects.
More importantly, the view, designed to explain de se communication, cannot solve
the incompatibility problem. Applied to taste communication, it makes the wrong
predictions. If the speaker, in saying ‘is cookie is tasty,’ expresses her belief with the
content
(.) COOKIE : fhw; t; xi: the (salient) cookie tastes good to x in w at tg,
the hearer will, by recentering, infer something like the content fhw; t; xi: x is ad-
dressed by someone to whom the cookie tastes good in w at tg. Surely, that is not
what the hearer comes to believe. On the contrary, the hearer comes to believe, simply,
COOKIE.
One may think that the right account of taste communication can be combined
with the recentering view by declaring a systematic diﬀerence between taste and de se
communication: In recentering, hearers use diﬀerent relations – something like be-
ing addressed by for de se assertions and the identity relation for taste assertions. is
proposal, however, cannot account for mixed assertions, such as ‘My cookies are tasty’
and ‘My pants are on ﬁre and that’s not fun,’ which on the proposal require hearers to
recenter in inconsistent ways.
.. Lockean Communication without Centered Belief Content
Perry (, ) argued that de se attitudes are attitudes to regular propositions and
that their distinctive cognitive signiﬁcance is due to the ﬁrst-personal mode of presenta-
tion (so-called ‘belief states’) by which propositions are entertained. Simplifying some-
what, when Ben believes de se that he is hungry, he believes, in a ﬁrst-personal way,
the proposition that Ben is hungry. Ben communicates his de se belief by asserting ‘I
am hungry,’ which given a Kaplanian semantics expresses the proposition that Ben is
hungry. If communication is successful, the audience comes to believe that very pro-
position. e Lockean picture is thus preserved. Speaker and audience believe the same
proposition, albeit under diﬀerent modes.
. Objections 
Perry’s account of de se attitudes may be combined with elements of Moltmann’s
() account of thought and talk about taste. On her account, assertions about mat-
ters of taste express contents with absolute truth conditions but to which our cognitive
access is essentially ﬁrst-personal. Very roughly, ‘is cookie is tasty’ has the logical
form Gn x this cookie is tasty to x, where Gn is a generic quantiﬁer whose domain is
contextually restricted; an assertion of this sentence expresses, roughly, that the cookie
tastes good to the individuals in the domain. We grasp this content in a ﬁrst-personal
way by taking the domain to contain only individuals with which we identify. is
identiﬁcation marks the special ﬁrst-personal mode of presentation with which taste
contents are entertained.
Perry’s account may seem simpler than the sequenced worlds model and therefore
preferable. As it stands, however, it avoids the conﬂict by ignoring its cause. e fact
that what is a de se belief for the speaker becomes a de te belief for the hearer, and vice
versa. For an utterance of ‘I am hungry,’ Perry’s account needs to explain the systematic
coordination of speaker’s ﬁrst-personal mode of presentation, the words used to express
the thought, and the hearer’s second-personal mode of presentation. On one way of
understanding modes of presentation, they are associated with functions from contexts
(a believer at a time and world) to propositions (such as that Ben is hungry); they are
the mental equivalents of the Kaplanian characters of the sentences used to express the
beliefs. On another way of understanding modes of presentation, they are associated
with functions from contexts to contents true at the contexts; if contexts are understood
as centered worlds, the set of contexts that get mapped to true contents, for a given
mode of presentation, is the set of centered worlds the Lewisian takes to be the object
of the attitude. Whatever the exact understanding of modes of presentation, a complete
mode of presentation account is not simpler than the sequenced worlds model, it just
locates de se aspects in a diﬀerent place.
ere are also some drawbacks to locating the subjective dimension of taste judg-
ments in the modes of presentation. Moltmann’s account, for instance, needs to explain
why we would systematically entertain contents about taste in a way that leads many to
erroneous judgments. For Moltmann’s contents have absolute truth conditions – their
truth depends on the tastes of the contextually selected domain of people. Neverthe-
less, our taste judgments diﬀer vastly and statistical data on people’s tastes usually do
not help settle disputes.
. Objections
.. Belief and Sequenced Worlds Content
Objection. e notion of belief in sequenced worlds content is one on which thinkers
do not just locate themselves but the entire conversational group of which they are a
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member. But clearly, this is not a plausible notion of belief outside of conversational
contexts.
Response. In solitary thinking and soliloquy, in which the thinker is not addressing
anyone in a second-personal way, we can think of belief as locating the ‘group’ that
consists just of the thinker herself. at is, her belief content is a set of sequenced
worlds whose sequences have a single center – i.e., it is a centered worlds content. So
in solitary contexts, belief naturally amounts to self-location.
.. On Believing in Context
Objection. e previous response entails that belief in a conversational context and
belief in a solitary context come apart. For instance, Ben’s belief that I am hungry, prior
to a conversation with Anna, has centered worlds content p: fhw; t; xi: x is hungry in
w at tg. But p is not the content he communicates to Anna on the sequenced worlds
model when he says ‘I am hungry.’ Instead he communicates q, given the conversational
sequence hBen, Annai: q = fhw; t; hx1; x2ii: x1 is hungry inw at tg. To see that p 6= q,
note that by the equivalence established in S    
 , q = q’ :
q’ = fhw; t; xi: there are individuals x1; x2 such that x = x1, x is addressing
x2, and x1 is hungry in w at tg
If we uphold the Lockean picture on which the same content plays the role of S
  and M , then Ben is not communicating the content of
the belief he has prior to conversation. Instead, he has to subtly modify the beliefs he
brings to the conversation if he wants to communicate them. But that is implausible.
Response: It is true that on the sequenced worlds model, Ben’s belief contents undergo
a subtle transformation when he enters a conversational context. I cannot here oﬀer a
complete theory of belief update over time. But one thing can be said: Given the beliefs
Ben acquires by entering a conversation, his belief in p is equivalent to his belief in q’.
Ben’s overall belief state in w at t, Doxhw; t;Beni, can be modelled as the set of centered
worlds compatible with what he believes in w at t. If Ben in w1 and at some time
t1 prior to conversation believes de se that he is hungry, his belief state Doxhw1; t1;Beni
contains only centered worlds that are elements of p. If at t2, Ben enters a conver-
sation with Anna by telling her, ‘I am hungry,’ he acquires the de se belief that I am
addressing someone – call its content r. So Doxhw1; t2;Beni contains only centered worlds
which are members of r. But given Doxhw1; t2;Beni, the belief in p and the belief in
q’ are equivalent in the following sense: updating Doxhw1; t2;Beni with p would have
the same result as updating with q’. More generally, for any doxastic state that con-
tains only r-centered worlds, its intersection with p equals its intersection with q’. e
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only diﬀerence between p and q’ is that the latter requires that the center is address-
ing someone. Since Doxhw1; t2;Beni already contains only centered worlds in which the
center is addressing someone, updating with p as well as updating with q’ will have the
eﬀect of eliminating all centered worlds except those in which the center is hungry.
Hence there is nothing mysterious about the contents of Ben’s beliefs changing when
he enters a conversation. e cognitive signiﬁcance they have for him is the same in
the conversational context.
.. Objecting on Someone Else’s Behalf
Objection. On the sequenced worlds view, it seems that I can object to updating the
common ground with the content of a bare taste claim on someone else’s behalf. For
instance, on the view Bill’s rejoinder in the following conversation between Ben, Sal
and Jim should be a natural conversational move.
(.) Ben: is liquorice is tasty.
Sal: ? I disagree/No. Jim doesn’t like it.
Response. Sal’s rejoinder is odd for two reasons: (i) It is generally odd to speak for
people who are present in the conversation when it comes to value judgments. ere
is some oddity in Sal’s reply even in the following conversation between Ben, Sal, and
Jim.
(.) Ben: Jim ﬁnds this liquorice tasty.
Sal: ? I disagree/No. Jim ﬁnds it disgusting.
(ii) It is odd to speak on other people’s behalf when they are present because the epi-
stemic access we have to their tastes is much less immediate than their own access. Note
that it is much less odd to object on behalf of someone who, for whatever reason, is less
well positioned to express their taste judgments. For instance, it is not so odd to object
on a child’s behalf – especially when agreement or disagreement as a group matters for
practical purposes.
.. Sameness of Content
Objection. On the sequenced worlds model, assertions of the same sentence by the
same person in diﬀerent conversations may express diﬀerent contents where intuitively,
they are the same. If Ben says ‘I am hungry’ in a conversation with one addressee, it
will express a diﬀerent content than an assertion of the same sentence by Ben in a
conversation with two addressees. e ﬁrst will express a pair-centered content, the
second a content whose worlds are centered on a sequence with three individuals. But
it seems that what he said is the same on both occasions.
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Response. It is true that sequenced worlds speech act content depends on facts about
the context, namely the number of participants in the conversation. As a result, asser-
tions of the same sentence by the same speaker may express diﬀerent sets of sequenced
worlds in contexts that diﬀer only with respect to the number of interlocutors. But
while intuitions about ‘what is said’ are themselves highly context-dependent and can
track diﬀerent aspects of meaning, there is one aspect of meaning which is stable
across the diﬀerent contexts of Ben’s assertion, and which is closely related to the con-
tent represented as sets of sequenced worlds. To see this, let us take a step back. A
sequenced worlds content, just like a possible worlds content, can be understood as
a way of distinguishing between alternative possibilities. Possible worlds content is a
way of distinguishing between ways the world might be. Sequenced worlds content
is a way of distinguishing between ways a number of people might be. Both types of
content are partitions of a space of possibilities. For sequenced worlds content, that
space of possibilities itself may diﬀer in kind from context to context, depending on
the number of people whose possibilities are represented. It can thus yield diﬀerent sets
of sequenced worlds – sets of worlds with sequences of diﬀerent length. If we under-
stand content as a way of distinguishing between group possibilities, then the content
of Ben’s assertion is stable across contexts. Technically, this stable aspect of meaning is a
function from a conversational context that includes an ordered n-tuple of participants
to a set of sequenced worlds. All of Ben’s assertions have in common the function that
takes a conversational sequence (of any length) to a set of sequenced worlds such that
the center representing the speaker is hungry in the world at the time.
.. ‘Tasty to us’
Objection: On the sequenced worlds view of speech act content, an assertion of ‘Li-
quorice is tasty to us’ expresses the same speech act contentSW as an assertion of ‘Li-
quorice is tasty.’ In a conversation between two people, they both express (.).
(.) fhw; t; hx1; x2ii: liquorice tastes good to hx1; x2i in w at tg
But an assertion of ‘Liquorice is tasty to us’ does not have the same communicative
eﬀects as an assertion of ‘Liquorice is tasty.’ For instance, in a conversational context
in which it is common belief that liquorice fails to taste good to at least one of the
addressees, the assertion ‘Liquorice is tasty to us’ seems infelicitous. But a speaker to
whom liquorice tastes good can still felicitously assert ‘Liquorice is tasty’ in that context.
So it seems that the two assertions have diﬀerent truth conditions.
Among the vast literature, see for instance Lewis (), Cappelen and Hawthorne (, ch.) and
Stojanovic ().
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Response. I will suggest that in contexts in which ‘us’ picks out the conversational
group, assertions of ‘Liquorice is tasty’ and ‘Liquorice is tasty to us’ do in fact have
the same assertability conditions, contrary to appearance. To explain the perceived
diﬀerence in appropriate assertability in the objection’s example, however, I will ﬁrst
have to say much more about norms of assertion and the pragmatics of disputes about
taste. e full response will therefore have to wait until section ..
.. Negated Taste Claims
Objection. e semantics for PPTs, together with the deﬁnition of S  -
SW on the sequenced worlds model of communication, makes the wrong predic-
tions for negated taste claims. Consider the following assertion by Ben:
(.) a. is liquorice is not tasty.
b. [ [is liquorice] [is not tasty PROC] ]
In the conversational context hwc; tc; hBen, Annaii, Ben’s assertion expresses the con-
tent LIQUORICE :
(.) LIQUORICE : fhw; t; hx1; x2ii: the liquorice does not taste good to hx1; x2i
in w at tg
LIQUORICE is true at a triple hw1; t1; hy1; y2ii just in case it is not the case that the
liquorice is tasty to both y1 and y2 in w1 at t1. Consider the situation in which Ben
does not like the liquorice, but Anna does. In this situation, LIQUORICE is true, and
thus Anna should accept Ben’s proposal to update with LIQUORICE. But intuitively,
Anna should not accept Ben’s assertion, since she does like liquorice. It seems that Ben
and Anna should agree on (.a) only if the liquorice is not tasty to either of them. So
LIQUORICE cannot be what Ben expresses in (.a), contrary to what is predicted
on the sequenced worlds view.
Response. In fact, the view does not predict that (.a) always expresses LIQUORICE.
(.a) is ambiguous and has two readings. On the ﬁrst, the negation takes wide scope
over PROC, as in (.b). On this wide scope reading, (.a) expresses LIQUORICE.
On the second reading, negation takes narrow scope. is reading is obtained when
PROC is moved to the front of the sentence:
is objection bears some similarity to an objection Lasersohn (, -) raises against a form of
indexical contextualism that says that an assertion of ‘Liquorice is not tasty,’ at least in some contexts,
expresses the content that liquorice is not tasty to the group that includes speaker and hearer. Indexical
contextualists may avail themselves of the reply I give below depending on the syntactic and semantic
details of their view.
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(.) PROC this liquorice is not tasty
On this narrow scope reading, (.a) expresses LIQUORICE’.
(.) LIQUORICE’ : fhw; t; hx1; x2ii: to hx1; x2i, the liquorice does not taste
good in w at tg
LIQUORICE’ is true at a triple hw1; t1; hy1; y2ii just in case the liquorice tastes good
to neither y1 nor y2 in w1 at t1. us LIQUORICE’ is not true in the situation in
which Ben does not like the liquorice but Anna does. On the narrow scope reading, the
sequenced worlds model correctly predicts that Anna should not accept Ben’s assertion
(.a).
It is plausible to think that PROC can be moved to the front of the sentence, just
like overt experiencer arguments can be moved to the front:
(.) To Ben and Sal, this liquorice is tasty.
(.) To Ben and Sal, this liquorice is not tasty.
(.) To everyone in their right mind, this liquorice is not tasty.
For (.) and (.), the default readings are narrow scope readings. For instance,
(.) is naturally understood as true just in case for every x in their right mind, the
liquorice does not taste good to x. So it is plausible to assume that (.), where PROC
is moved to the front, expresses LIQUORICE’.
Finally, narrow scope readings are also the strongly preferred readings when the
overt experiencer argument has not been moved to the front. Consider (.):
(.) ? is liquorice isn’t tasty to Ben and Sal, but it is tasty to Ben.
(.) is clearly odd at ﬁrst sight. But if the ﬁrst conjunct, ‘is liquorice isn’t tasty to
Ben and Sal,’ is read with negation taking wide scope, the whole sentence may still be
true – in a situation where the liquorice tastes good to Ben but not to Sal. However, the
oddity is easily explained on the reading of the ﬁrst conjunct on which negation takes
narrow scope. In this case, the second conjunct, ‘it is tasty to Ben,’ is a ﬂat contradiction
of the ﬁrst conjunct.
In sum, it is plausible to assume that for Ben’s assertion of (.a), ‘is liquorice
is not tasty,’ the default reading is the narrow scope reading, for which the sequenced
worlds model predicts the speech act content LIQUORICE’ and makes the right pre-
dictions about the acceptance conditions for the hearer.
. Conclusion 
. Conclusion
I have argued that the conﬂict between a Lewisian view of belief as self-location and
the received Lockean picture of communication can be resolved by conceiving of the
contents of mental attitudes and speech acts as sets of sequenced worlds – possible
worlds ‘centered’ on a sequence of individuals at a time. Sequenced worlds content
is the kind of centered information that is transferred from speaker’s head to hearer’s
head in successful communication. Communication, on the sequenced worlds view,
is the project of distinguishing between possible ways the group of interlocutors might
be and involves the coordination of participants’ individual perspectives. e point
of assertions about matters of taste is to reach a joint perspective. e aim of de se
assertions is to establish the speaker’s individual possibilities.
ere are other solutions of the conﬂict. But all of them must give up either the
self-locating account of belief or the Lockean picture of communication. e major
theoretical beneﬁt of the sequenced worlds view is that it provides a uniﬁed account
of thought and communication which preserves the insights of both the received and
simple Lockean picture of communication and the self-locating account of belief.
 Perspective in Context: Sequenced Worlds
.A Diagonalisation and Context-Sensitivity
In section ., speech act content is the result of (taking the m-inverse of the result of )
diagonalising the sentence’s semantic value: c:JKc;c. As a consequence, not only the
contribution of ﬁrst- and second-person pronouns to speech act content is aﬀected, but
also the contribution of any expression whose extension varies with the context of use
(e.g., demonstratives and indexicals). In sections . and ., we assumed Kaplanian
entries for all of the following expressions.
Given a context of use c = hw; t; hx1; x2ii that determines a unique location lc of
c,
(.) JIKc;i = x1
(.) JyouKc;i = x2
(.) JhereKc;i = lc
(.) JnowKc;i = t
(.) JthisKc;i = the object demonstrated in c
We can, however, give diﬀerent entries for these expressions so that diagonalisation af-
fects only the contribution of ﬁrst- and second-person pronouns but not other context-
sensitive expressions. ere are at least two ways to do this. To keep it simple, I will
exemplify the diﬀerence for the entries for ‘I’ and ‘this.’
. Let a context of use be c0 = hw; t; hx1; x2i; si, where s is the object salient in c0.
(.) JIKc;i = x1
(.) JthisKc;i = sc
(.) Speech act content of a sentence  at a context of use c:
hw; t; hx1; x2ii:JKhw;t;hx1;x2i;sci;hw;t;hx1;x2ii
(.)-abstracts not over all features of the context of use but only over hw; t; hx1; x2ii,
and  is evaluated with respect to a context including sc, the object that is salient at
the context of use c. Since ‘this’ takes as its referent s, the diagonal speech act content
of an assertion of ‘I like this’ at c is (.):
(.) fhw; t; hx1; x2ii: x1 likes sc in w at tg
. Let a context of use be c = hw; t; hx1; x2ii. e interpretation function maps an
expression , a context c, an index i, and an assignment function g to extensions.
g is a contextually determined function that takes numerical indices to objects. e
demonstrative ‘this’ is encoded at LF with a numerical index, e.g., this.
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(.) JIKc;i;g = x1
(.) JthisKc;i;g = g()
(.) Speech act content of a sentence  at a context of use c:
c0:JKc0;c0;gc
(.) -abstracts over the entire context. But the semantic value of ‘this’ does not
depend on the context that is being abstracted over. Instead, it gets its value from g,
which is determined by the context of use c. So the speech act content of an assertion
of ‘I like this’ at c is (.):
(.) fhw; t; hx1; x2ii: x1 likes gc() in w at tg
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SEQUENCED WORLDS, EAVESDROPPING, RETRACTION
. Introduction
It is popular among linguists and philosophers with relativist leanings to understand
content, in particular the content of beliefs about subjective matters such as personal
taste and of sentences expressing such beliefs, as sets of centered worlds – possible worlds
‘centered’ on an individual inhabiting the world at some time. Many philosophers
and linguists also believe that de se attitudes, attitudes about oneself, have centered
worlds content. In chapter  we saw that centered worlds content is in conﬂict with
the received Lockean picture of communication, on which communication involves
the transmission of information from speaker’s head to hearer’s head. Chapter  de-
veloped a solution to the conﬂict in terms of sequenced worlds content – sets of possible
worlds ‘centered’ on a group of individuals – which reconciles the Lockean picture of
communication with key aspects of the self-location account of attitudes underlying
the centered worlds approach. On the emerging picture of communication, to engage
in conversation is to distinguish between alternative ways that the conversational par-
ticipants might be, where this does not require that all share the ways they individually
might be.
Chapter  also outlined a compositional semantics for predicates of personal taste
and ﬁrst- and second-personal pronouns that draws upon Stephenson (a) and Ka-
plan () in key respects. But this semantics and the sequenced worlds model leave
many questions open. Crucially, the model as developed does not yet make predictions
about the data that has been of central concern in debates between relativists and con-
textualists about predicates of personal taste. So what are the views’ predictions about
eavesdropping, retraction, and disagreement? Is the fully developed sequenced worlds
view a form of contextualism or relativism about predicates of personal taste?
Chapters  and  are devoted to answering these questions. I will begin by showing
that the sequenced worlds model, as it stands, is neutral between versions of contex-
tualism and relativism about assertions regarding matters of taste. More precisely, it
is neutral between nonindexical contextualism and truth relativism. I will then look
at empirical data from eavesdropping and retraction in chapter  and from disagree-
See for instance Egan et al. (), Egan (, a), Lasersohn () and Stephenson (a) for
centered worlds versions of relativism.

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ment cases and monadic truth ascriptions in chapter . e empirical data will help
us decide between the contextualist version and the relativist version of the sequenced
worlds model. To account for the pragmatic phenomena on the model, we will have to
develop it further in crucial respects. While the model can be developed in ways that
service either nonindexical contextualism or truth relativism, it exposes and highlights
some unfortunate consequences of nonindexical contextualism. Chapters  and  thus
contain an argument in favour of sequenced worlds relativism.
. Contextualism and Relativism
e sequenced worlds model, with the semantics and the notion of S  -
SW given in chapter , can be completed in diﬀerent ways to result in either a
version of nonindexical contextualism or truth relativism regarding predicates of per-
sonal taste.
Nonindexical contextualism and truth relativism about predicates of personal of
taste (PPTs) can each be characterised by three theses. e views share the ﬁrst two
theses.
I 
On its default ﬁrst-personal use, a sentence involving a PPT expresses a content
that is neutral with respect to the experiencer’s perspective or standard of taste.
I  sets apart nonindexical contextualism and truth relativism from
indexical contextualism. On a simple version of indexical contextualism about PPTs,
an utterance of ‘Liquorice is tasty’ by Anna expresses the content that liquorice is tasty to
Anna. On the contrary, nonindexical contextualism and truth relativism predict that
her utterance expresses the content that liquorice is tasty, in which no value is assigned to
e terms ‘nonindexical contextualism’ and ‘truth relativism’ are here used in MacFarlane’s (; )
sense, although I introduce them without using MacFarlane’s notions of indexicality, use-sensitivity and
assessment-sensitivity.
I  does not exclude PPTs from inducing some variability of content with context. Many
predicates of personal taste are gradable adjectives. For instance, an activity can be more fun than another
activity; a food can be somewhat tasty, or very tasty. Nonindexical contextualists and relativists can allow
sentences involving PPTs to express contents that are speciﬁc with respect to a degree element which can
vary with context of use (‘tasty to degree x’), as long as the degree element is determined independently
of the perspective of the experiencer. See Kennedy (, ) for discussion of the degree analysis
of gradable adjectives. Similarly, they can allow a comparison class to be determined by the context of
use, such that ‘tasty’ expresses ‘tasty for an x,’ where x is a contextually salient comparison class (e.g., the
class of all cookies), as long as this comparison class is determined independently of the perspective of
the experiencer. See Richard () for a relativist view on which a comparison class is determined by
the context of use. See, e.g., Kamp (), McConnell-Ginet (), and Klein () for the partial
predicate analysis.
. Contextualism and Relativism 
an experiencer argument. I  also distinguishes nonindexical contex-
tualism and truth relativism from content relativism (sometimes also called indexical
relativism), according to which what an utterance of a sentence involving a PPT ex-
presses is dependent on the interpreter’s context. On this view, a single utterance of
‘Liquorice is tasty’ by Anna may express the content that liquorice is tasty to Ben relative
to Ben’s context of interpretation, and the content that liquorice is tasty to Sal relative
to Sal’s context of interpretation. In what follows, I will use ‘relativism’ to mean truth
relativism, and the explicit ‘content relativism’ to refer to content relativism.
S
Propositional truth depends not just on the world (and time) of evaluation but
also on the individual(s) or standard of taste relative to which the proposition is
evaluated.
S allows for the truth of contents expressed by ﬁrst-personal uses of taste
claims to vary with the taste preferences of the individual whose perspective is relevant
to the evaluation of the claim.
Nonindexical contextualism and truth relativism diﬀer with respect to the third
thesis, the deﬁnition of truth. According to nonindexical contextualism, the truth of
sentences in context depends solely on features of that context.
N  
A sentence  containing a PPT, as used in c, is true iﬀ  is true at the context c
and the index determined by c.
According to truth relativism, the truth of sentences in context is relative to the per-
spective of an assessor.
R 
A sentence  containing a PPT, as used in a context c, is true relative to an
assessor iﬀ  is true at the context c and the index determined (at least in part)
by the assessor’s perspective.
Nonindexical contextualism about PPTs is the view that encompasses I -
, S and N  . According to the view,
See Cappelen (b,a) for an exposition of the content relativist view and for a summary of content
relativisms regarding conditionals (Weatherson, ), epistemic modals, and indexicals (Egan, ).
Cappelen’s main case for content relativism rests on predicates used in instructions, imperatives, and legal
texts. See MacFarlane (, ) to situate content relativism in MacFarlane’s taxonomy of theories.
Cf. Kaplan’s deﬁnition of truth in context (, )
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a sentence like ‘Liquorice is tasty,’ on a ﬁrst-personal use, it will express the experiencer-
neutral content that liquorice is tasty, whose truth depends on the perspective of the
individual salient at the context of its use. Once the context of use is ﬁxed, the truth
of a sentence, or content, does not further vary with anyone’s perspective.
Truth relativism about PPTs is the view that encompasses I ,
S and R . To get a relativism with bite, the thesis should be
added that one and the same sentence containing a PPT, on a single ﬁrst-personal use in
a context c1, may be true relative to the perspective P of one assessor and false relative
to the perspective P of another assessor.
I , S and R  (or N -
 ) are to be understood as constraints on semantic and pragmatic
theorising. Truth relativism (nonindexical contextualism) as deﬁned here is not it-
self a semantic or pragmatic theory. In particular, the theses deﬁning truth relativism
(nonindexical contextualism) are neutral on and compatible with diﬀerent semantic
implementations. So in order to see that the sequenced worlds model is compatible
with both nonindexical contextualism and truth relativism, we simply need to show
that the sequenced worlds model – in particular, the semantics for PPTs of section
. and the deﬁnition of S  SW of section . – validate I-
 , S and N   or R
. First, then, note that I  ﬁts with S  SW
because the diagonal content of a sentence  at any context of use c is c0:JKc0;c0 ,
which does not depend on c. Second, S is compatible with our semantics
for ﬁrst-personal uses of PPTs, since PROC takes as its value the sequence coordinate
of the index, and the truth of sequenced worlds speech act contents crucially depends
on the values of the sequence.
ird, the sequenced worlds model is also compatible with either N
  or R . To see this, it will be helpful to ﬁrst clarify
the relation between the compositional semantics and these notions of truth and then
show that the sequenced worlds semantics of chapter  allows the formulation of either
notion of truth. We are then in a position to show that the sequenced worlds model is
compatible with N   and also with R 
(but not together).
e notion of truth is crucial for the connection between the compositional se-
mantics and the use of expressions in the language for which the semantics is given.
Without this thesis, relativism is compatible with the view that there is only one valid perspective that
assessors may adopt, so that a single taste claim will never be true from one assessor’s perspective but false
from another assessor’s perspective.
e theses deﬁning relativism are compatible with all major truth relativist views on taste, such as Egan
et al. (), Egan (a), Kolbel (), Lasersohn (), MacFarlane (), Richard () and
Stephenson (a).
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To see why it is important, let us take a step back. Truth-conditional theories of se-
mantic meaning go hand in hand with the idea that to know the meaning of a sentence
requires knowing the conditions under which the sentence is true. is knowledge
enables speakers to use sentences in contexts appropriately. But intensional compos-
itional semantics of the sort we have been considering do not themselves provide a
notion of truth that tells us when a sentence, as used in a context, is true. e se-
mantics formulated in section . provides a notion of truth at a context and index for
sentences of the language: A sentence  is true at a context c and index i iﬀ JKc;i
= . (Given a sentence as input, the semantics will output a truth value relative to a
context and an index.) is notion of truth at a context and index, however, does not
in itself determine when a sentence, as used in a context, is true. For the notion does
not itself specify a value for the index, given a context in which the sentence is used.
Yet truth at a context and index can be used to deﬁne a notion of truth that is relevant
for speakers’ use and assessment of sentences in context. And this second deﬁnition of
truth in terms of truth at a context and index is the locus where nonindexical contextu-
alists and truth relativists diﬀer. N   and R
 are diﬀerent ways of connecting the compositional semantics to language use.
e sequenced worlds compositional semantics of section . allows the formu-
lation of a nonindexical contextualist notion of truth and a truth relativist notion of
truth. e nonindexical contextualist version of the sequenced worlds semantics will
have T  .
T  
A sentence  is true in the context c iﬀ JKc;ic = ,
where ic is the index hwc; tc; hx1c ; : : : ; xnc ii whose coordinates are determined
by c. (Given the formal representation of c as a sequenced world, ic = c.)
e truth relativist version of the sequenced worlds semantics will have T  
    ’ .
T       ’ 
A sentence  at context c is true from an assessor’s perspective P iﬀ for n  ,
P = hw; t; hx1; : : : ; xnii and JKc;iP = , where iP = hw; t; hx1; : : : ; xnii.
We are now in a position to see that the sequenced worlds model of communication
is compatible with N   and R . We
simply have to show that the model is compatible with T   as well as
MacFarlane (, ) calls the extra step, in which the pragmatically relevant notion of truth is deﬁned,
the ‘postsemantics,’ to distinguish it from the ‘semantics proper’, the recursive deﬁnition of truth at a
context and index in terms of which the former notion is deﬁned.
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with T       ’ . In the model as
presented in chapter , truth only occurs in the group-centric norms of assertion and
acceptance, which permit assertion (acceptance) of a sentence only if (if ) the expressed
content is true from the conversation’s perspective. e content a sentence  expresses
in a context c is true from the conversation’s perspective P just in case  is true at c
and the index determined by P. But this is just to say that  is true in the context
c: e conversation’s perspective, as deﬁned in chapter , just is c, which is formally
represented as a sequenced world. us, the index as determined by c is identical to
the index as determined by the conversation’s perspective. e sequenced worlds model
is compatible with T  .
e group-centric norms are also compatible with the relativist notion of truth.
For a sentence  in a context c to be true from the conversation’s perspective is for it to
be true from the assessor’s perspective in the special case where the assessor’s perspect-
ive is identical to the conversation’s perspective. Of course, the distinctive diﬀerence of
the relative notion of truth from the standard T   thus plays no role in
the norms of assertion and acceptance. But this does no harm to the norms’ compat-
ibility with relativism. Relativism does not require relativistic norms of assertion and
acceptance.
e sequenced worlds model, with the proposals for the semantics of PPTs and
pronouns and for speech act content, can be completed with T   as
well as T       ’ . It is thus neutral
between nonindexical contextualism and truth relativism.
. On Two Implementations of Relativism
It is worth brieﬂy pausing over the diﬀerent ways that I , S-
,  R  have been implemented in the relativist literature, and to
situate the sequenced worlds model among the approaches. A natural way of classifying
the approaches divides them in two groups, depending on the following interrelated
theoretical choices: (i) the kinds of coordinates in the index, (ii) the technical represent-
ation of mental content and speech act content, and (iii) in the deﬁnition of R
, the determination of the coordinates in the index by the context of use or the
context of assessment.
In section ..,  ’  P was deﬁned as follows: e perspective of a conver-
sation is hwc; tc; hx1; : : : ; xnii, where wc and tc are the world and time at which the conversation takes
place, and the sequence of individuals hx1; : : : ; xni is determined by the conversational sequence for the
conversation. It represents the individual perspectives of all conversational participants x1; : : : ; xn in wc
at tc.
See MacFarlane (, ch.) for a discussion of the relation between relative truth and truth norms of
assertion, which comes to the same conclusion.
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One option is the centered worlds relativism advocated by Egan et al. () and
Egan (, a) (see also Egan ()). On this view, the index of the intensional
semantics consists of a triple of a world, time, and an individual. e contents of
attitudes and assertions are sets of centered worlds. In evaluations of contents in context
for truth and falsity, all of the coordinates in the index are determined by the assessor’s
location – the index just is the centered world representing the location of the assessor.
(In the terminology introduced by John MacFarlane, all coordinates of the index are
determined by the context of assessment.)
e other option, advocated by MacFarlane (a,b, a, ), takes a stand-
ard of taste in the index. e index of the intensional semantics consists of a tuple of
a world and a standard of taste (and perhaps a time). e contents of attitudes and
assertions are sets of world-standard tuples hw; si (or world-time-standard triples). In
evaluations of contents in context for truth and falsity, the world (and time) coordinate
in the index is determined by the context of use – for instance, the context in which the
sentence whose content is getting evaluated was used – whereas the standard of taste is
determined by the context of assessment. A content p as used in a context of use cU
and assessed at a context of assessment cA is true iﬀ p is true at hwcU ; scAi.
Not all existing views in the recent literature that have received the label ‘relativism’
perfectly ﬁt the mould of one or the other kind of relativism. On some views, the index
contains a standard of taste but the assessor’s perspective determines all coordinates of
the index (Kolbel, ). On other views, centered worlds content is coupled with the
thesis that assessments for truth and falsity are made relative to the world and time of
the context of utterance (Lasersohn, ; Stephenson, a).
On Richard’s (; ) versions of relativism, propositional truth is also relativised to a standard
of taste. In contrast to MacFarlane, he does not make explicit the role of the context of assessment in
determining the standard of taste coordinate of the index.
Kolbel () advocates a semantic implementation with a tuple of world and standard of taste as the
index, yet his position is most naturally read as taking the assessor’s context to determine both the world
and the standard of taste coordinate. e relativism advocated in Kolbel (, ) is similar to centered
worlds relativism, although propositions are here taken as true or false relative to just ‘perspectives,’ where
perspectives are understood as functions that assign truth values to propositions.
Lasersohn (, , ) advocates centered worlds relativism insofar as his indices are triples of a
world, time, and an individual, and speech act contents are sets of centered worlds. However, he deﬁnes
a notion of (pragmatically relevant) truth which, in MacFarlane’s terminology, assigns truth to a content
in context just in case the content is true at the world and time of the context of use and the individual
determined by the context of assessment. (Formally, his view bears resemblance to nonindexical contex-
tualist views since he deﬁnes a Kaplanian notion of truth in context (, ). But Lasersohn treats
contexts, the formal object c in the semantics, not as concrete speech situations but as just that: formal
objects, ﬁxing values not only for standard features of the speech situation but also a ‘judge’ (, -
). Given a particular speech situation, there are as many corresponding contexts as there are potential
judges. In evaluating contents for truth and falsity, an assessor picks one such context – usually the one
that has herself as the judge.) Lasersohn sides with centered worlds relativism on (i) and (ii) but with
MacFarlane on (iii).
Stephenson (a,b) also endorses a centered worlds version of (i) and (ii). She does not explicitly
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e sequenced worlds account is closer to the ﬁrst option than the second. It is
similar to centered worlds relativism regarding (i) and (ii), since it maintains that the in-
dex contains a world, time, and sequence of individuals, and endorses sequenced worlds
content where centered worlds relativism has centered worlds content. And it is closer
to centered worlds relativism than to MacFarlane’s relativism on (iii), since the assessor
determines the entire index in evaluations for truth and falsity – sometimes selecting
the assessor’s individual perspective (eavesdropper and other inter-conversational assess-
ments) and sometimes selecting the perspective of the conversational group of which
the assessor is a member (intra-conversational assessments).
We will discuss the diﬀerences in empirical predictions between the two versions of
relativism in chapter , sections . and .. ese diﬀerences concern tense and the
assessment of past and future assertions as well as modality and transworld assessments.
As we will see, sequenced worlds relativism sides with centered worlds relativism in their
predictions about tense and cross-temporal assessments.
. Eavesdroppers
e neutrality of the sequenced worlds model between nonindexical contextualist and
relativist views about predicates of personal taste is a strength of the model. But how are
we to decide between the nonindexical contextualist version of the sequenced worlds
model and the relativist version? Setting aside worries about the coherence of the notion
of relative truth, the decision is a largely empirical matter. It turns on key empirical
data from eavesdropping and retraction cases for which the views diﬀer in their predic-
tions. In this section, I will exemplify the diﬀerences as they arise for eavesdropping
cases. After reviewing the norm(s) of assertion in section ., I will turn to retraction
cases in section ..
Consider (.):
(.) [Sal is secretly listening in on the following conversation between Ben and
Anna.]
Ben: Liquorice is tasty.
Anna: at’s right. It is tasty.
Sal [to himself ]: at’s false. Liquorice tastes awful.
state a deﬁnition of (pragmatically relevant) truth. But her remarks on retraction and the assessment of
past assertions in (a, ) suggest that she endorses a deﬁnition of truth that resembles MacFarlane’s
approach: A content p as used in a context of use cU and assessed by judge j at a context of assessment
cA is true iﬀ p is true at hwcU ; tcU ;  jcAi. 
Stephenson’s and Lasersohn’s systems diﬀer from Egan’s system in their predictions of cross-temporal
and trans-world assessments of assertions – that is, of assertions made at other times or in counterfactual
worlds. is diﬀerence will be discussed in chapter , section . on tense and modality.
See chapters  and  of MacFarlane () for some worries about the coherence of relative truth and a
defence of MacFarlane’s version of truth relativism.
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Relativism predicts that (.) can be perfectly acceptable. It is intuitively correct for
Anna to say ‘at’s right’ (if liquorice tastes good to her) and it is also intuitively correct
for the eavesdropper Sal to say to himself ‘at’s false’ (if liquorice does not taste good
to him). According to relativism, Sal’s assertion of ‘at’s false’ in (.) is acceptable
because it is false relative to his perspective that liquorice is tasty.
It seems that relativism’s predictions coincide with intuitive judgments. Assuming
that liquorice does not taste good to Sal – after all, he says that it tastes awful – it seems
correct for him to dismiss Ben’s assertion that liquorice is tasty as false.
Nonindexical contextualism predicts that Sal’s last assertion is false. Sal assesses
Ben’s assertion, which is correct (relative to any perspective) because it is true in Ben’s
context of use. While Sal is within his linguistic rights to say ‘Liquorice tastes awful,’
he cannot correctly say that Ben’s assertion is false. On the contrary, nonindexical
contextualists predict that Sal could truly assert ‘Liquorice tastes awful. Still, Ben’s
assertion is true.’
Relativism seems better positioned to make correct predictions regarding eaves-
dropping data. However, my main goal here is to show that no matter one’s choice
between nonindexical contextualist and relativism, one can and should adopt the se-
quenced worlds model. I will brieﬂy outline how to account for the nonindexical con-
textualist interpretation of the data on the sequenced worlds model and then turn to
the relativist interpretation.
In order to make predictions that diﬀer from relativism’s predictions, nonindexical
contextualists need to say that eavesdroppers assess the utterances themselves for truth
and falsity. So if Sal is said to be wrong in his assessment of Ben’s assertion, that is
because he is mistaken about the assertion’s truth in its context. After all, it follows
from T  , deﬁned for sequenced worlds content, that ‘Liquorice is
tasty’ is true in the context in which liquorice tastes good to Ben and Anna.
It is important to register a second option for nonindexical contextualists. ey
could predict that Sal’s assertion is true by claiming that ‘that’ in (.) picks out the
proposition expressed by Ben’s assertion rather than the assertion itself. Ordinary truth
ascriptions could uniformly be treated as ascriptions of propositional truth. en Sal’s
assertion is true because the assertion ‘e proposition that liquorice is tasty is false’
Note that eavesdropper cases have mainly been advanced to support relativism about epistemic modal
claims, but the same pattern of relativist predictions arises for third-party assessments of taste claims. See
Egan (, –), Egan et al. (), and MacFarlane (a, x.) for discussion of eavesdropper cases
regarding epistemic modals.
e monadic, object language predicates ‘true’ and ‘false,’ on the relativist view, are disquotational in the
sense that for any context c and perspective P, the equivalence schema It is true that  iﬀ  is true at c
and from P. I will discuss the object-language monadic truth predicate in more detail in section ...
For some doubts about eavesdropping data from PPTs, see for instance Stephenson (a,  n.).
To be precise, it is the sentence used by Ben in the context which is true according to T  .
It is plausible to assume that if utterances are the kinds of things that are truth-apt, their truth values
correspond to those of the sentences used in the context of utterance.
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is true in Sal’s context of use, provided only that ‘true’ is governed by the equivalence
schema It is true that  iﬀ . I am generally sympathetic to the idea that utterance
truth is a theoretician’s notion and that ordinary truth ascriptions are ascriptions of
propositional truth. However, if nonindexical contextualists give up the claim that
the empirical data yield ascriptions of utterance truth, their view ends up making the
same predictions as truth relativism on eavesdropping. As we will see, the option of
making the same predictions as relativism is available to nonindexical contextualists for
cases of retraction and disagreement as well. So the second option will be a recurring
theme. However, if they choose the second option for every set of empirical data, their
view becomes empirically indistinguishable from relativism. In that case, the decision
between truth relativism and nonindexical contextualism will have to turn on non-
empirical issues. In what follows, I will generally canvass the more interesting option
that sets apart nonindexical contextualism from relativism and will note the second
option only in passing.
ings get more interesting on the relativist version. Eavesdroppers are by deﬁn-
ition third parties who are not members of the conversation. e sequenced world
model, as developed so far, is an account of conversation only. It allows for more than
one way to explain eavesdropper assessments. Let me spell out the three most prom-
ising.
. Fully deferential eavesdropper. In trying to understand a claim made in some
conversation to which he is not party, the eavesdropper could reconstruct the com-
mon ground as the shared presuppositions of the actual members of the conversation,
himself excluded. In his own assessments, he is fully deferential to what is acceptable
in the conversation. His assessments reﬂect what actual members of the conversation
should accept. at is, the eavesdropper assesses taste claims relative to the conversa-
tion’s perspective. Obviously, this will not yield relativism-friendly predictions, as a
liquorice-hating eavesdropper would judge the claim ‘Liquorice is tasty’ true if it was
true from the perspective of everyone in the conversation.
. Inclusive/partially deferential eavesdropper. An eavesdropper could reconstruct
a common ground from the shared presuppositions of the actual members of the con-
versation and himself. His assessments reﬂect acceptance of expressed contents to the
common ground that includes his presuppositions. On this way of understanding the
eavesdropper, he is correct in rejecting ‘Liquorice is tasty’ and judging it false, as relativ-
ism predicts, because it is not true from the conversation’s perspective, which includes
his own, that liquorice is tasty. A problem with this explanation of what eavesdrop-
pers do is that it would predict that an eavesdropper feels addressed by some assertions
involving the words ‘all of you,’ since he includes himself among the conversational par-
ticipants. It might also seem implausible that eavesdroppers, in their reconstruction of
See MacFarlane (, x) and Cappelen and Hawthorne (, -) for discussion
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the common ground, judge as if they are party to the conversation.
. Egocentric eavesdropper. Eavesdroppers may be judging assertions from their
own, individual perspective. at is, they are not in the business of reconstructing
a conversational common ground at all. If they are judging assertions relative to an
individual perspective, they cannot be judging the sequenced worlds content that is
added to the common ground if accepted in conversation. at is because a sequenced
worlds content, with sequences of more than one individual, will require a perspective
of more than one individual for its evaluation. However, there is a content nearby that
eavesdroppers may plausibly be judging: the Kaplan horizontal. Recall that the Kaplan
horizontal is a function from the index to an extension:
Kaplan horizontal of  at c: i:JKc;i =
fhw; t; hx1; : : : ; xnii: JKc;hw;t;hx1;:::;xnii = g
If the index is a centered world, this content can be assessed from an individual per-
spective.
e Kaplan horizontal of ‘Liquorice is tasty’ at c, given an index consisting of a
world, time, and individual is the set fhw; t; xi: liquorice tastes good to x in w at tg.
is content is true from the perspective of an assessor at hw1; t1; ai iﬀ liquorice tastes
good to a in w1 at t1. is yields relativism-friendly predictions: In (.), Sal may
assess Ben’s assertion as false because he judges the horizontal content from his own
perspective, from which liquorice is not tasty.
Importantly, taking the Kaplan horizontal as the object of eavesdroppers’ assess-
ments also makes the right predictions for de se and de te assertions. We have given
pronouns their standard Kaplanian semantics. So an assertion of ‘I am hungry’ in a
context in which Ben is the speaker expresses the Kaplan horizontal fhw; t; hx1; : : :ii:
Ben is hungry inw at tg. An assertion of ‘It’s your turn’ in a context where the intended
addressee is Anna expresses the Kaplan horizontal fhw; t; hx1; : : :ii: it’s Anna’s turn in
w at tg. ere is thus no risk that because eavesdroppers judge the content relative to
their own perspective, they are misled in resolving the reference of pronouns, indexicals
and demonstratives.
is last option, the egocentric eavesdropper, seems by far the best if we want to
make the relativist’s predictions regarding eavesdropping data on the sequenced worlds
model. But it involves introducing a second notion of content, deﬁned in standard
ways by the semantics but diﬀerent from S  SW. is may seem ad
hoc. Why have a diﬀerent type of content for eavesdroppers’ evaluations?
Eavesdroppers make inter-contextual assessments. If they know that they do not
share the context of the conversation with speaker and audience, their proper under-
standing of utterances will reﬂect that fact. For example: they will not be inclined to
think that ‘here,’ as used by the speaker, refers to where they themselves are standing,
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when their location is at a signiﬁcant distance from the conversation’s location. ey
do not see themselves as involved in the central business of conversation, which is es-
tablishing the live possibilities of the conversational group by adding information to
the common ground. So the sequenced worlds content cannot be the piece of inform-
ation they gain if they understand the assertion. e piece of information they gain has
to contain all contextual information required for the resolution of indexical expres-
sions – yet be apt for assessment from the eavesdropper’s own perspective. e Kaplan
horizontal is just this piece of information.
We will return to the evaluation of content for truth and falsity in chapter , section
...
. Norms of Assertion
In section . above, we saw that both nonindexical contextualism and truth relativism
are compatible with the group-centric norm of assertion formulated in chapter  and
repeated here.
G-   
AG A speech act content p is appropriately assertable in context c only
if p is true from the conversation’s perspective in c.
In chapter , I mentioned that the group-centric norm makes some predictions that
might seem too strong. For talk about taste, the group-centric norm entails that, for
instance, ‘is cookie is tasty’ is assertable only if the cookie tastes good to speaker and
audience. at is because all interlocutors have to be correctly located in the content,
which is true from the conversational perspective just in case the cookie tastes good
to each one of them. But why should a speaker have to make sure that she and her
audience have a common outlook on taste in order to guarantee that her assertion
about the cookie’s tastiness is appropriate? e subjectivity of taste claims might seem
to be better captured by an egocentric norm that only requires that the cookie be tasty
to the speaker. However, we already saw in chapter  that egocentric norms are not
equipped to explain why in some situations, claims about what is tasty to the speaker
are acceptable while bare taste claims are not.
In this section, I will make the positive case for the group-centric norm while giv-
ing the intuitions underlying an egocentric norm their rightful place. As we will see,
two norms of assertion – a strong group-centric norm and a weak speaker-oriented
norm – hold sway over discourse, each related to a diﬀerent conversational purpose.
Here is the basic picture. Conversations are cooperative enterprises with the goal of
locating the conversational group, i.e. reducing the group-possibilities in the context
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set. When bare taste assertions are made, this goal requires that participants agree on
the tastiness of the food in question (or agree to disagree). But while the maximally
cooperative, group-centric communicative purpose of bare taste claims is to establish
a shared perspective on the tastiness of the food, bare taste claims also serve the more
speaker-oriented purpose of giving voice to the speaker’s own perspective. Each of
these two purposes gives rise to a norm of assertion, which is conditional on the pur-
pose. Judgments about the appropriateness of assertions may reﬂect either of the norms,
depending on the purpose guiding the judgment.
e plan for the section is as follows. I will ﬁrst show what explanatory work is done
by the strong group-centric norm of assertion. I will then turn to intuitive judgments
about the appropriateness of bare taste assertions that are weaker than those guided by
the strong norm. is will require discussing the expressive-persuasive nature of bare
taste assertions and how it is accounted for on the sequenced worlds model. At the end
of the section, we will be in a position to state the two norms of assertion.
So let us start with the strong group-centric norm of assertion, AG, and the
conversational goal of establishing a shared perspective on the tastiness of a food in
question. Disputes about taste often become unreasonable when it is clear that no
agreement can be reached. ere is a sense in which bare taste claims, but not explicitly
relativised taste claims, are pointless and uncooperative conversational moves when it
has already been established in conversation that speaker and audience do not share
tastes. It is often, but not always, unreasonable to keep insisting that some food is
tasty when one’s interlocutor has made it plain that she strongly disagrees with that
judgment. In this kind of situation, however, it is reasonable to retreat to the claim
that the food is tasty to oneself. For illustration, consider again the following example.
(.) a. Ben: Schnitzel is tasty.
b. Anna: No, it’s not tasty! It is bland.
c. Ben: Well, it’s tasty to me, at least.
(.) a. Ben: Schnitzel is tasty.
b. Anna: No, it’s not tasty! It is bland.
c. Ben: ? Well, it is tasty.
e strong group-centric norm AG, but no egocentric norm, explains the diﬀer-
ence in assertability between (.c) and (.c). e group-centric norm predicts that
(.c) is not appropriate to assert in this kind of situation because the asserted content
is not true from the conversation’s perspective. But it makes no such prediction for
By ‘bare taste claims’ I mean ﬁrst-personal uses of a PPT that is covertly relativised to PROC (cf. section
.). ere are of course other uses of PPTs on which they are covertly relativised to a contextually salient
experiencer (‘exocentric uses’) or on which an experiencer variable is bound by a quantiﬁer. In this section,
I put such uses aside.
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(.c) because the asserted content – the set of pair-centered worlds such that Schnitzel
tastes good to the speaker-center – is true from the conversation’s perspective in the
case where Schnitzel tastes good only to Ben. e group-centric norm captures the
reasonableness of bare taste assertions, because their appropriateness conditions reﬂect
the conditions of fully cooperative communicative success, which consists in an up-
date of the common ground that entails that all interlocutors agree on the tastiness of
Schnitzel. When in such situations we judge that a bare taste assertion is uncooperat-
ive and inappropriate, our judgments are guided by the fully cooperative, group-centric
communicative purpose of bare taste claims.
It is a consequence of the strong group-centric norm of assertion that if there is
signiﬁcant divergence in our views on matters of taste, many of our taste assertions are
likely to be inappropriate. But very often, especially at the beginning of a conversation
about matters of taste, it seems perfectly appropriate to make a bare taste claim such
as ‘is cookie is tasty,’ even when someone among our audience as a matter of fact
disagrees. How can we explain such judgments of conversational appropriateness?
Bare taste claims are aimed at establishing a shared perspective. But they also serve
the purpose of voicing our own individual perspective. Under normal circumstances,
I want my audience to share my perspective, and for that I need to put my perspective
out there, in the hope that my audience will agree. In many cases, this hope is well-
founded. Our perspectives are very often very similar. It is very often reasonable to
assume that we are alike in our perspectives on the tastiness of the food in question,
be it because it is reasonable to assume that as humans, we share a basic physiological
make-up, or because we are similar in our dispositions to enjoy foods according to their
taste, or because we belong to a community of values whose members arrive at similar
evaluative judgments due to normative pressure towards the coordination of attitudes.
Even when there is resistance from my audience that indicates they do not share my
perspective, it might be reasonable – up to a point – to sustain the assumption of
relevant similarity because there is good reason to think that they might come to share
my perspective as a result of the conversation. Where the purpose of voicing one’s
perspective – with an eye to persuading the audience of adopting the perspective – is
in the foreground, assertions seem appropriate only if they correctly voice the speaker’s
perspective and there is some chance that the audience can be persuaded of adopting
the perspective. Appropriateness in this sense is captured by the weak norm of assertion
that is tied to the more speaker-oriented purpose of voicing one’s perspective.
Before we can state the weak norm of assertion, we need to get clearer on the
expressive-suggestive nature of bare taste assertions. is requires making precise the
assumption of relevant similarity on the sequenced worlds framework. For conversa-
tional participants to assume that they are similar with respect to their perspectives on
the tastiness of some food is for them to presuppose that they have a joint perspective
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on the sequenced worlds content p, which says that the food is tasty.
J   
hw; t; hx1; : : : ; xnii is a joint perspective on a sequenced worlds content p iﬀ
for all individuals xi and xj 2 fx1; : : : ; xng: either both
hw; t; hx1; : : : ; xi; xj ; : : : ; xnii 2 p and hw; t; hx1; : : : ; xj ; xi; : : : ; xnii 2 p,
or both
hw; t; hx1; : : : ; xi; xj ; : : : ; xnii 2 :p and hw; t; hx1; : : : ; xj ; xi; : : : ; xnii 2
:p.
For a pair-centered content p, this means that the sequenced world hw1; t1; hBen,
Annaii is a joint perspective on p just in case either both hw1; t1; hBen, Annaii 2 p and
hw1; t1; hAnna, Benii 2 p, or both hw1; t1; hBen, Annaii 2 :p and hw1; t1; hAnna,
Benii 2 :p. Where p is a content expressed by a bare taste claim, this intuitively
says that Anna and Ben have a joint perspective on the tastiness of some food in w1
at t1 just in case the food tastes good either to both of them or to neither of them
in w1 at t1. A presupposition (in the sense deﬁned in section ..) of joint perspective
on p is in place in a conversation with participants x1; : : : ; xn just in case the context
set contains only joint perspectives on p. For a conversation between Ben and Anna
this means that a presupposition of joint perspective on a pair-centered content p is in
place just in case for every sequenced world hw; t; hx1; x2ii in the context set, either
both hw; t; hx1; x2ii 2 p and hw; t; hx2; x1ii 2 p or both hw; t; hx1; x2ii 2 :p and
hw; t; hx2; x1ii 2 :p.
Provided that speakers know their own taste and the context set contains the con-
versation’s perspective (the ‘actual’ sequenced world), an assertion will not be inappro-
priate (in either weak or strong sense) in a conversation in which a correct presupposi-
tion of joint perspective is in place.
Let us now move on to the expressive-suggestive nature of bare taste assertions.
It is crucial to realise that the point of bare taste assertions is never just to state one’s
perspective. We noted that there is a diﬀerence between asserting ‘is cookie is tasty’
and ‘is cookie is tasty to me.’ e latter is a statement of one’s perspective, and it can
function as a ‘partial retraction’ of one’s bare taste claim. e former cannot function
 Note that the negation, :, of a bare taste sentence  on a ﬁrst-personal use has two readings depending
on the scope of the negation. Where  is the sentence ‘X is tasty,’ the default wide scope reading says,
very roughly: it is not the case that X is tasty to all of the conversational participants. e default narrow
scope reading says: X is not tasty to either of the conversational participants. For the deﬁnition of J
   to deliver the intuitively correct result, :p must be the content expressed by the narrow
scope reading of :. us, where  is a bare taste sentence, p:pq does not denote the complement set
of p. See section .. for discussion of negated taste claims.
See Egan (, a) and Lopez de Sa () for two accounts on which a presupposition of relevant
similarity is a necessary condition for the felicity of assertions of bare taste sentences.
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in this way. So what is it about the bare taste assertion that distinguishes it from the
mere statement of one’s perspective?
Emotivists and others have long noted that evaluative claims have a persuasive,
or recommending, force. ey recommend a particular attitude towards the object,
event, or action in question. On the sequenced worlds model, it is not hard to see
how this could be so. If Ben asserts that liquorice is tasty, he proposes to add to the
common ground the content that liquorice tastes good to all participants. For his
assertion to be appropriate (in the weak sense), a presupposition of joint perspective
has to be in place. If no such presupposition is yet in place and liquorice does not
taste good to the addressee, she faces a choice. She can either reject the claim or she
can accommodate the presupposition of joint perspective. In the default case where the
common ground is common belief, she accommodates the presupposition if she comes
to believe that food of the relevant kind either tastes good to both the speaker and herself
or to neither of them (and believes that the speaker believes this and so on). Knowing
from the speaker’s assertion that liquorice tastes good to the speaker, she will sincerely
believe that it tastes good to both of them only if she changes her individual perspective
on the tastiness of liquorice, thus bringing it about that the taste claim is true. e
kind of accommodation is just what accommodation of any type of presupposition (on
the Stalnakerian model) amounts to, viz. adding the missing presupposition to the
common ground. It is a peculiarity of the sequenced worlds framework that adding
the presupposition of joint perspective may involve changing one’s own perspective:
For the conversation’s perspective to be a joint perspective on the asserted content, the
addressee must like what the other participants like. If she does not do so already, she
has to change her taste or that of the other participants. us, the persuasive force of
bare taste assertions amounts to the potential need for accommodation on the hearers’
part, which they bring about by changing their perspectives.
We can thus explain why even when it is understood that the audience disagrees
with the speaker about the tastiness of some food, it may still be sensible for the speaker
to insist on her judgment as long as she has reason to think that her audience is in a po-
sition to accommodate. And even when she has little reason to think that her audience
will in fact accommodate, the practical pressure of having to coordinate her perspective
with her hearers’ perspectives – for instance, when they have to take a collective decision
on which food to order in a restaurant – may provide suﬃcient reason to insist on a
See, for instance, Stevenson (, ch.)
It is widely (though not uncontroversially) assumed that a rule of accommodation applies to speech acts
that carry presuppositions: If a speech act requires presupposition q to be appropriate and q is not yet
presupposed, then ceteris paribus the presupposition q comes into existence (cf. Lewis (b, )).
Relativists like Egan (a, ), MacFarlane (a, ), and Recanati (,  n.) have noted the
link between the process of accommodation (in Lewis’ sense) and the purpose of establishing a shared view-
point. For Richard (, ), the process of ‘accommodation and negotiation’ can be found wherever
we use vague scalar expressions that give rise to relative truth.
. Norms of Assertion 
bare taste claim in light of opposition.
Let me summarise. Judgments about the propriety of bare taste assertions may be
guided by diﬀerent conversational purposes. On the one hand, they may be guided
by maximal cooperativeness – a property an assertion possesses if everyone in the con-
versation can appropriately accept it. ese judgments are accounted for by the strong
group-centric norm of assertion. ey track reasonableness – what a dispute about
matters of taste lacks when ‘it makes no sense’ to keep disputing. On the other hand,
judgments may track a much lower threshold of appropriateness. In that case, they
are guided by the speaker-oriented purpose of voicing one’s perspective and persuading
one’s audience of sharing one’s perspective. An assertion counts as appropriate in this
weaker sense only if it correctly represents the speaker’s perspective and there is a chance
that the hearers may be persuaded – that is, the hearers are in a position to accommod-
ate in such a way as to bring about the asserted content’s truth from the conversational
perspective.
In talk about objective matters, these two purposes do not come apart. But in
talk about subjective matters, the changes an assertion proposes to make to the com-
mon ground may be appropriate relative to the speaker-oriented purpose, yet fail to
be appropriate with respect to maximal cooperativeness. Judgments may be guided by
the strong group-centric norm of assertion or by the weak speaker-oriented norm of
assertion.
S -   
AG A speech act content p is appropriately assertable in context c only
if p is true from the conversation’s perspective in c.
W -   
AW A speech act content p is appropriately assertable in context c only if
p correctly locates the speaker and the hearers in c are in a position
to accommodate in such a way as to bring about p’s truth from the
conversational perspective at c.
A speech act contentSW p correctly locates a speaker S just in case p contains a triple
consisting of the speaker’s actual world @, her current time t, and a sequence with S in
the position that represents S relative to the conversational sequence: Given the con-
versational sequence hS,: : :i, there is a triple h@; t; hS,: : :ii such that h@; t; hS,: : :ii 2
p.
e discussion in this section owes much to Egan (a), with whose general outlook on the reason-
ableness of disputes about taste it is in large agreement. Of course, no claim is made about the converse
agreement.
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. e Objection from ‘tasty to us’
e sequenced worlds model predicts that an assertion of ‘Liquorice is tasty’ may have
the same content as an assertion of ‘Liquorice is tasty to us’ in the same context. Some
readers may ﬁnd this objectionable for the following reason. In a conversation between
two people, assertions of ‘Liquorice is tasty’ and ‘Liquorice is tasty to us’ both express
(.).
(.) fhw; t; hx1; x2ii: liquorice tastes good to hx1; x2i in w at tg
But intuitively, an assertion of ‘Liquorice is tasty to us’ is about what tastes good to
the group, whereas an assertion of ‘Liquorice is tasty’ is not. is diﬀerence shows in
the diﬀerent assertability conditions of the assertions. For instance, in a conversational
context in which it is common belief that liquorice fails to taste good to at least one of
the addressees, the assertion ‘Liquorice is tasty to us’ seems infelicitous. But a speaker
to whom liquorice tastes good can still felicitously assert ‘Liquorice is tasty’ in that
context. is strongly suggests that the two assertions have diﬀerent truth conditions.
In section .., where we ﬁrst encountered this objection, I postponed the reply
until this chapter. e discussion of norms of assertion now puts us in a position to
see how two assertions like the above may seem to come apart in their assertability
conditions. It will be helpful to ﬁrst restate the objection in a rigorous way. I will then
make a few clariﬁcatory remarks before I explain why the two assertions may seem to
have diﬀerent assertability conditions.
Here is the step-by-step reconstruction of the objection.
. Let c be a conversational context in which it is common belief that liquorice
fails to taste good to one of the addressees. e sequenced worlds content ex-
pressed by an assertion of ‘Liquorice is tasty’ in c = the sequenced worlds content
expressed by an assertion of ‘Liquorice is tasty to us’ in c = fhw; t; hx1; : : :ii: li-
quorice tastes good to hx1; : : :i in w at tg [Premise]
. For any c’, if two assertions made in c’ express the same content (have the same
truth-conditions), then they have the same assertability conditions in c’. [Premise]
. So in c, an assertion of ‘Liquorice is tasty’ and an assertion of ‘Liquorice is tasty
to us’ have the same assertability conditions. [from , ]
. But the two assertions do not have the same assertability conditions in c. e
assertion of ‘Liquorice is tasty to us’ is infelicitous and the assertion of ‘Liquorice
is tasty’ is felicitous. [Premise]
. Contradiction [, ]
. e Objection from ‘tasty to us’ 
. Hence premise  is false: the content expressed by an assertion of ‘Liquorice is
tasty’ in c 6= the content expressed by an assertion of ‘Liquorice is tasty to us’ in
c, pace the predictions of the sequenced worlds model. [from , ]
e objection crucially relies on the claim about the sequenced worlds model in premise
 and the principle linking truth conditions and assertability conditions in . But
notice, ﬁrst, that the conversational context c is not suﬃciently speciﬁed to guarantee
the truth of premise . ‘Tasty PROC’ and ‘tasty to us’ express the same content only
on one of several possible readings of ‘us.’ e ﬁrst-person plural pronoun ‘we’/‘us’
can pick out any group that includes the speaker. In particular, it can pick out groups
including none of the addressees, some or all of the addressees. It is only in contexts in
which ‘us’ picks out the group consisting of speaker, all addressees, and no one else that
‘tasty PROC’ and ‘tasty to us’ express the same content in conversation. So the context
c has to be a context that triggers this contextual interpretation if it is to establish the
truth of premise . But this use of ‘tasty to us’ seems rare. Typically, PPTs are explicitly
relativised to present people to mark a diﬀerence between them; hence the use of ‘tasty
to me’ when retreating from a bare taste claim in the face of opposition. Likewise,
the more natural use of ‘tasty to us’ is the exclusive reading, which underlines that
some food tastes good to some group including the speaker, even if not to (all of ) the
addressees. So the scope of cases of which premise  is true is limited.
It is also worth noting, second, that premise  is far from obvious. Indeed it is
routinely dismissed in accounts of the communicative eﬀects of assertions that appeal to
pragmatic implicatures, semantic or pragmatic presuppositions, or information struc-
tural properties like focus. In the example above, however, I do not think that any of
these phenomena is responsible for the perceived diﬀerence in assertability conditions.
So I will not dispute premise  here.
Instead, I maintain that premise  is false. e assertions of ‘Liquorice is tasty’ and
‘Liquorice is tasty to us’ do have the same assertability conditions in a suitable context c
in which ‘us’ picks out the conversational group. Both assertions are not appropriately
assertable in c according to the strong group-centric norm because it is not true that
liquorice tastes good to all of the conversational participants. But there may very well be
good reason to think that agreement is still possible because the disagreeing addressee is
in a position to accommodate. So both assertions are appropriately assertable according
to the weak speaker-oriented norm of assertion. Our impression that the assertions
More precisely, ‘us’/‘we’ allows of inclusive and exclusive readings. On the exclusive reading, the referent
is a group that includes the speaker but excludes the addressee (‘I and others but not you’). On the
exclusive reading, ‘tasty’ and ‘tasty to us’ do not express the same content in conversation. On inclusive
readings, the addressee is included in the group referred to by ‘we’/‘us.’ Inclusive readings can further
be distinguished. On so-called + readings (the numbers refer to ﬁrst and second person), the group
referred to consists only of speaker and addressee(s). On ++ readings, the group referred to consists of
speaker, addressee(s) and third parties.
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come apart in appropriate assertability is due to the fact that the diﬀerence in overt
linguistic material makes diﬀerent purposes and thus diﬀerent norms of assertability
salient. e speaker-oriented purpose of a bare taste assertion, even in a situation in
which it is understood that someone in the conversation disagrees with the claim, is to
voice the speaker’s perspective and persuade the hearers of adopting that perspective. As
long as there is a chance that hearers can be persuaded, the assertion satisﬁes the weak
norm. Our judgments of appropriate assertability of ‘Liquorice is tasty’ are guided
by the speaker-oriented weak norm. In contrast, the explicit relativisation ‘to us’ in
‘Liquorice is tasty to us’ makes the group’s perspective on the tastiness of liquorice
salient and draws attention to the purpose of maximal cooperativeness, which is geared
at getting the group’s perspective right. In c, where it is understood that the perspectives
of the members diverge, ‘to us’ makes salient that no joint perspective is in place. us
‘to us’ draws attention to the falsity of the assertion’s content and the failure of the
strong norm. As a result, the speaker-oriented purpose gets trumped in salience, and
our judgments are guided by the strong group-centric norm.
. Retraction
Let us now return to a second set of empirical data that will help us decide between a
nonindexical contextualist and a relativist completion of the sequenced worlds model.
e model is compatible with the predictions of both relativists and nonindexical con-
textualists regarding cases of retraction, although we will see that it ﬁts much better
with relativist predictions. I will start by presenting some retraction data (x..). In
order to explain the diﬀerent cases of retraction on the common ground model, we
will ﬁrst have to address the issue of how the passage of time in conversation aﬀects the
common ground (x..). After explaining retraction on the sequenced worlds model
of the common ground (x..), I will show that the model can be complemented by
either relativist or nonindexical contextualist norms for retraction to yield the respect-
ive predictions (x..). For the retraction of assertions, it will not come as a surprise
that there are two norms for retraction, corresponding to the two norms of assertion.
Recanati () endorses what he calls ‘moderate relativism’ about aesthetic predicates on which “It is
beautiful’ means something like It is beautiful for us, that is, for the community to which the speaker and his
audience belong.’ () He discusses a problem similar to the objection above: Why, in light of opposition,
do speakers sometimes not retreat to a weaker explicit statement about their own aesthetic perspective but
keep asserting ‘It is beautiful’? Recanati suggests that the disputants appeal to a community standard
which they try to shape with their assertions, with ‘one foot in the future’ (quote from an unpublished
manuscript by Johan Brannmark that Recanati cites). What Recanati’s account does not explain is why it is
signiﬁcantly less natural to try and shape one’s community’s standards by making the explicitly relativised
aesthetic assertion with the same content. It is an advantage of the pragmatic account I favour that it
can account for the diﬀerence between bare uses of PPTs and uses on which the predicate is explicitly
relativised to the conversational group.
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.. e Data and Its Interpretation
MacFarlane (, -) argues that ﬁrst-personal uses of PPTs give rise to a particular
pattern of retraction:
When I was a kid, I once told my mother, ‘Fish sticks are tasty.’ Now that
I have exposed my palate to a broader range of tastes, I think I was wrong
about that; I’ve changed my mind about the tastiness of ﬁsh sticks. So, if
someone said, ‘But you said years ago that ﬁsh sticks were tasty,’ I would
retract the earlier assertion.
Retraction of an assertion is a speech act by which one withdraws the original assertion,
performed either explicitly by saying ‘I retract that’ or ‘I take that back,’ or implicitly
by acknowledging, for instance, the falsity of one’s original assertion (cf. MacFarlane
(, section .)). Relativism, so MacFarlane, predicts the obligation to retract as-
sertions involving PPTs (on ﬁrst-personal uses) in cases like the above. Provided that
‘Fish sticks are tasty’ is true relative to young MacFarlane’s context of assessment, it was
appropriate for him to assert it. Now that his taste has changed, however, this very
assertion is false relative to his current context of assessment. It is thus obligatory for
adult MacFarlane to retract this assertion. Relativism makes this prediction given the
following norm for retraction.
(.) An agent in context c2 is required to retract an (unretracted) assertion of p
made at c1 if p is not true as used at c1 and assessed from c2.
Nonindexical contextualism, on the contrary, predicts that MacFarlane is not required
to retract. Given T  , young MacFarlane’s assertion of ‘Fish sticks are
tasty’ is true and remains true. Provided the following truth norm for retraction, then,
MacFarlane is not required to retract his (still) true original assertion.
Not all relativists predict retraction data based on this conversational norm for retraction. As we will see
below, for instance, Stephenson (a) rejects retraction data for PPTs. On her view, speakers evaluate
an assertion a with respect to their perspective at the time the assertion a was made. Changes in their
perspective since the time of assertion are thus irrelevant to their evaluation. With speakers still judging
their previous assertions true, no obligation to retract is predicted.
MacFarlane (, ). According to the norm in (.), falsity from one’s current perspective (context of
assessment) is suﬃcient for the obligation to retract. It is not necessary. Other facts are also in themselves
suﬃcient for the obligation to retract. For instance, when it turns out that a speaker did not and still
does not have appropriate evidence for her assertion, she is required to retract her original assertion. (is
norm is likely if the corresponding norm of assertion that says that one may make an assertion only if one
has appropriate evidence is likely.) Other reasons suﬃcient for an obligation to retract are connected to
an assertion’s violation of general norms of conduct such as norms of politeness, etiquette, ethical norms
or particular institutional norms as they are in place, e.g., in court. MacFarlane’s discussion of (.) is
compatible with further norms for retraction holding sway over discourse. His claim is that if a truth
norm is uniquely constitutive of assertion, then the corresponding truth norm for retraction is constitutive
of the speech act of retraction.
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(.) An agent in context c is required to retract an (unretracted) assertion of
sentence  made in context c if  is not true in c.
It is worth noting a consequence of the nonindexical contextualist’s view of retraction.
On the view, it should be felicitous for MacFarlane to say any of the following:
(.) I won’t take that back. But of course, ﬁsh sticks aren’t tasty.
(.) My assertion from back then is true. Still, ﬁsh sticks aren’t tasty.
(.) My assertion from back then is true. But I now reject what I said.
Nonindexical contextualism’s predictions of felicity are certainly counterintuitive. Re-
traction cases seem to favour relativism. Nonetheless, it is worth pausing over the data.
Stephenson (a, ), for instance, observes that in the following case, Sam’s re-
traction ‘seems odd and pathologically meek’:
(.) Mary: How’s the cake?
Sam: It’s tasty.
Sue: No it isn’t, it tastes terrible!
Sam: Oh, then I guess I was wrong.
Stephenson concludes from this case that ‘predicates of personal taste do not give rise
to the same retraction phenomena [as epistemic modals]’ and accordingly provides no
account of retraction for taste claims (Stephenson, a, ). Similarly, Molt-
mann (, ) maintains that ‘retraction does not seem to hold for sentences with
predicates of [personal] taste.’
But the conclusion that it is never obligatory or even felicitous to retract assertions
about taste is too quick. Even within one and the same conversation, retraction of
assertions involving PPTs can be appropriate, as in (.).
Nonindexical contextualists could make the same predictions as relativists by adopting a diﬀerent norm
for retraction:
(i) An agent in context c is required to retract an (unretracted) assertion of the content p made at c
if p is not true in c.
By (i), MacFarlane is required to retract because the content that his original assertion expressed is not
true in his current context. See section . for discussion.
For some doubts about the relativist’s predictions regarding the retraction of epistemically modal sen-
tences, see von Fintel and Gillies () and Schaﬀer (), and regarding the retraction of knowledge
ascriptions, see Greenough ().
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(.) Ben: is liquorice and mint tea is tasty! I’ve never tried this combina-
tion before.
Anna: No, it’s not! e anise, minty and sweet ﬂavours together are dis-
gusting. And the aftertaste is the worst.
Ben: Hmmm. Let me have another sip then. . .You’re right. I take that
back. It’s not tasty at all.
So why does retraction seem appropriate in (.) but not in (.)? What distinguishes
cases like (.) from cases like (.) is that in the latter, but not the former, the speaker’s
change of perspective on the tastiness of the food between his original assertion and his
later retraction is plausible. In (.), it is ‘pathologically meek’ for Sam to change his
mind about the cake’s tastiness simply because Sue opposes his judgment. (Sam is not
given any further motivation to change his mind.) In (.), on the contrary, Anna
gives Ben good reasons to change his mind by drawing his attention to ﬂavours he may
not yet have appreciated. e fact that Ben replies by saying ‘Let me have another
sip’ suggests that he had not tried enough of the tea to be completely settled in his
opinion. Similarly, the naturalness of retraction in MacFarlane’s ﬁsh sticks example
is proportional to the plausibility of him having changed his perspective on ﬁsh sticks
since his childhood. 
Susceptibility to reasons and change of perspective seem perhaps more commonplace with judgments
about what is fun or entertaining than with judgments about tastiness. In (.), one might also think
that the tea at no point tasted good to Ben and that he was wrong in asserting ‘is liquorice and mint
tea is tasty’ in the ﬁrst place. On this interpretation, Ben does not change his perspective during the
conversation, but simply comes to realise what his perspective really is. However, if we assume that
Ben’s ﬁrst assertion was based on a pleasurable phenomenal experience of drinking the tea, then this
interpretation of (.) presupposes a metaphysics of taste on which something can fail to taste good
to an agent at a time even if the agent has a pleasurable phenomenal experience that disposes them to
judgments of tastiness. Limitations of space and expertise prevent me here from settling the metaphysics
and physiology of taste. Let it suﬃce that there can be cases in which a speaker genuinely changes their
perspective on the tastiness of food within the period of a single conversation.
One may ﬁnd the obligation to retract incurred by MacFarlane rather weak for another reason, however.
It is not clear just how much we are committed to what we said decades ago, and there seems to be no
need to retract something to which we are not anymore committed. One may ﬁnd that one’s childhood
claims carry very short-lived commitments and that in MacFarlane’s example it is rather odd that someone
will take him up on his childhood assertion by saying ‘But you said years ago that ﬁsh sticks were tasty.’
If, however, that challenge is taken seriously, then the commitments taken on by the childhood assertion
are accepted as still being in place and the requirement to retract as binding.
ere are of course also cases of retraction of tastiness assertion in which no change of perspective takes
place, but in which the speaker admits that what she said was not even true from the perspective she had
as she was saying it. Consider (i).
(i) [Context: Sal has cooked dinner for his friends Anna and Ben.]
Ben: Your lasagne tastes awful, Sal.
Anna: No, it doesn’t, and you know that. You’re just being mean.
Ben: God. . .You’re right, Anna. I’m sorry, Sal. I take that back. I’m in a bad mood today.
Your lasagne tastes good, as usual.
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ere are, ﬁnally, cases in which speakers ‘partially retract,’ as Pearson (forthcoming,
x.) observes.
(.) a. Ben: Schnitzel is tasty.
b. Anna: No, it’s not tasty! It is bland.
c. Ben: Well, it’s tasty to me, at least.
In (.), Ben gives up on his original assertion and retreats to the weaker claim ‘it’s tasty
to me,’ which should be acceptable to Mary even if the cake does not taste good to her.
e phenomenon of ‘partial retraction,’ however, is diﬀerent from the above cases of
retraction in a number of ways. In (.), Ben is probably not prepared to assert the
negation of his previous claim. Nor does it seem that Ben has changed his mind about
the cake’s tastiness. Moreover, in (.) Ben does not seem to be required to (fully)
retract.
e data about retraction is thus a little more complex than it might at ﬁrst appear.
We should expect an account of retraction to explain the diﬀerence between the cases
and make the intuitively correct predictions for each.
.. e Common Ground and the Passage of Time
Retraction is the speech act of withdrawing a speech act made at an earlier point in
the same or a previous conversation. Before we can explain retraction on the common
ground model, we need to get clear on the temporal dimension of discourse on the
common ground model. e view that speech act content and mental content are sets
of sequenced worlds is a form of temporalism. Propositional temporalism is the view
that some contents, or propositions, are time-neutral: their truth value can change
with the time of evaluation. For instance, the content expressed by the present tense
sentence ‘Bill is sitting’ may be true when evaluated with respect to t1 but false with
respect to t2. It is easy enough to see that sequenced worlds content is temporalist
content. Consider the content that Ben’s assertion of ‘Bill is sitting’ expresses at t1 in a
conversation with two participants:
(.) SIT : fhw; t; hx1; x2ii: Bill is sitting in w at tg
Here Ben concedes that he said something that was not true from his own perspective at the time. Anna’s
opposition is not just based on her own perspective, but calls on Ben to be sincere, that is, to not say what
is not true from his perspective. MacFarlane’s relativism and nonindexical contextualism equally predict
the felicity of Ben’s retraction in (i).
e alternative view is propositional eternalism, according to which all contents are time-speciﬁc: their
truth value does not change over time; contents have their truth value eternally. Propositions conceived
of as sets of possible worlds are eternalist proposition. Stalnaker’s model of the common ground assumes
eternalist possible worlds content. As the problem I am about to present concerns only temporalism, the
amendment of the common ground model I will suggest is not required on Stalnaker’s original model.
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Suppose in the world w1 Bill is sitting at t1 but not at t2. en SIT will contain the
triple hw1; t1; hx1; x2ii but not hw1; t2; hx1; x2ii, and will thus be true of w1 at t1
(and of hx1; x2i) but not of w1 and t2.
e temporalist nature of sequenced worlds content raises a problem for the view
that in conversation, the eﬀect of a successful assertion is the addition of its speech act
content to the common ground (or the intersection of the context set with its speech
act content). Suppose as above that at t1, Bill is sitting in w1, the world of Ben’s
conversation, but not at t2. At t1, Ben truly asserts ‘Bill is sitting.’ e assertion is
accepted and its speech act content is added to the common ground. e context set
will now only contain hw; t; hx1; x2ii-triples such that Bill is sitting in w at t. Suppose
Ben at the later time t2 truly asserts ‘Bill is standing.’ Now the context set will be
intersected with STAND:
(.) STAND: fhw; t; hx1; x2ii: Bill is standing in w at tg
Since the context set after t1 contains only Sitting-Bill triples, intersecting it with
STAND yields the empty set and ‘crashes’ the context. e model predicts that Ben
has contradicted himself. But obviously, Ben’s later assertion is compatible with his
earlier assertion, and conversation will proceed smoothly.
e solution to the problem is to recognise that the common ground needs to be
updated with the ﬂow of time. If participants accept the content of an assertion of
‘Bill is sitting’ at one point in time, they are not thereby disposed to accept the content
of another assertion of ‘Bill is sitting’ one minute later. What their earlier acceptance
seems to dispose them to is acceptance at the later time of the content which, very
roughly, an assertion of ‘Bill was sitting one minute ago’ would express. Provided that
participants keep track of the passage of time and presuppose that they all keep track of
time, the context set is constantly being updated according to the following rule.
Let ti be a moment in time, where the index i is a rational number. Moments in
time are ordered by the relation earlier than or simultaneous with, which we can express
by the relation  on the moments’ indices. e context set is updated as follows.
More precisely, the requisite assumption is that participants are capable of keeping track of time, and
presuppose that they are so capable, in the minimal sense that they know how much time has passed
between their current moment and salient events in the past (they know the relation between their present
and past events). It need not be assumed that they can place their present time ‘de re’/absolutely in time,
e.g. by knowing ‘what time it is’ – by knowing the number conventional clocks ascribe to their present
time.
‘Constantly’ – the context set needs to be updated at least as often as conversational moves are made.
e temporal update rule as formulated does not take into account the information increase that often
goes hand in hand with the passage of time. For instance, if speakers come to silently presuppose that the
goat has now left the room, this presupposition needs to be added to the common ground independently.
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T CS
8t1; t2 through which a conversation with context set CS passes and
8hw; t; hx1; : : : ; xnii 2 CSt1 : CSt2 contains all hw; t0; hx1; : : : ; xnii such that
t0 = t+ (t2   t1), where (t2   t1) is the time interval between moments t1 and
t2.
Intuitively, T CS takes every world-time-individuals triple that is an
element of the context set at t1 and adds the unit of time that has passed to the time of
every triple. So if, for instance, time passes by  unit and hw; t45; hx1; : : : ; xnii is in
the context set, then the temporal update delivers hw; t46; hx1; : : : ; xnii. Participants
who take the live possibilities for themselves as a group to be having features xyz will a
minute later take their live possibilities to be having had features xyz a minute ago.
On the representation of conversation in terms of common ground, the set of pre-
supposed contents, the rule corresponding to T CS is as follows:
T CG
8t1; t2 through which a conversation with common ground CG passes, 8p 2
CGt1 and 8hw; t; hx1; : : : ; xnii 2 p: CGt2 contains all and only those q such
that 8hw; t0; hx1; : : : ; xnii 2 q, t0 = t+ (t2   t1).
Intuitively, T CG takes all the sequenced worlds contents p in the com-
mon ground at t1 and adds the unit of time that has passed to the time of each world-
time-individuals triple in every content, delivering a common ground containing con-
tents q. e temporal update of a single content p is the result of applying T
CG to a common ground containing p as its sole member.
An example will illustrate the temporal update of the context set. At t1 Ben says
to Anna, pointing to a photograph of a man: ‘is man is arriving in London. I
will meet him in  minutes.’ If Ben’s assertion is successful, the context set, given
the conversational context hwc; t1; hBen, Annaii, will contain only hw; tn; hx1; x2ii-
triples such that the man who is being demonstrated is arriving in London at tn and
x1 meets that man  minutes after tn in w. Applying T CS for the
passage of  minute (which we will represent by the addition of  integer to moments’
Not all presuppositions concern only the present moment. Many are tenseless (‘ plus  equals ’),
concern past or future moments, or concern the present moment as part of a larger interval in time (‘Bill
is a Member of Parliament’). I will have to leave the discussion of the aspectual and tense features of
present tense sentences for another occasion. Suﬃce it to say that an assertion like ‘Bill is a Member
of Parliament’, if understood to make a claim concerning an interval of time that stretches at least n
moments into the future, will express a set of sequenced worlds such that for every of its world-time-
individuals triples hw; ti; hx1; : : : ; xmii, hw; ti+n; hx1; : : : ; xmii is such that Bill is (still) a Member
of Parliament in w n moments after ti. In this case, the assertion may n moments later still be reaﬃrmed
by asserting the present tense sentence ‘Bill is (still) a Member of Parliament.’
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indices) to the context set at t1, the resulting context set at t2 will contain all and only
triples hw; tn+1; hx1; x2ii. Intuitively, what these triples have in common is that the
man who is demonstrated one minute before tn+1 is arriving in London one minute
before tn+1 and x1 meets the man  minutes after tn+1 in w.
.. Retraction and the Common Ground
We are now in a position to account for retraction on the sequenced worlds model. Let
us start by distinguishing diﬀerent kinds of cases of retraction. Inter-conversational
retraction is retraction of a speech act made in a previous conversation, as in MacFar-
lane’s example. Intra-conversational retraction is retraction of a speech act made in the
same conversation. Cases of intra-conversational retraction can further be divided. Call
those cases in which the challenge happens as an immediate reaction to the assertion
and the retraction follows as a direct result, perhaps after some negotiation, negotiation
and withdrawal. (.) and (.) above are cases of negotiation and withdrawal. Call
those cases in which challenge and retraction happen only later, after the assertion was
accepted and the conversation moved on, later correction. Figure . summarises the










... Conversational Commitments and the Proposal Nature of Assertion
e sequenced worlds model is based on a Stalnakerian account of the assertion and its
eﬀect within a conversation. e model does not account for the relationship between
T UCS/CG does not rule out that conversational participants often retain the information
contributed by an assertion of a present tense sentence in a diﬀerent sense of ‘retain.’ For instance, if
someone asserts ‘Tesco on Market Street is open,’ it may be a shared expectation that Tesco will continue
to be open for a while. In that case, at a later point in the conversation, it will for instance be felicitous to
presuppose that Tesco is (still) open. We can pragmatically explain the availability of the content of the
original assertion, in addition to the temporal update of this content, by appeal to the shared expectation
that needs to be in place if the content is later available. In such cases, the common ground contains the
content such that if the Tesco store is open, it will remain open for a while.
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speech acts taking place in diﬀerent conversations. us, we will have to look bey-
ond the model for inter-conversational retraction cases. For intra-conversational cases,
the distinction between negotiation and withdrawal and later correction is important.
On Stalnaker’s model of conversation, assertions are proposals to add contents to the
common ground, the shared presuppositions of speaker and hearers. Stalnaker (,
) says about the proposal nature of assertion: ‘To make an assertion is to reduce the
context set in a particular way, provided that there are no objections from the other parti-
cipants in the conversation.’ (emphasis D.K.) us, if retraction happens as a result of
immediate challenges, the original assertion is unsuccessful: its content is not added to
the common ground. is is the case of negotiation and withdrawal. Retractions that
happen only after the proposal was successful and the assertion’s content was added to
the common ground are cases of later correction.
e proposal nature of assertion also allows for a distinction in the conversational
commitments that a speaker incurs in making an assertion. By making a proposal to
add a content p to the common ground, a speaker incurs a commitment to accepting p
as true (for the purposes of the conversation) – in short, a commitment to p. Speakers
do not forfeit this commitment even when the assertion is unsuccessful and p is not
added to the common ground. Call this commitment a speaker commitment. If the
assertion of p is successful, i.e. accepted by all participants as true (for the purposes of
the conversation), (accepting) p (as true for the purposes of conversation) becomes a
joint commitment of speaker and hearers and ceases to be a speaker commitment. e
joint commitments in a conversation are all and only the propositions in the common
ground. e sum total of a speaker’s commitments are her speaker commitments plus
the joint commitments. Both commitments are public commitments. Retraction is
the explicit withdrawal from a commitment. In intra-conversational cases of negoti-
ation and withdrawal, retraction is the withdrawal from a speaker commitment. In
intra-conversational cases of later correction, retraction is the withdrawal from a joint
commitment.
e incurred commitment may be a stronger commitment than accepting the content as true (for the
purposes of conversation). For instance, it may be the commitment to giving evidence for the content’s
truth. I have assumed that the norm of assertion states a requirement of truth. Correspondingly, the
commitment incurred by an assertion is to the content’s truth. If the reader’s judgments lean towards a
stronger commitment, she might also be inclined to endorse a stronger norm of assertion. For discussion,
see footnote  in section ...
e proposal nature of assertion is emphasised on many pragmatic models of discourse (see for instance
Clark and Schaefer (); Clark (); Farkas and Bruce (); Ginzburg ()). Farkas and Bruce
() propose a richer structure of ‘context,’ which contains the common ground – the shared ‘discourse
commitments’ of all participants as well as a set of individual discourse commitments of each participant
(those not yet in the common ground), a ‘Table’ of the issues under discussion, and a ‘projected set,’ which
records the potential changes to the common ground that are proposed by a speech act. An assertion has
the eﬀect of adding its content to the speaker’s individual discourse commitments, of placing it on the
Table, and of creating a projected set that is, roughly, the common ground plus the asserted content.
Hearers are prompted to conﬁrm (or reject) the assertion, to the eﬀect that the projected set becomes
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... Intra-conversational Cases of Retraction
e most frequent and the most natural kind of retraction is perhaps negotiation and
withdrawal. It is worth illustrating it with an example. (.), repeated here, is a case of
negotiation and withdrawal.
(.) Ben: is liquorice and mint tea is tasty! I’ve never tried this combina-
tion before.
Anna: No, it’s not! e anise, minty and sweet ﬂavours together are dis-
gusting. And the aftertaste is the worst.
Ben: Hmmm. Let me have another sip then. . .You’re right. I take that
back. It’s not tasty at all.
In (.) Anna rejects Ben’s proposal to add the content of ‘is liquorice and mint tea is
tasty’ to the common ground. Hence, the content is not added to the common ground
and no joint commitment is incurred. Ben subsequently withdraws his proposal by
saying ‘I take that back.’ He thus withdraws from his speaker commitment to the
content of his original assertion. Since Ben, after retracting his claim, also aﬃrms
the negation of his original assertion by saying ‘It’s not tasty at all,’ the negation of the
original content is added to the common ground (assuming that Anna acts consistently
and does not reject this proposal). During the negotiation, which could be longer
than the three turns in (.), many other contents may of course be added to the
common ground.
It is a little less clear how to account for cases of later correction on the sequenced
worlds model, cases in which an assertion is retracted after it has been accepted by all
conversational participants and the conversation has moved on. MacFarlane (c)
suggests that on Stalnaker’s account, later correction might be thought of as ‘a new
proposal to undo the changes that were made . . . a proposal to subtract that information
[the information that got added by the assertion].’ He raises the following diﬃculty
for this way of understanding later correction:
the new common ground, and the content disappears from the Table and the speaker’s set of individual
discourse commitments.
e notion of a speaker commitment to the content of an assertion is broadly in agreement with Farkas
and Bruce’s notion of ‘individual discourse commitment,’ and the main points in this section are com-
patible with Farkas and Bruce’s model, which provides a more ﬁne-grained account of the dynamics of
(dis)agreement and retraction of assertions. For the discussion of the dynamics of (dis)agreement on the
sequenced worlds model, see section .. An important diﬀerence between the sequenced worlds model
and Farkas and Bruce’s discourse model is that their model assumes eternalist possible worlds contents,
and hence has no need for a temporal update of the common ground.
Retracting one’s original assertion is not equivalent to aﬃrming the negation of the content originally
expressed. One may, for instance, retract because one prefers to suspend judgment on the matter, thus
neither aﬃrming nor rejecting the original content. However, assertions of ‘I take that back’ or ‘I was
wrong’ may imply that the speaker endorses the negation of the original content.
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is idea is not easy to integrate with a representation of the common
ground as a set of possible worlds: clearly, subtracting a proposition from
such a set does not amount to taking the union of the proposition and
the set. But if we represent the common ground as a set of propositions,
we can view the eﬀect of retraction as simple subtraction. (MacFarlane,
c, )
e problem MacFarlane raises is this: if the eﬀect of assertion is understood as the
result of intersecting its content with the context set (whether that be a set of possible
worlds or sequenced worlds), there is no straightforward set-theoretic operation on the
context set that amounts to the eﬀect of later correction. Taking the union of the
context set and the content will not do because this will, among other things, smuggle
back in a number of possibilities that have already been ruled out. For instance, the
content expressed by ‘Sam is home’ will contain a possibility in which Sam is at home
and the conversation happens among gods under the tree Yggdrasil, a possibility that
is presumably not a live possibility in most conversations.
MacFarlane suggests that on the representation of the common ground as a set
of contents, the eﬀect of later correction amounts to the simple operation of removing
the asserted content from the common ground. But this operation does not adequately
capture the eﬀect of later correction either. In many conversations, later correction has
a domino eﬀect on some of the contents that were added after the retracted assertion.
Suppose we are solving a murder case, reasoning with various pieces of evidence we
provide in conversation. I say that the murder required physical strength. You say
that the butler suﬀers from advanced osteoporosis. We conclude that the butler is not
the murderer, and shift our attention to the gardener. Later, I retract my assertion by
saying ‘Wait. Let me take that back. I got it mixed up. It’s the butler’s wife who suﬀers
from osteoporosis.’ Clearly, the conversation does not just proceed by erasing from the
common ground the single piece of information added by my original assertion. We
will also remove the conclusion we drew on its basis, and potentially other information
that was oﬀered later on.
What exactly the eﬀect of later correction is depends on a number of contextual
and psychological factors such as the participants’ memory and reasoning skills and
their assumptions about these skills in each other. One limit case may be the removal
of just the originally asserted content. But in some situations, it might not even be
clear to the participants what the eﬀect of a particular act of retraction is. us the
other limit case is the complete breakdown of the common ground with the need to
explicitly establish, for every (still relevant) assertion made after the retracted assertion,
whether it is still accepted by all participants.
e Stalnakerian sequenced worlds model does not oﬀer a precise account of later
correction, at least not without major extension. But in the absence of a detailed story
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about all the contextual factors pertaining to the exact eﬀect of retraction, a very simple
account may do. According to this account, a later correction is an (implicit) asser-
tion of a content incompatible with the originally asserted content (e.g., its negation).
When this new content is added to the common ground, the common ground be-
comes inconsistent. (e intersection of the context set with the new content is the
empty set.) us the conversation’s context set ‘crashes’ and needs to be repaired. In
repairing, a conversational participant makes her presuppositions based on her beliefs
about which information she can still take for granted, her beliefs about which inform-
ation the other participants still take for granted, her beliefs about what their beliefs are
about her beliefs, and so forth. is process is very much like that at the beginning
of a conversation, except that participants now have more clues as to what the others
already take for granted.
... Inter-conversational Cases of Retraction
In inter-conversational retraction cases, as in MacFarlane’s ﬁsh sticks example, a speaker
retracts an assertion she made in a previous conversation, typically in reaction to an
explicit challenge. ree things are important for the understanding of inter-conversa-
tional retraction on the sequenced worlds model.
First, inter-conversational retraction is required, and plausible, only if the asser-
tion’s content is under discussion in the current conversation and if speaker and hearers
take the speaker to still be committed to what she asserted in the previous conversa-
tion. at is, they treat the content of the original assertion (not quite its content, see
points two and three below) either as a speaker commitment of the speaker or a joint
commitment in the current conversation. Of course, not everything one ever asserted
is thereby a commitment in a current conversation. Whether a speaker’s previous com-
mitment becomes a current commitment in conversation depends in part on whether
it is a presupposition in the conversation that the speaker made the assertion. Often,
this presupposition is added as the result of a challenge – as in MacFarlane’s example
when someone says ‘But you said years ago that ﬁsh sticks were tasty’ – whereby the
commitment incurred by the earlier assertion becomes a current commitment of the
speaker.
Second, the current speaker commitment is not exactly a commitment to the con-
tent the previous assertion expressed in its conversational context. Recall that conversa-
tion is the joint project of establishing the conversational group’s possibilities. In estab-
lishing the possibilities of one’s current conversational group at the time of speaking,
we are clearly not committed to accepting as current live possibilities the very possib-
A detailed account of individual speakers’ process of revising their presuppositions is beset by the problems
known from the work on belief revision. At the same time, logics of belief revision provide a fruitful
starting point for such an account (see e.g. van Ditmarsch et al. (, ch. ), Gardenfors ()).
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ilities a potentially diﬀerent conversational group took to be their live possibilities at
an earlier time. Rather, we treat earlier conversations in the same way as eavesdrop-
pers treat a conversation they overhear. In both cases, the piece of information gained
by remembering or overhearing a speech act is ‘de-contextualised’ information. As we
saw in section ., for instance, eavesdroppers are not inclined to think that ‘here,’ as
used by the speaker, refers to the shared location; rather, they learn something about
the conversation’s location. Similarly for temporal indexicals like ‘now’ and ‘today’,
pronouns like ‘I’ and ‘you,’ and other indexical expressions. e Kaplan horizontal of
the original assertion of a sentence  at the context c – i:JKc;i, a function from an
index to a truth value – delivers just this piece of information.
ird, the current speaker commitment is not exactly a commitment to the Kaplan
horizontal of the previous assertion either. Why not? e Kaplan horizontal, just like
S  SW, is a temporally unspeciﬁc content. So just like the common
ground – which can be understood as the participants’ shared conversational commit-
ments – requires updating with the passage of time, the commitment incurred from
a previous assertion needs to be the temporal update of the assertion’s Kaplan hori-
zontal. Technically, the speaker’s current commitment is the result of applying the rule
T CG of section .. to that Kaplan horizontal, where the sequence
of individuals in the index contains as many slots as there are participants to the cur-
rent conversation. Let me illustrate this with an example. Ben, in a conversation with
Anna and Sal, is reminded that a week ago, he said ‘is man was at the airport a day
ago,’ pointing at a photograph of the spy Ortcutt. e Kaplan horizontal of his as-
sertion for an index with a sequence of three individuals is ARRIVE (given here as the
characteristic set).
(.) ARRIVE : fhw; t; hx1; x2; x3ii: Ortcutt was at the airport in w one day before
tg
Intuitively, what Ben’s previous assertion commits him to in his current conversation is
the content that Ortcutt was at the airport a week and a day ago. We get this content
by applying T CG to the Kaplan horizontal – that is, by adding the
number of temporal units that have passed between Ben’s assertion and his current
conversation to the time in each triple in ARRIVE.
Putting the pieces together, the commitment incurred by a speaker’s previous as-
sertion is the temporal update of the assertion’s Kaplan horizontal. is commitment
may be a speaker commitment, amounting to a standing proposal to add the temporal
update of the assertion’s Kaplan horizontal to the common ground. If the speaker
commitment has not yet been added to the common ground, the speaker’s retraction
is a retraction from this speaker commitment and resembles the case of negotiation
and withdrawal. e commitment may also be a joint commitment. If all participants
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presuppose that the speaker made the previous assertion and presuppose the temporal
update of the Kaplan horizontal, the speaker’s retraction is a retraction from the joint
commitment and resembles the case of later correction.
... Generics and Retraction
So does the account of retraction on the common ground model give us the right results
for all the cases introduced in section ..? We will only be able to give a full answer
to this question once we have introduced the norms for retraction on the sequenced
worlds view in the next section. But one important complication needs to be discussed
ﬁrst. Consider again the ﬁsh sticks case. Adult MacFarlane asserts that ﬁsh sticks are
not tasty, and his interlocutor challenges him by saying ‘But years ago you said that
ﬁsh sticks are tasty.’ He thus reminds MacFarlane of the commitment incurred by his
childhood assertion. We want to say that the temporal update of the Kaplan horizontal
of this assertion is incompatible with the speech act content of the current assertion
of ‘Fish sticks aren’t tasty,’ so MacFarlane has two contradictory speaker commitments.
MacFarlane is a cooperative conversational participant and resolves the incompatibility
by withdrawing from his speaker commitment to the temporal update of his previous
assertion’s Kaplan horizontal.
e trouble is that if we treat the assertion of ‘Fish sticks are tasty’ like any other claim
about the present, it turns out that the temporal update of its Kaplan horizontal is not
incompatible with the speech act content of MacFarlane’s later assertion of ‘Fish sticks
aren’t tasty.’ If we treat the earlier assertion as a claim about just the time when it was
made, the temporal update of its Kaplan horizontal is a set of sequenced worlds which
have in common that years ago ﬁsh sticks tasted good to the centers. is content, how-
ever, is compatible with the speech act content of MacFarlane’s later assertion, which
is the set of sequenced worlds such that ﬁsh sticks do not (currently) taste good to the
centers. ere are a lot of sequenced worlds of which both of these contents are true –
for instance those whose centers have changed their mind on the tastiness of ﬁsh sticks.
us, MacFarlane should be able to respond to the challenge by saying ‘Look. Years
ago ﬁsh sticks were tasty. But I have changed my mind. ey’re not anymore.’
I think that this reply is not utterly unnatural, but there is certainly a preference
for retraction. To see why, it is important to notice ﬁrst that MacFarlane’s assertion
involves the bare plural ‘ﬁsh sticks’ and thus makes a generic statement about ﬁsh sticks.
His assertion roughly means that ﬁsh sticks are usually/typically/generally tasty. With
other generic statements, similar eﬀects regarding their temporal dimension can be
observed. Consider an assertion of ‘Firemen are fearless,’ which is challenged years
later. In response to the challenge, the speaker can either retract and say ‘I take that
e speaker may want to retract not because of pressure from her hearers but because she discovered
defeating evidence or because she does not believe anymore what she said.
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back. Firemen aren’t fearless,’ or she can clarify and say ‘Look. Firemen used to be
fearless. But now they’re not anymore.’ e latter response seems preferable, but I take
it that both are available.
What is it that explains the availability of either response in both generic state-
ments, yet a preference for retraction in the taste case and a preference for clarifying
and holding one’s ground in the ﬁremen case? In the literature on generics, it has been
recognised that generic statements do not concern only the present moment. at is,
‘Firemen are fearless’ does not just express a generalisation about current ﬁremen. Ariel
Cohen (a) points out that even if at the moment of speaking, all Supreme Court
judges as a matter of fact have a prime Social Security number, the following generic
statement would not be true.
(.) Supreme Court judges have a prime Social Security number.
Cohen observes that ‘the truth, indeed the acceptability of [(.)] requires that Su-
preme Court judges have a prime Social Security number not just at present, but that
this property be expected to hold in the future with some regularity’ (Cohen, a, ,
my emphasis). How this future-directed aspect of generics is best captured in the se-
mantics is an intricate question, but the details need not concern us here. What
matters for our purposes is that generic statements require for their truth that the said
property is possessed not only by (some/many/most) present instances of the kind but
also by future instances, insofar as the future is a regular continuation of the present.
us a speaker who is challenged on her generic assertion of ‘Firemen are fearless’
made in the past will retract if she accepts that the actual history since her assertion has
been a regular continuation of the past and contains too many fearful ﬁremen for the
generic to be true. If, however, a speaker stands her ground and clariﬁes, it is because
she does not accept that the actual history has been a regular continuation of the past
and so does not think that later instances disconﬁrm her generic statement. Typically,
a speaker will provide some justiﬁcation about why the actual history has not been
a regular continuation, for instance by pointing to a signiﬁcant change in ﬁremen’s
properties that is responsible for their loss of fearlessness.
e same holds in the ﬁsh sticks case. If adult MacFarlane accepts the challenge,
it is because he accepts that the actual history has been a regular continuation of the
past, so ﬁsh sticks’ not being tasty is in conﬂict with the past claim that they are tasty
(and are to be expected to remain tasty). If, on the contrary, he stands his ground and
clariﬁes, it is because he rejects that the actual history has been a regular continuation
of the past. To justify that it is not, he may point to some relevant change of properties
Cohen’s own proposal is that generics express probability judgments and involve quantiﬁcation over ‘ad-
missible histories’ in the metalanguage, where admissibility requires that histories are continuations of the
actual history that preserve the relevant regularities.
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of ﬁsh sticks or a change of properties of his own that are relevant to his experience of
taste.
Finally, the diﬀerence in preference – retracting or clarifying – between generics in-
volving PPTs and other generics can be explained by the fact that in generic statements
of both sorts, the kind to which some property is attributed is attended to. is makes
salient the various properties of its instances, which may, or may not, have changed
since the generic statement was made. It is thus natural to clarify by pointing to some
relevant property of the kind that has changed (and thus makes the actual history an ir-
regular continuation of the past), both in taste and other cases. But generic statements
in which an unrelativised PPT occurs with silent PROC do not draw attention to the
experiencer’s perspective – only the food is explicit in the sentence. is explains why
in cases where it is the speaker’s perspective that has changed, clarifying is less frequent.
We should thus expect that where the speaker has changed her mind about some food’s
tastiness on account of a perceived change in the food itself, she will be more inclined
to clarify than in cases where it is her perspective that has changed.
In sum, it is the future-directed feature of generics that accounts for the incompat-
ibility of MacFarlane’s commitments in the ﬁsh sticks case.
ere is a residual worry. What about similar cases of non-generic taste asser-
tions? For instance, suppose young MacFarlane asserted ‘is dish is tasty.’ It might be
thought that adult MacFarlane may still retract this claim if he has changed his mind
on the tastiness of that particular piece of food. But obviously ascriptions of tastiness
to particulars come with no expectation that the particular food will remain tasty.
Note that if MacFarlane’s assertion is understood as a claim about the kind of food
he had on that occasion, the explanation appealing to features of generic statements is
again available. But if we focus on the reading which says of the particular token dish
that it is tasty, I must admit that my intuitions about the naturalness of retraction are
not very clear. It seems to me that the more natural reading is about the kind. But
where the particular-reading is salient, retraction would involve the past tense assertion
‘at dish was not tasty.’ (If one retracts by saying, ‘at dish isn’t tasty,’ it is clearly
the kind-assertion that is retracted.) But it strikes me that this past tense assertion sits
oddly with the admission that the dish did taste good to the speaker at the time. Rather,
it seems natural to say ‘at dish was tasty. I just wouldn’t ﬁnd it tasty nowadays.’ It
must be admitted, however, that intuitions may diﬀer here. We will come back to issues
arising from the interaction of PPTs with time in section .. below.
I am thankful to Bernard Nickel and Rachel Sterken for helpful discussion on the temporal dimension of
generics.
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.. Norms for Retraction
is outlines the account of retraction on the common ground model of conversation.
What still needs to be addressed is the question under which conditions retraction is
normatively required of cooperative conversational participants.
e norms for retraction of the relativist and the nonindexical contextualist above
mirrored their egocentric norms of assertion. e relativist’s norms say, very roughly,
that an assertion is permissible only if it is true from the asserter’s perspective at the
time of asserting; the retraction of that assertion is required if the assertion is not true
from the retractor’s perspective at the time it is reconsidered. In section . on asser-
tion above, we have seen that judgments of conversational propriety can be guided by
two diﬀerent conversational purposes, namely the group-centric purpose of maximal
cooperativeness and the more speaker-oriented purpose of voicing one’s perspective
and persuading one’s audience of sharing one’s perspective. e diﬀerent judgments
correspond to two diﬀerent norms of assertion, repeated here.
S -   
AG A speech act content p is appropriately assertable in context c only
if p is true from the conversation’s perspective in c.
W -   
AW A speech act content p is appropriately assertable in context c only if
p correctly locates the speaker and the hearers in c are in a position
to accommodate in such a way as to bring about p’s truth from the
conversational perspective at c.
Judgments about the obligation to retract previous assertions mirror the judgments
about appropriateness of assertion. Corresponding to a strong and a weak norm of
assertion, there is a strong and a weak norm for retraction. ese norms also register
the diﬀerent conversational purposes that may guide judgments regarding the oblig-
ation to retract. Consider ﬁrst the strong norms for retraction, formulated here as a
pair of norms, one for intra-conversational retraction and one for inter-conversational
retraction. (eir normative impact is the same.)
S -   
RS An agent at t2 is required to retract an assertion of p made in the
same conversation at t1 if the temporal update of p is not true
from the conversational perspective at t2.
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RS An agent at t2 is required to retract an assertion of pmade in a pre-
vious conversation at t1 if the temporal update of the assertion’s
Kaplan horizontal is not true from the conversational perspective
at t2.
RS and RS entail that an assertion of a bare taste sentence must be re-
tracted if it is met with a sincere challenge by one of the conversational participants.
is might seem to strong. However, there is a sense in which a proposal to add a con-
tent to the common ground which faces this kind of resistance should be dropped. If
the temporal update of (the Kaplan horizontal of ) the assertion’s speech act contentSW
p is not true from the current conversational perspective because at least one of the
participants disagrees with the speaker on the tastiness of the food in question, it is not
appropriate to add that content to the common ground, and consequently, the proposal
to add that content should be dropped to allow for the fully cooperative progression of
the conversation.
In most cases of retraction, however, intuitive judgment tracks the speaker-oriented
purpose of conversation. e judgments reﬂect the prescriptions of a weaker pair of
retraction norms, mirroring the weak norm of assertion, which permits assertion only
where the asserted content correctly locates the speaker and hearers can accommodate
in such a way as to bring about the content’s truth from the conversational perspective.
W   
RW An agent at t2 is required to retract an assertion of the speech act
content p made in the same conversation at t1 if (i) the temporal
update of p is not true from the conversational perspective at t2
and (ii) hearers at t2 are in no position to accommodate in such
a way as to bring about the truth of the temporal update of p.
RW An agent at t2 is required to retract an assertion of p made in
a previous conversation at t1 if (i) the temporal update of the
assertion’s Kaplan horizontal is not true from the conversational
perspective at t2 and (ii) hearers at t2 are in no position to accom-
modate in such a way as to bring about the truth of the temporal
update of the assertion’s Kaplan horizontal.
Let us see what the predictions are of the weak and strong norms for retraction regarding
the data with which we started out in section ... In MacFarlane’s ﬁsh sticks case,
it is not true from the conversational perspective of adult MacFarlane that ﬁsh sticks
are tasty, because ﬁsh sticks do not taste good to MacFarlane anymore. is is a case
of inter-conversational retraction. Both the weak norm RW and the strong
norm RS predict that MacFarlane should retract, since the temporal update of
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the Kaplan horizontal of his childhood assertion ‘Fish sticks are tasty’ is not true from
his current conversational perspective for the reason that ﬁsh sticks fail to be tasty to
MacFarlane himself (see section ... for details). is prediction coincides with the
relativist’s prediction.
In Stephenson’s cake case, repeated here, retraction seemed ‘pathologically meek
and odd.’
(.) Mary: How’s the cake?
Sam: It’s tasty.
Sue: No it isn’t, it tastes terrible!
Sam: Oh, then I guess I was wrong.
In section .., we explained the oddity of the retraction with the implausibility of
a change of mind on the part of Sam simply on account of Sue’s resistance to accept
his assertion. (.) is an intra-conversational case of negotiation and withdrawal. e
strong norm RS predicts that Sam should retract, since the fact that the cake
does not taste good to Sue makes Sam’s assertion false from the conversational perspect-
ive. e weak norm RW, however, does not predict an obligation to retract,
since Sam’s hearers are in a position to accommodate in such a way as to bring about the
truth of the temporal update of the content expressed by Sam’s assertion. All Sue needs
to do is change her mind about the taste (or act as if she changed her mind and accept
the content of Sam’s assertion merely for the purposes of the conversation). Provided
that Sam does not change his mind, relativism also predicts that he is not obliged to
retract. (.) is thus evidence that the weak norms for retraction are needed on the
common ground model to make the predictions of relativism.
In the liquorice and mint tea case, repeated here, retraction did seem natural to the
same degree that it seemed plausible that Ben changed his mind about the tea between
his ﬁrst assertion and his later retraction.
(.) Ben: is liquorice and mint tea is tasty! I’ve never tried this combina-
tion before.
Anna: No, it’s not! e anise, minty and sweet ﬂavours together are dis-
gusting. And the aftertaste is the worst.
Ben: Hmmm. Let me have another sip then. . .You’re right. I take that
back. It’s not tasty at all.
(.) is an intra-conversational case of negotiation and withdrawal. Provided that Ben
did change his mind, both RW and RS predict that Ben should retract.
at is because from the later conversational perspective in (.), the temporal update
of the content of Ben’s assertion is not true, due to Ben’s change of mind, and the hearer
Anna is in no position to accommodate in such a way as to bring about the truth of
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the temporal update of the content of Ben’s assertion from the current conversational
perspective; after all, she cannot change Ben’s taste preferences single-handedly. Re-
lativism also predicts that Ben is required to retract, since it is not true from his current
context of assessment that the tea is tasty.
Finally, recall (.), a case of ‘partial retraction.’
(.) a. Ben: Schnitzel is tasty.
b. Anna: No, it’s not tasty! It is bland.
c. Ben: Well, it’s tasty to me, at least.
We noted above that (.) diﬀers from other retraction cases in crucial ways. For in-
stance, it would be odd for Ben to retract by asserting the negation of his original
assertion. And it seems implausible that Ben’s partially retracts as a result of changing
his mind about the taste of the cake. Provided that Ben does not change his mind,
relativism predicts that he need not retract. e weak intra-conversational norm for
retraction, RW, equally predicts that Ben is not required to retract, as his hearer
Mary is in a position to bring about the relevant content’s truth from their current con-
versational perspective. But what does Ben’s partial retraction amount to? ere is a
sense in which Ben has withdrawn from his proposal to add the content of his original
assertion to the common ground in reaction to Mary’s rejection. He settles for the
weaker claim, which is acceptable for Mary even if cake does not taste good to her.
On the common ground model, partial retraction in (.) amounts to the withdrawal
from a speaker commitment, without the endorsement of the negation of the original
assertion. Partial retraction is predicted by the strong norm RS, since the tem-
poral update of the content of Ben’s assertion is not true from the later conversational
perspective.
In sum, the relativist’s predictions are captured by the weak norms for retraction.
In most cases, the predictions of the strong norms for retraction coincided with those
of the weak norms. But in Stephenson’s cake case, the strong norms predicted an ob-
ligation to retract, contrary to intuitive judgments. It is in cases of ‘partial retraction’
that the strong norms do explanatory work.
Nonindexical contextualism makes the prediction that in none of the cases discussed
the speaker is required to retract. at is because the view is naturally combined with
a norm for retraction that prescribes retraction only if, roughly, the assertion was not
true from the speaker’s perspective at the time of assertion. It is possible to state a weak
norm for retraction that delivers roughly similar predictions.
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NC    
RWNC An agent at t2 is required to retract an assertion of the speech act
content p made at t1 if (i) p was not true from the conversational
perspective at t1 and (ii) hearers at t1 were in no position to
accommodate in such a way as to bring about the truth of the
temporal update (of the Kaplan horizontal) of p.
To illustrate, MacFarlane is not required to retract his childhood assertion of ‘Fish sticks
are tasty’ according to this norm for retraction because the content of his assertion was
true from the conversational perspective at the time of assertion. In all but Stephen-
son’s cake case, however, the nonindexical contextualist’s predictions are counterintu-
itive. As we saw in section .., the nonindexical contextualist’s pragmatics predicts
the felicity of the following assertions by adult MacFarlane.
(.) I won’t take that back. But of course, ﬁsh sticks aren’t tasty.
(.) Although what I said back then is false, I won’t take it back.
(.) My assertion from back then is true. But I now reject what I said.
On the common ground model of communication, there is a simple explanation of
why these assertions are odd. By not retracting, the speaker indicates that he stands
by his conversational commitments, viz. the temporal update of the content of ‘Fish
sticks are tasty.’ But by following this up with ‘ﬁsh sticks aren’t tasty’, the speaker makes
a contradictory proposal, the proposal to intersect the context set with a content that
Or, if the asserted content was not true from the conversation’s perspective because ﬁsh sticks did not taste
good to one of the hearers, clause (ii) of the norm would most probably have failed: his hearers were in
a position to accommodate in such a way as to bring about the content’s truth from the conversation’s
perspective.
Nonindexical contextualism could make the same predictions as relativism regarding the obligation to
retract. At the cost of losing distinctiveness, nonindexical contextualists could adopt norms equivalent to
the relativist’s norms, using the notion of T  . e strong and weak retraction norm for
intra-conversational retraction would look as follows:
RNCS An agent at t2 is required to retract an assertion of p made in the same conver-
sation at t1 if the temporal update of p is not true in the context at t2.
RNCW An agent at t2 is required to retract an assertion of the speech act content p
made in the same conversation at t1 if (i) the temporal update of p is not true
in the context at t2 and (ii) hearers at t2 are in no position to accommodate in
such a way as to bring about the truth of the temporal update of p.
is set of norms, however, still leaves nonindexical contextualism with a range of counterintuitive pre-
dictions. For instance, adult MacFarlane could felicitously assert the following:
(i) I take that back. Still, my assertion is true.
(ii) I was wrong, ﬁsh sticks aren’t tasty. Still, my assertion is true.
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contains only possibilities in which ﬁsh sticks taste good to none of the conversational
participants. However, since the previous assertion’s commitment has been kept, the
speaker is also making a proposal to intersect with possibilities in which ﬁsh sticks taste
good to all of the participants. e two proposal cannot both be accepted without
‘crashing’ the context set – reducing it to the empty set.
us, the sequenced worlds model of the common ground sits oddly with the
nonindexical contextualist’s predictions about retraction. But this oddity is not due
to peculiar theoretical choices on the sequenced worlds model. Rather, the oddity
reﬂects the counterintuitiveness of some consequences of nonindexical contextualism
– as witnessed by (.)–(.). ese are consequences that nonindexical contextualism
has independently of its implementation in a sequenced worlds framework. e bad ﬁt
with nonindexical contextualism regarding retraction indicates that a relativist version
of the sequenced worlds model should be favoured.
. Conclusion
Chapter  developed the fundamentals of the sequenced worlds view. At the beginning
of this chapter, we saw that the view is neutral between nonindexical contextualism and
truth relativism about predicates of personal taste. However, the subsequent discussion
of eavesdropping and retraction data showed that the predictions of relativism provide
support for a relativist version of the sequenced worlds view. Among other things,
the discussion of pragmatic phenomena of conversation showed that eavesdroppers,
who are not part of the conversational project of locating the conversational group,
receive and evaluate the information carried by an assertion’s horizontal content rather
than diagonal content; that two norms of assertion are in place depending on the pur-
pose(s) of the conversation; and that over the course of a conversation, the temporalist
common ground is in constant temporal update in order to preserve the information
accumulated in the conversation.
at is, assuming that ‘Fish sticks aren’t tasty’ receives a narrow scope reading for the negation. See chapter
section .. on the interaction of negation with PPTs.

 
SEQUENCED WORLDS, DISAGREEMENT, TRUTH ASCRIPTIONS
. Introduction
Chapter  introduced the sequenced worlds view. Chapter  showed that the view is
compatible with nonindexical contextualism and truth relativism. At the same time,
it became clear in chapter  that eavesdropping and retraction data lend support to a
relativist version of the sequenced worlds view. In this chapter, I continue the devel-
opment of the sequenced worlds view to account for disagreement cases and monadic
truth ascriptions. In section ., I give a suﬃcient conditions account of disagreement
within the sequenced worlds model and show how we can make sense of the notion
of faultless disagreement. In section ., I provide the beginnings of an account of the
dynamics of agreement and disagreement about matters of personal taste on the se-
quenced worlds model of common ground. e discussion of disagreement will put us
in a position in section . to take up the question of the cognitive signiﬁcance of de se
and subjective attitudes. Returning to empirical questions regarding sequenced worlds
relativism, I will then explore the interaction between predicates of personal taste and
tense as well as modality in sections . and .. In chapter , two major strands of
relativist theories were identiﬁed, centered worlds relativism and MacFarlane’s relativ-
ism, and the proximity of centered worlds and sequenced worlds relativism was noted.
e discussion of tense and modality will allow us to see where sequenced worlds re-
lativism diﬀers from MacFarlane’s relativism in empirical predictions, and will conﬁrm
the similarity of centered and sequenced worlds relativism. I will close with a summary
and discussion of the roles of horizontal and diagonal content on the sequenced worlds
view in section ..
. Disagreement
.. Introduction
Perhaps the most frequently championed argument in favour of (truth) relativism and
against (indexical) contextualism is an argument from disagreement. Contextualism,
I will use ‘contextualism’ to mean indexical contextualism, and will use the explicit ‘nonindexical contex-
tualism’ as before to refer to nonindexical contextualism.

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it is urged, makes it mysterious why Ben and Anna in (.) would regard themselves
as disagreeing.
(.) Ben: is cake is tasty.
Anna: No/Nuh-uh/I disagree, it’s not tasty!
According to a simple version of contextualism, Ben expresses the content that the
(contextually salient) cake is tasty to Ben, and Anna expresses the content that the cake is
not tasty to Anna. ese two contents are compatible. So Anna and Ben should not take
themselves to be disagreeing, and the use of disagreement markers like ‘No’, ‘Nuh-uh’,
and ‘I disagree’ should be infelicitous. In fact, this simple contextualism predicts that
Ben and Anna disagree no more in (.) than they do in (.).
(.) Ben: I’m a philosopher.
Anna: No/Nuh-uh/I disagree, I’m not a philosopher.
Relativism, on the contrary, predicts that Ben and Anna disagree in (.) but not in
(.). In (.), there is a single content, that the cake is tasty, which Ben accepts by virtue
of asserting it and which Anna rejects by virtue of asserting its negation. ere is no
such content in (.). Relativism, it is concluded, saves disagreement about subjective
matters.
Some advocates of relativism make the stronger case that relativism is uniquely cap-
able of explaining the possibility of faultless disagreement — ‘that is, situations where
one person asserts or believes some sentence content, and another person believes or
asserts its negation, but where neither person has made a mistake.’ (Lasersohn, ,
) us in (.) Ben and Anna disagree faultlessly because each of them asserts a con-
tent that is true relative to himself/herself. Faultlessness is explained as truth relative to
the asserter’s or believer’s own perspective.
However, not all relativists put a great deal of emphasis on faultlessness (MacFar-
lane, a; Stephenson, a). Some even agree with critics of relativism and think
that the combination of single content and truth from each of the parties’ own perspect-
ive does not account for faultless disagreement (MacFarlane (, ch. ), Richard
(, ch. )).
Versions of the argument from disagreement can be found throughout the relativist literature, for instance
in Kolbel (), Kolbel (, esp. -), Kolbel (, -), Lasersohn (), Lasersohn (,
-), Lasersohn (, x), Lasersohn (), MacFarlane (a), MacFarlane (, ch. ), Richard
(), Richard (, chs. &), Stephenson (a, xx,), and Wright ().
See Kolbel (, , ), Lasersohn (, ), and Wright () for the argument for relativ-
ism from faultless disagreement.
Anti-relativist objections to the claim that relativism is able to account for faultless disagreement are given
by Moltmann (), Rosenkranz (), and Stojanovic ().
. Disagreement 
Initial enthusiasm has also been curbed by general worries about the prospects of
providing a necessary-and-suﬃcient-conditions analysis of disagreement. As a result,
some relativists stress eavesdropper (Egan, ) or retraction data (MacFarlane, )
over disagreement data. Others have oﬀered independent motivation for relativist se-
mantics from the embedding behaviour of PPTs in larger expressions, e.g., in attitude
contexts and presuppositional constructions (Lasersohn, , ).
I share both the worries about the project of giving an analysis of disagreement
and the doubts about the early relativists’ explanation of faultless disagreement. My
goal in this section is (i) to give a suﬃcient-conditions account of disagreement on the
sequenced worlds model, which makes the right predictions for disagreement about
subjective matters and disagreement in de se communication; and (ii) to show in which
ways a sequenced worlds relativist is (and is not) entitled to talk of ‘faultless disagree-
ment.’ I will begin by stating the relativist account of disagreement on the sequenced
worlds model (x..). After a note on transworld disagreement (x..), I will ex-
plain in which ways disagreements about subjective matters may be said to be faultless
(..). I will close with a brief discussion of a nonindexical contextualist account of
disagreement on the sequenced worlds model (x..). In the next section, we will see
how some aspects of the pragmatics of agreement and disagreement in conversation
can be modelled on the sequenced worlds framework (x.).
Before proceeding, it is important that we distinguish the two projects involved. As
Cappelen and Hawthorne (, -) point out, ‘agree’ has both a state and an activ-
ity meaning. e same goes for disagreement. ‘A and B disagree’ can describe a state
in which A and B are in virtue of having made conﬂicting speech acts or having con-
ﬂicting attitudes; or it can describe the activity of A and B engaging in a discussion or
dispute in which they can felicitously use expressions like ‘No’, Nu-huh’, ‘I disagree’, or
‘at’s false.’ e latter requires some sort of interaction between A and B, the former
does not. us, A and B can disagree in the state sense without disagreeing in the
activity sense. ey may never have met, yet disagree in virtue of holding conﬂicting
beliefs. Cleisthenes, the father of Ancient Greek democracy, and Confucius disagree
on the ideal form of government, even though they presumably did not even know
of each other’s existence. Likewise, A and B can engage in the activity of disagreeing
even when they do not disagree in the state sense. ey may, for instance, have exactly
the same beliefs about the moral (in)admissibility of assisted suicide, yet engage in a
dispute about the topic to practice their debating skills. Speakers may also engage in a
dispute (for a while) without disagreeing in the state sense because they mistakenly take
the contents of their assertions to be in conﬂict. For instance, they may have a dispute
about whether or not visiting relatives can be boring, where one of them means that
the activity of visiting relatives can be boring and the other means that relatives who visit
See footnote  in this chapter for some of these worries.
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can be boring. In section .. and .., I will give a suﬃcient-conditions account of
disagreement in the state sense. is has been the main target of relativist and contex-
tualist discussions. In section ., I will address (dis)agreement in the activity sense by
looking at the pragmatics of disputes about taste.
.. Disagreement on the Sequenced Worlds Model
e distinction between intra-conversational and inter-conversational phenomena has
been important in the treatment of eavesdropping and retraction. It is equally import-
ant for disagreement in the state sense. A speaker may disagree with another speaker
who is party to the same conversation, or she may disagree with a speaker who is party
to another conversation. Moreover, as we will see in due course, another distinction
is important to draw. Two agents may disagree in virtue of their assertions (whether
or not belief is their attitude to the content of their assertions); or they may disagree
in virtue of their beliefs (whether or not their beliefs are expressed in speech). ere
are thus four possibilities: (i) intra-conversational disagreement in virtue of assertions,
(ii) intra-conversational disagreement in virtue of beliefs, (iii) inter-conversational dis-
agreement in virtue of assertions, and (iv) inter-conversational disagreement in virtue
of beliefs. On the sequenced worlds model, a suﬃcient-conditions account is given for
each possibility. Let us take them in turn.
I- 
Two parties to a conversation disagree if one asserts a speech act contentSW p and
the other asserts a speech act contentSW q that is incompatible with p.
Moreover, as Cappelen and Hawthorne (, ) remark, the two uses of ‘agree’/‘disagree’ are gram-
matically distinct in that the event use but not the state use felicitously combines with progressive aspect.
‘Ben and Anna are disagreeing about the existence of free will’ only has a reading that requires Ben and
Anna to be engaged in the activity of disputing to be true.
I- , like the three other accounts of disagreement, gives only a suf-
ﬁciency condition, not necessary and suﬃcient conditions. at is because there are many cases that
plausibly count as cases of disagreement, in which there is no incompatibility between the assertions’
speech act contentsSW. For instance, the disagreement may arise from pragmatically implicated contents.
Huvenes (, ) draws attention to the following case based on an example by Grice ():
(i) A: Mr. X is meeting a woman tonight.
B: I disagree, he is meeting his wife.
A’s and B’s speech act contents (in Grice’s terms, what each says) are compatible. Mr. X’s meeting a woman
does not preclude that it is his wide he is meeting. Yet B’s use of ‘I disagree’ does not seem infelicitous.
e disagreement can be explained if B is understood to be disagreeing not with what A said but with
what he implicated. According to Grice, A under normal conditions implicates that the woman to be met
is not X’s wife, a claim with which the content of B’s assertion is incompatible.
Huvenes (, ) points to another type of case, in which the speech act contents are compatible.
(e following case diﬀers from Huvenes’ own example.)
(ii) Sal: I like e Sopranos.
Ben: Oh, no/I disagree. I hate e Sopranos.
. Disagreement 
I-  relies on the notion of incompatibility. But
what is it for two sequenced worlds contents to be incompatible? As a ﬁrst approx-
imation, a modal analysis will do: Two sequenced worlds contents are incompatible
iﬀ they cannot both be true from the same (conversational) perspective. But a modal
analysis of this kind has obvious problems. As MacFarlane (a, ) points out, if
one of the contents is a necessary falsehood, then no matter what the second content
is, it will be impossible for both to be true (from the same conversational perspective)
simply because it is impossible for the necessary falsehood to be true (from any conver-
sational perspective). Moreover, a modal analysis of incompatibility in an account of
disagreement overgenerates cases of disagreement. Suppose a physical theory T entails
that some sentence S, which says something speciﬁc about the melting of ice in the
Arctic, is false. en any two speakers who utter S and ‘T is true,’ respectively, will
turn out to disagree. But where the entailment is far from obvious, and the two claims
intuitively about diﬀerent subject matters, the speakers do not seem to disagree.
To my knowledge, there is no account of incompatibility that avoids all problems
of this kind. Fortunately, the modal analysis makes the right predictions for many
of the cases we are interested in. I will thus rely on it in my discussion of the cases.
Oﬃcially, however, the account of disagreement in conversation will have to rely on
a notion of incompatibility that is based on an intuitive notion of what it is for the
truth (from some perspective) of one content to preclude the truth (from the same
perspective) of another content. I trust that the reader is suﬃciently familiar with the
notion of preclusion to competently arrive at judgments of incompatibility. Again, for
our cases involving predicates of personal taste, the modal analysis delivers intuitively
correct results.
I-  makes the intuitively correct predictions
regarding disagreements about matters of personal taste. Consider again (.).
Judgments on (ii) may vary, but if take Ben’s reply to be natural, it is tempting to understand Sal and Ben
as disagreeing about the television series e Sopranos. However, Sal’s liking of it is perfectly compatible
with Ben’s hating it. One way of explaining the disagreement is to point to the incompatibility of the
attitudes expressed – incompatibility in roughly the sense that a single rational agent could not coherently
hold both attitudes at the same time.
I follow MacFarlane’s lead here in relying on a notion of preclusion that is not made fully precise. For
some remarks as to how one may elucidate the notion of preclusion in terms of its formal properties, see
MacFarlane (, -).
I-  makes one idealising assumption, namely that the two assertions
happen within a short enough time interval. Without this assumption, the account would predict that
a speaker who says ‘e one-minute news are on’ would disagree with her interlocutor who says, more
than a minute later, ‘e one-minute news are over.’ To also account for these cases, intra-conversational
disagreement would have to be stated in terms of the temporal update of the ﬁrst assertion’s horizontal
content and the second assertion’s horizontal content. See the discussion of I- -
 below.
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(.) Ben: is cake is tasty.
Anna: No/Nuh-uh/I disagree, it’s not tasty!
In (.), Ben expresses the speech act contentSW CAKE&. Anna expresses NOT-
CAKE&.
(.) CAKE&: fhw; t; hx1; x2ii: to hx1; x2i, the contextually salient cake tastes
good in w at tg
(.) NOT-CAKE&: fhw; t; hx1; x2ii: to hx1; x2i, the contextually salient cake
does not taste good in w at tg
CAKE& andNOT-CAKE& are incompatible as there is no conversational perspective
from which they are both true (for all hw; t; hx1; x2ii, it cannot be the case that both
hw; t; hx1; x2ii 2 CAKE& and hw; t; hx1; x2ii 2 NOT-CAKE&). Hence I-
  predicts that Anna and Ben in (.) disagree.
I-  is also correct in making no prediction of
disagreement in (.) and other cases involving ﬁrst-personal pronouns. (However,
the account does not predict that speakers do not disagree, since it only gives suﬃcient
conditions for disagreement, not necessary conditions.)
(.) Ben: I’m a philosopher.
Anna: No/Nuh-uh/I disagree, I’m not a philosopher.
In (.), Ben expresses PHIL. Anna expresses NO-PHIL.
(.) PHIL: fhw; t; hx1; x2ii: x1 is a philosopher in w at tg
(.) NO-PHIL: fhw; t; hx1; x2ii: x2 is not a philosopher in w at tg
PHIL and NO-PHIL are not incompatible since there is a conversational perspective
from which they are both true – the perspective hw0; t0; hBen, Annaii which is such
that Ben is but Anna is not a philosopher in w0 at t0.
I-  concerns the incompatibility of the parties’
speech act contentsSW. In standard conversations in which people sincerely express
their beliefs, they will disagree in their beliefs just in case they disagree with regard
to the speech act contentsSW expressing those beliefs. But depending on the purpose
of the conversation, speakers need not always believe what they assert and may still
disagree. For instance, if the mutually recognised purpose of the conversation is to
explore a hypothesis, conversational disagreement will be accompanied by disagreement
in suppositions. If the purpose is to make up a ﬁctional story, the attitude underlying
Cf. section .., footnote 
. Disagreement 
speakers’ presuppositions is pretence and disagreement will go hand in hand with
disagreement in pretence. So there can be intra-conversational disagreement without
intra-conversational disagreement in belief. Likewise, there can be intra-conversational
disagreement in belief without intra-conversational disagreement. Two parties to a
conversation may hold relevant incompatible beliefs yet refrain from expressing them
in speech acts. us we need to separate I-  from
intra-conversational disagreement in belief.
I-   
Two parties to a conversation, A and B, disagree in their beliefs with contentsSW
pA and qB if pA is incompatible with qB.
We also need to separate our accounts of intra- and inter-conversational disagreement.
In section . on eavesdropping we saw that diﬀerent contents are relevant to eaves-
droppers and to conversational participants. is is because eavesdroppers do not take
themselves to be part of the conversation, they are not engaged in the joint project of
locating the conversational group. Rather, they are locating just themselves. e in-
formation they assess for truth is ‘de-contextualised’: An eavesdropper who spies on a
conversation taking place hundreds of miles away will not reject an assertion of ‘e
money is here’ simply because he thinks the money is not where he himself is. He
should reject it only if the money is not in the location of the speaker. We saw that the
Kaplan horizontal is just the piece of ‘de-contextualised’ information the eavesdropper
assesses.
Eavesdropper who reject a claim, for instance by saying ‘at’s false’, disagree with
the speaker, as in (.) repeated here.
(.) [Sal is secretly listening in on the following conversation between Ben and
Anna.]
Ben: Liquorice is tasty.
Anna: at’s right. It is tasty.
Sal [to himself ]: at’s false. Liquorice tastes awful.
ere are further cases of inter-conversational disagreement. Two speakers who are
party to diﬀerent conversations may be said to disagree, for instance when one asserts
‘God exists’ and the other asserts ‘God doesn’t exist.’ Moreover, the same person may
disagree with her past self. In MacFarlane’s ﬁsh sticks example (cf. section ..),
See the deﬁnition of S PSW in section ..
See footnote  in this chapter for an idealising assumption about time that I- -
   shares with I- .
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MacFarlane disagrees with his childhood self about the tastiness of ﬁsh sticks. In all
of these cases, it is the incompatibility of the speech acts’ Kaplan horizontal that ﬁgures
in the explanation of disagreement. (If we took the incompatibility of the diagonal
contents to matter, we would get the wrong result that someone asserting ‘It’s sunny
here’ in Scotland would count as disagreeing with someone asserting ‘It’s not sunny
here’ in England.)
e ﬁsh sticks example also raises another important aspect. Horizontal content,
just like diagonal content, is temporally neutral. But surely, I do not disagree with my
former self simply because yesterday I said ‘It’s sunny’ and now I say ‘It’s not sunny.’
Rather, I disagree with my former self if I now say ‘It wasn’t sunny a day ago.’ It is thus
not the assertions’ Kaplan horizontal whose incompatibility matters for disagreement.
In the sequenced worlds account(s) of retraction, we got the right predictions by look-
ing at the temporal update of the previous assertion’s horizontal content (cf. sections
.. and ..). Analogously, in the sequenced worlds account of inter-conversational
disagreement the temporal update of the horizontal content gives the right results.
I- 
Two speakers in diﬀerent conversations at t1 and t2 disagree if the Kaplan hori-
zontal of the speaker’s assertion at t2 is incompatible with the temporal update
at t2 of the Kaplan horizontal of the other speaker’s assertion at t1.
To illustrate, I-  predicts that I disagree with my
former self if I now say ‘It wasn’t sunny a day ago’ because the temporal update of my
former assertion’s horizontal content, SUNNYt , is incompatible with the horizontal
content SUNNYt of my later assertion.

Some authors are sceptical of inter-conversational disagreement, however. For instance, Glanzberg (,
) and Schaﬀer (, x) reject clear judgments of disagreement in inter-conversational cases in which
one speaker asserts ‘X is tasty’ and the other asserts ‘X is not tasty.’ According to Glanzberg, we only
get clear judgments of disagreement if the two conversational contexts make it suﬃciently clear that the
speakers in both conversations talk about the same person or group to whom X is said to be tasty.
By modifying the example slightly, we can see once more that the modal analysis of incompatibility as
impossibility of joint truth (from the same perspective) is insuﬃcient for accounts of disagreement. Sup-
pose that in the above example, I say on day d, the day after my ﬁrst assertion on d, ‘It wasn’t sunny
yesterday.’ By the Kaplan semantics for indexical expressions like ‘yesterday’, the horizontal content of
this assertion is SUNNYd :
(i) SUNNYd : fhw; t; xi: it is not sunny on d in wg
It is not diﬃcult to see that it is not impossible for SUNNYd and SUNNYt to be true from the same
perspective. ey are both true at hw0; t0; xi, where w0 is a world in which it is not sunny on day d
(making SUNNYd true) but in which it is sunny on day d and t
0 is a moment during d (making
SUNNYt true). Hence SUNNYd and SUNNYt are not incompatible. But I clearly disagree with my
former self in asserting the two contents on two consecutive days.
Note that the temporalist aspect of content is not the culprit. Similar examples arise for possible worlds
content. For instance, suppose someone says ‘e man in the red suit is drunk’, and someone says about
Sal, who is the man in the red suit, ‘Sal’s not drunk.’ It is natural to report them as disagreeing. But on
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(.) SUNNYt : fhw; t; xi: it is sunny one day before t in wg
(.) SUNNYt : fhw; t; xi: it is not sunny one day before t in wg
Inter-conversational disagreement in virtue of assertions must be distinguished from
inter-conversational disagreement in virtue of belief. First, speakers may make asser-
tions whose horizontal contents (modulo the temporal update) are incompatible yet
may not believe what they say, for instance because the purpose of their respective con-
versations is to explore a hypothesis. ey may still count as disagreeing. Second,
two agents may disagree in belief even if they have not expressed their respective beliefs
in speech. e account of inter-conversational disagreement in belief is as follows.
D  
Two agents at t1 and t2, who are not party to the same conversation, disagree in
belief if the Kaplan horizontal content of the agent’s belief at t2 is incompatible
with the temporal update at t2 of the Kaplan horizontal of the other agent’s belief
at t1.
ere are thus four accounts of disagreement, covering disagreements in virtue of what
speakers assert in the same conversation (I- ), dis-
agreements in virtue of the beliefs of speakers in the same conversation (I--
   ), disagreements in virtue of what speakers assert in
diﬀerent conversations (I- ), and disagreements in
virtue of what agents who are not party to the same conversation believe (D
 ). Where speaker believe what they assert, intra-conversational accounts of
disagreement and of disagreement in belief make the same predictions (and so do the
inter-conversational accounts). But where speakers take a diﬀerent attitude to what
they assert, the two accounts, respectively, may make diﬀerent predictions.
standard semantics for deﬁnite descriptions and proper names, it is possible for the contents expressed by
these assertions to be true at the same world.
It is an open question, I think, whether two speakers disagree when it is known that one believes what
she asserts but the other makes her assertion in a conversation the goal of which is to establish common
supposition. Perhaps the attitudes expressed in assertion have to be relevantly similar for the two speakers
to count as disagreeing.
ere might be a diﬃculty about knowing what an agent believes if she has not voiced her belief. But
this is irrelevant to the point. What matters is that agents can felicitously be reported to be disagreeing
in virtue of conﬂicting beliefs (no matter what they say). For instance, if Anna believes that liquorice is
tasty and Sal (who has never met nor talked to Anna) believes that liquorice is not tasty, then they can be
said to disagree. (For a denial of this conditional and the view that disagreement requires the disagreeing
agents to be party to the same conversation, see Schaﬀer (, x.).)
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.. A Note on Transworld Disagreement
e two accounts I-  and D  -
 have the consequence that agents in diﬀerent possible worlds may be in disagree-
ment. at is because the notion of incompatibility in the accounts relies on the
relativist notion of truth from an assessor’s perspective (cf. sections . and .), on
which contents are true or false relative to the assessor’s world. us, if the horizontal
content of some speaker in w1 and the temporal update of the horizontal content of
another speaker in w2 cannot both be true relative to the (same) world of the assessor,
the speakers count as disagreeing.
One may object that there are no transworld disagreements since, as MacFarlane
puts it (borrowing Perry’s () terminology), the assertions or beliefs of agents in dif-
ferent worlds concern diﬀerent worlds. MacFarlane (a, ) motivates the rejection
of transworld disagreement with the following example.
Consider Jane (who inhabits this world, the actual world) and June, her
counterpart in another possible world. Jane asserts that Mars has two
moons, and June denies this very proposition. Do they disagree? Not in
any real way. Jane’s assertion concerns our world, while June’s concerns
hers. If June lives in a world where Mars has three moons, her denial may
be just as correct as Jane’s assertion.
Contrary to MacFarlane, I think that our intuitive judgments about alleged cases of
transworld disagreement do not in fact tell against transworld disagreement. Our judg-
ments, I claim, can go either way, and whenever we have clear intuitive judgments, we
follow counterfactual reasoning that construes the case as one of same-world disagree-
ment. Let me explain.
ere are two ways of presenting alleged cases of transworld disagreement. e
ﬁrst employs explicit talk of possible worlds, putting the subjects in diﬀerent worlds as
if they inhabited diﬀerent continents. But relying on the language of modal realism
in the presentation of cases has two signiﬁcant disadvantages. First, it brings with it
metaphysical commitments that few are prepared to accept. And second, it is doubtful
whether we should trust our intuitive judgments based on modal realist talk, given
I-  does not have this consequence because the parties have to be
part of the same conversation. I assume without argument here that one cannot be in a conversation with
someone in a diﬀerent possible world. In the sequenced worlds model, it is stipulated that conversations
can be characterised in terms of a series of formal objects hw; t; hx1; : : : ; xnii, which are deﬁned as triples
of a world w, time t and individuals x1 : : : xn inhabiting the same world w.
Sequenced worlds relativism shares the aspect of world-perspectivalness with Egan’s relativism but not
with Lasersohn’s, Stephenson’s, or MacFarlane’s relativism, on which propositions count as true iﬀ they
are true relative to the world and time of the speaker and the assessor/judge (or the standard of taste salient
in the context of assessment). See section . for the relevant diﬀerences.
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that modal realism is a controversial theory about the metaphysics of possibility and
necessity. It is safer, then, to use language that is more entrenched in everyday use.
e second way of presenting alleged cases of transworld disagreement uses stand-
ard counterfactual talk. Here judgments diﬀer from case to case. In cases in which
we are given information about the counterfactual assertion (or belief ) as well as relev-
ant ‘worldly’ information with respect to which the world of the counterfactual asser-
tion diﬀers from the actual world, judgments of no disagreement seem to prevail. In
contrast, in cases in which the counterfactual world is not explicitly stipulated to be
diﬀerent in relevant ‘worldly’ facts, judgments of disagreement seem prominent.
Consider an example. Here is counterfactual scenario .
(.) R  
In March , Pier Carlo Padoanan, the OECD deputy secretary-general,
said ‘e UK is back in recession.’ George Osborne, the UK’s Chancellor of
the Exchequer, could have said (but did not), ‘e UK is not back in recession.’
Now ask yourself: Would Osborne have disagreed with Padoanan? I think one can
plausibly answer yes and reason as follows: Osborne did not say it and so does not
disagree with Padoanan. But had he said it, he would have disagreed with him.
Consider next counterfactual scenario .
(.) R  
In March , Pier Carlo Padoanan, the OECD deputy secretary-general,
said ‘e UK is back in recession.’ Contrary to fact, the UK could be
experiencing its strongest economic growth in recent years, and Osborne could
have said (but did not), ‘e UK is not back in recession.’
Ask yourself again: Would Osborne have disagreed with Padoanan? I think in this
scenario, it is much more natural to judge that they would not have disagreed.
What is important to note about these two cases is that insofar as we engage in
counterfactual reasoning, our judgments are based on same-world construals of the
cases. Standard accounts of counterfactual conditionals underscore this fact and sup-
port the diﬀerence in judgments. In each of the above scenarios, the described context
MacFarlane (a, ) maintains that alleged cases of transworld disagreement need not be presented in
modal realist talk and provides an alternative presentation of the case using counterfactual talk. Cappelen
and Hawthorne (, -) object that this presentation does not yield intuitions of no-disagreement.
In reply, MacFarlane (, -) corrects his presentation of the case and makes appeal to the notion
of a ‘counterfactual attitudes-in-context.’ I agree that this improves the presentation of cases, but I worry
that pre-theoretical judgments about disagreeing with someone’s counterfactual attitude-in-context are
hard to come by.
See www.guardian.co.uk/business//mar//uk-back-in-recession-oecd
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is one in which Pier Carlo Padoanan actually said ‘e UK is back in recession.’ In the
ﬁrst case, we then reason with the following counterfactual: ‘If George Osborne had
said ‘e UK is not back in recession’, he would have disagreed with Padoanan.’ On
a Lewis-Stalnaker theory, this counterfactual is true iﬀ all the relevant worlds w that
are most similar to the world of the context of use and in which Osborne made his
assertion are such that he disagreed with Padoanan in w. e most similar worlds are
all worlds in which Padoanan made his assertion, so they do turn out to disagree. In
contrast, in the second case, we reason with the following counterfactual: ‘If the UK
was experiencing its strongest economic growth in recent years and George Osborne
had said ‘e UK is not back in recession’, he would have disagreed with Padoanan.’
is counterfactual is true iﬀ all the relevant worlds w0 that are most similar to the
world of the context of use and in which the UK is going strong economically and Os-
borne made his assertion are such that he disagreed with Padoanan inw0. However, the
relevant worlds that are most similar to the world of the context of use presumably are
not all worlds in which Padoanan made his assertion, since in those worlds, he would
have been incorrect and so may not have made his assertion. Hence in those worlds,
he would not disagree with Osborne.
In sum, I believe that the only natural way of presenting alleged cases of transworld
disagreement triggers judgments which are based on counterfactual reasoning that con-
strues them as same-world disagreements. e variations in judgments about such cases
can be explained by standard accounts of counterfactuals. us, our judgments regard-
ing alleged cases of transworld disagreement provide no reason against disagreements
between agents in diﬀerent possible worlds.
.. Faultlessness
Relativists like Kolbel (, , ) and Lasersohn (, , ) argue
that relativism is uniquely positioned to explain the possibility of faultless disagreement
about subjective matters. On their view, disagreement is explained by the fact that the
propositions agents express or believe contradict each other; faultlessness is explained
by the fact that each subject expresses or believes a proposition that is true relative
to herself. In opposition to this case for relativism, however, some critics argue that
If we wanted to avoid commitment to transworld disagreement, it would be easy enough to restrict the
accounts to same-world cases of disagreement. e amended account of inter-conversational disagreement
would be as follows.
S- - 
Two speakers in diﬀerent conversations at t1 and t2 in the same possible world disagree if the
Kaplan horizontal of speaker’s assertion at t2 is incompatible with the temporal update at t2 of
the Kaplan horizontal of the other speaker’s assertion at t1.
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relativism can explain either disagreement or faultlessness, but not both.
I will show in this section that on the sequenced worlds view, one can make sense
of the notion of faultless disagreement while at the same time acknowledging that there
is more than one way in which disagreements fail to be faultless. However, in the intra-
conversational cases of faultless disagreement that have attracted most attention, the
notion of faultlessness on which disagreements about subjective matters can be said to
be faultless is not the notion of truth relative to the speaker that relativists like Kolbel
and Lasersohn have adduced. us the account of faultless disagreement oﬀered here
is not suited to support Kolbel’s and Lasersohn’s strong case for relativism. At the same
time, it is not subject to the charge their explanation of faultless disagreement faces.
Note ﬁrst that on the sequenced worlds view, the above explanation in terms of
truth relative to the speaker is not available for all cases of disagreement. In particular,
it fails for cases of I-  and I-
  . On these accounts, the relevant notion of perspectival truth
is truth from the conversational perspective. An assertion of ‘is cake is tasty’ in a
one-to-one conversation has the content CAKE&:
(.) CAKE&: fhw; t; hx1; x2ii: the contextually salient cake tastes good to
hx1; x2i in w at tg
CAKE& is true from the conversational perspective just in case the cake tastes good to
both interlocutors at the time and in the world of the assertion. Its truth does not vary
from one interlocutor to the other. So an explanation of faultlessness as truth from one’s
individual perspective is not available. If the second interlocutor asserts ‘No, this cake
isn’t tasty’, then one of them has asserted a content that is false from the conversational
perspective and is thus at fault.
Not much is lost, however, for the sequenced worlds relativist who gives up the
account of faultless disagreement in terms of truth relative to each speaker’s perspective.
As MacFarlane (, ch. ) observes, ‘faultlessness’ can mean diﬀerent things when
ascribed to acts of asserting and believing. An act of assertion, for instance, may be
faultless in at least any of the following ways:
. Faultless: expressing an epistemically warranted content
. Faultless: expressing a true content
. Faultless: complying with the norm(s) of assertion
Here is what the sequenced worlds relativist can say about the multiple ways in which
disagreements may or may not be faultless.
See for instance Moltmann (), Rosenkranz (), and Stojanovic ().
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First, in the conversation in which Ben asserts ‘Liquorice is tasty’ and Anna asserts
‘Liquorice is not tasty,’ they may both be faultless – epistemically warranted – in their
assertions because they both have ﬁrst-hand evidence of the taste of liquorice and they
both have good reasons to believe that they are relevantly alike in their taste preferences,
evidence that overrules any indication to the contrary that arises from the fact that
they disagree. (Of course, they may lose these reasons at some point as the dispute
continues.)
Second, Ben’s and Anna’s assertions in the same conversation can not both be
faultless – expressing a true content. We will discuss the ordinary language, mon-
adic truth predicate in detail in section ... For now, it will suﬃce to note that ‘true’
is ascribed of contents and is disquotational in the sense that it is governed by the fol-
lowing equivalence schema for contents: e content that  is true if and only if . On
the sequenced worlds view, this schema is true at context c and from a perspective just
in case its right hand side is true at c and from that perspective iﬀ its left hand side is
true at c and from that perspective. Where a content varies in truth value from per-
spective to perspective, its ascriptions of monadic truth vary in truth from perspective
to perspective, too. It is easy to see, then, that there is a perspective from which one
of the assertions’ contents must be false. To an eavesdropper, for instance, liquorice
will either taste good or fail to taste good. So at least one of the contents will fail to be
true from the eavesdropper’s perspective. Hence, in assessing the assertions’ horizontal
contents from her individual perspective, she cannot truly say of both contents that
they are true.
e sequenced worlds relativist also has a theoretical notion of perspectival truth
at her hands. For assertions made in the same conversation, the relevant perspective is
that of the conversation. e contents of both Ben’s and Anna’s assertions cannot both
be true from the conversational perspective. Whatever their respective tastes, it cannot
both be the case that liquorice is tasty to them and that liquorice is not tasty to them.
So their assertions cannot both be faultless in the sense of expressing contents that are
both true from the conversational perspective.
For assertions made in diﬀerent conversations, however, it is the speakers’ indi-
vidual perspectives that matter. (Recall that eavesdroppers assess relative to their own
individual perspective.) Speakers in diﬀerent conversations who are said to disagree
may both be faultless in the sense that their assertions’ horizontal contents are both
true from their respective individual perspectives.
But Ben’s and Anna’s assertions, made in the same conversation, can not both be
faultless in the sense of expressing a content that is true from the speaker’s perspective.
is is because their speech act contentsSW are pair-centered contents, contents that
are true or false from a pair-perspective but not from an individual perspective.
ird, their assertions may or may not both be faultless – complying with the
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norm(s) of assertion – depending on the norm of assertion. On the sequenced worlds,
the two norms of assertion register two levels of appropriateness of an assertion: appro-
priateness given the group-centric conversational purpose of maximal cooperativeness
and appropriateness given the speaker-centric purpose of voicing one’s perspective and
persuading one’s audience of sharing one’s perspective. e ﬁrst level of appropriate-
ness is captured by the S, -   , which requires
the speech act contentSW to be true from the conversational perspective. At most one
of Ben’s and Anna’s speech act contentsSW can be true from the conversational per-
spective. Hence, their assertions cannot both be faultless in the sense of complying with
the strong, group-centric norm of assertion.
e second level of appropriateness is captured by the weak norm of assertion,
which requires only that each speech act contentSW correctly locate the speaker and
that the hearers be in a position to accommodate in such a way as to bring about the
content’s truth from the conversational perspective. Provided that both Ben and Anna
can change their tastes, each of their assertions meets the weak norm of assertion and
is hence faultless in the sense of complying with the weak norm of assertion.
e ways in which intra-conversational disagreements can and cannot be faultless
on the sequenced worlds view are summarised in Table ..
For inter-conversational disagreements, the picture is similar. However, as we
noted above, truth from the speaker’s individual perspective is relevant for inter-conver-
sational disagreement where truth from the conversational perspective is relevant for
intra-conversational disagreement. Moreover, the norms of assertion are not relevant
for inter-conversational disagreements. Two speakers in diﬀerent conversations may be
judged to disagree, and may each be faultless, without any information being available
on the conversational contexts that would allow judgments regarding the appropriate-
ness of their assertions in their respective conversations. Table . gives an overview of
faultlessness in inter-conversational disagreements.
For inter-conversational disagreement in belief, the norm of belief is egocentric. In
chapter  we saw that one should believe a content only if it is true of oneself. Two
believers (in diﬀerent contexts) can disagree and both be faultless in the sense that each
of their beliefs is complying with the egocentric belief norm. A summary of the ways in
which believers who are not party to the same conversation can and cannot faultlessly
disagree in belief is given in Table ..
ere are thus various ways in which disagreements in each category may be said
to be faultless. e paradigm case that has received most attention in arguments for
and against faultless disagreement is intra-conversational disagreement. Here, the se-
e norm was stated in section .. as follows:
E Believe p only if you yourself are correctly located by p.
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quenced worlds view allows for a notion of faultless disagreement on which the dis-
agreeing parties are faultless in the sense of complying with the weak norm of asser-
tion. e resulting picture is nuanced, though. ere are equally plausible ways of
understanding faultlessness – even in terms of conversational propriety – on which
disagreements about subjective matters turn out not to be faultless.




Epistemically X X X
warranted
True — — —
True from the conver- — N.A. N.A.
sational perspective
True from the N.A. X X
agent’s perspective
Complying with — N.A. N.A.
the strong norm
Complying with X N.A. N.A.
the weak norm
Complying with ego- N.A. N.A. X
centric belief norm
.. Nonindexical Contextualism and Disagreement
What should nonindexical contextualists say about disagreement? Presumably, they
want to make the same predictions that relativists make on the above accounts of dis-
agreement. ey can. All that nonindexical contextualists, on the sequenced worlds
view, need to do is adapt the account of incompatibility that ﬁgures in the accounts of
intra-conversational and inter-conversational disagreement (in belief ). e notion of
incompatibility received a modal analysis that made reference to the notion of truth.
To make the same predictions as relativists, nonindexical contextualists need to replace
the relativist’s notion of truth from the same (conversational) perspective with their
notion of truth in the same context. e notion of incompatibility underlying the
nonindexical contextualist accounts of disagreement (in belief ) will then be as follows:
Recall the deﬁnition of T   in section .: A sentence  is true in the context c iﬀ JKc;ic
= , where ic is the index hwc; tc; hx1c ; : : : ; xnc ii whose coordinates are determined by c.
. On the Dynamics of (Dis)agreement 
Two sequenced worlds contents are incompatible iﬀ they cannot both be true in the
same context.
e accounts of intra- and inter-conversational disagreement (in belief ) with the
nonindexical contextualists’ notion of incompatibility allow them to make the intu-
itively correct predictions about disagreement cases. However, the view is once more
stuck with counterintuitive consequences that arise from the separation of utterance
truth (more precisely: truth of sentences-in-context) and ordinary disquotational truth
as ascribed to propositions. We have already seen that nonindexical contextualist ac-
counts of eavesdropping and retraction make counterintuitive predictions. Making
the right predictions about disagreement now has the price of predicting the following
claims to be felicitous. ey are about Ben’s assertion of ‘Liquorice is tasty’ in one
conversation and Anna’s assertion of ‘Liquorice isn’t tasty’ in another conversation.
(.) Ben and Anna disagree. Still, their assertions are both true.
(.) Anna: What Ben said is false and I disagree with him. But his assertion is true.
For the nonindexical contextualist who does not want to accept these consequences,
there is a way to avoid them by changing the accounts of disagreement. Incompat-
ibility can alternatively be deﬁned as impossibility of truth in the contents’ respective
contexts of use. More precisely, two contents p and p, as asserted (believed) in c1
and c2 respectively, are incompatible iﬀ it cannot be both that p is true in c1 and
p is true in c2. Equipped with accounts of disagreement based on this notion of in-
compatibility, nonindexical contextualists avoid predictions of felicity for (.) and
(.). However, they do so at the cost of failing to predict disagreement in most cases
of inter-conversational disagreement. As long as the contents expressed by Anna’s and
Ben’s assertions are each true in the context in which they are each asserted, Anna and
Ben are not predicted to be in disagreement. On this account of disagreement, it will
be felicitous for Anna to assert (.).
(.) What Ben said is false, liquorice isn’t tasty. But I don’t disagree with him.
Nonindexical contextualism, on the sequenced worlds view, seems to be better oﬀ with
the accounts of disagreement that give it the same empirical coverage as relativism.
As with other data, however, the view will have to live with some implausible con-
sequences, i.e. the felicity of assertions like (.) and (.).
. On the Dynamics of (Dis)agreement
Disagreement as a state has received widespread attention in the literature on relativism
and contextualism about subjective matters. Agreement and disagreement as a conver-
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sational activity have received markedly less attention. is is unfortunate. Getting
clearer on (dis)agreement as a conversational activity promises to aﬀord insights into
the ways in which our perspective inﬂuences and is inﬂuenced by discourse and into
what speakers may learn from a dispute about taste even where no agreement is reached.
e sequenced worlds view developed in this and the previous chapters has at its
core a model of the common ground. is model is dynamic. It records the devel-
opment of the discourse in terms of the contributions made to the common ground
of shared background assumptions. e sequenced worlds model of common ground
thus allows us to say more about the conversational dynamics of agreeing and disagree-
ing about subjective matters.
A quick review will be useful. e model, as developed in the preceding sections,
consists of the common ground (or context set) – the information all speakers presuppose
– as well as the individual speakers’ commitments. Assertions are understood as propos-
als to add their content to the common ground. In asserting, speakers take on a speaker
commitment to the truth of the asserted content. If accepted, this commitment be-
comes a joint commitment of all discourse participants; it becomes part of the common
ground. If the proposal is not accepted, the speaker keeps the speaker commitment
unless she implicitly or explicitly retracts her assertion. Finally, how we represent se-
quenced worlds content depends on the order of the conversational participants in the
conversational sequence hx1; : : : ; xni. To have a convenient term call the combination
of the common ground (joint commitments), the individual speakers’ commitments,
and the conversational sequence the conversational scoreboard.
In what follows, I will illustrate how this sequenced worlds model illuminates the
conversational dynamics of disputes about matters of personal taste. In particular, the
model helps classifying disputes in terms of the diﬀerent eﬀects that they have on the
conversational scoreboard and speakers’ individual perspectives.
I will here not give a pretheoretical characterisation of what makes for a dispute
about taste, but will rely on an intuitive grasp. A dispute may, but need not, involve the
activity of disagreeing. It may, but need not, involve the use of explicit disagreement
markers such as ‘I disagree,’ ‘No,’ ‘at’s false’ and ‘You’re wrong’. We can deﬁne a
dispute theoretically, as a conversational situation in which a proposal to add a content
to the common ground is rejected by at least one interlocutor.
For all of the following cases, we stipulate that the conversational sequence is hBen,
Annai. To keep it simple, we will suppress the temporal update required over the dur-
ation of the conversation. is simpliﬁcation will be harmless as none of the assertions
are claims about short-lived states or events that terminate before the conversation ends.
ough see the integration of larger passages of conversation in the explanation of disagreement in the
state sense in Schaﬀer ().
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Let us start with a case of Agreement by Persuasion, which we have already en-
countered.
(.) Ben: is liquorice and mint tea is tasty! I’ve never tried this combina-
tion before.
Anna: No, it’s not! e anise, minty and sweet ﬂavours together are dis-
gusting. And the aftertaste is the worst.
Ben: Hmmm. Let me have another sip then. . .You’re right. I take that
back. It’s not tasty at all.
In (.), Anna disagrees with Ben’s ﬁrst assertion by making a counter-proposal to add a
content to the common ground that is incompatible with the content of Ben’s assertion
about the tastiness of the tea. Ignoring their other contributions, at this point they have
incompatible speaker commitments but no joint commitment regarding the tastiness
of the tea. Eventually, they come to agree on the tastiness of the tea because Anna
successfully persuades Ben to retract his previous claim and share her view, which she
expressed by saying ‘No, it’s not.’ Again ignoring other contributions to the common
ground, the eﬀect of the dialogue on the conversational scoreboard is that Anna and
Ben have a joint commitment to the truth of the content in (.), and the contents
of their assertions about the tastiness of the tea are removed from their respective lists
of speaker commitments.
(.) fhw; t; hx1; x2ii: the contextually salient liquorice and mint tea tastes good
to hx1; x2i in w at tg
e next dialogue is a case of Change of Perspective.
(.) Ben: is liquorice is tasty.
Anna: Excuse me? You hate anise.
Ben: Let me try another one then. . . .You’re right. It doesn’t taste good
to me at all.
In (.), Anna rejects Ben proposal to add the content that this liquorice is tasty to
the common ground because she doubts Ben’s sincerity. Since Ben retracts his ﬁrst
assertion by saying ‘You’re right’ and concedes that the liquorice does not taste good
to him, they end up agreeing. Regarding the tastiness of liquorice, the eﬀect of the
dialogue on the common ground is an update with (.).
(.) fhw; t; hx1; x2ii: the contextually salient liquorice does not taste good to x1
in w at tg
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Neither Ben nor Anna have any remaining speaker commitments. Note that Anna and
Ben only agree on whether the liquorice tastes good to Ben. e dialogue, and the
resulting common ground, do not establish anything regarding Anna’s perspective on
the taste of the liquorice. She might naturally continue the conversation with either of
the following assertions, each of which is compatible with the common ground at the
end of (.).
(.) Anna: I knew you don’t like it. Anyway, I myself think it tastes quite good.
(.) Anna: I knew you don’t like it. I can’t stand it either.
Consider a case of Suspension of Judgment.
(.) Ben: Pﬀﬀ. . . your coﬀee tastes awful.
Anna: Hold on. You just brushed your teeth. Of course you won’t like
coﬀee now.
Ben: Right. I take that back. I can’t tell right now whether your coﬀee
is tasty or not.
In (.), the dialogue does not result in any joint or speaker commitments regarding
the tastiness of the coﬀee. What Anna achieves is that Ben retracts his claim and expli-
citly suspends judgment on the coﬀee’s tastiness. Neither Anna nor Ben ends up with
any commitments regarding the coﬀee’s tastiness. Hence the conversational scoreboard
leaves it open whether the coﬀee tastes good to any of them.
(.) is a case of Unabated Disagreement.
(.) Ben: is liquorice is tasty.
Anna: No, it tastes terrible!
Ben: But consider the alteration of sweet and salty sensations on the
tongue.
Anna: at’s exactly what’s so disgusting. Also, the drops are too hard.
Ben: Really? Good liquorice must be hard.
Anna: . . .
e dots at the end indicate that without either party retreating from their claims, the
conversation either continues indeﬁnitely, ends abruptly, or the topic is changed. In
(.), no agreement regarding the liquorice’s tastiness is reached. Hence, no joint
commitment is incurred. However, since no party retracts their claims, they keep a
speaker commitment to the truth of the content expressed by ‘is liquorice is tasty’ and
‘It tastes terrible,’ respectively. While they fail to agree, they come to learn something
about their mutual perspectives. Provided that they assume that they are sincere and
assume that they all assume that they are sincere etc., the information they thereby
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acquire becomes part of the common ground. A pragmatic eﬀect of their assertions is
the update with (.) and (.).
(.) fhw; t; hx1; x2ii: the contextually salient liquorice tastes good to x1 in w at tg
(.) fhw; t; hx1; x2ii: the contextually salient liquorice does not taste good to x2
in w at tg
Unabated Disagreement must be distinguished from Agreement to Disagree in (.).
(.) Ben: is liquorice is tasty.
Anna: No, it tastes terrible!
Ben: But . . .
Anna: Ben, it might be tasty to you, but it clearly isn’t tasty to me.
Ben: Ok, let’s just agree that we don’t like the same things.
In (.), Ben and Anna do not reach any agreement regarding the tastiness of the
liquorice. And just like in (.), they also keep their speaker commitments and learn
about each other’s perspectives on liquorice. In contrast to (.), however, the content
of Ben’s ﬁnal assertion is added to the common ground, which establishes an explicit
agreement to accept that they have diverging perspectives.
In more ﬁne-grained discourse models such as Farkas and Bruce’s (), the dif-
ference between Unabated Disagreement and Agreement to Disagree can be explained
more elegantly. Farkas and Bruce assume that the conversational scoreboard also has a
‘Table’ that keeps a record of the Question Under Discussion. As long as an item is on
the Table, it remains to be resolved whether or not, roughly, the content is to be added
to the common ground. To simplify, in cases of Unabated Disagreement the items ‘Li-
quorice is tasty’ and ‘Liquorice is not tasty’ remain on the Table. Cases of Agreement
to Disagree result in the removal of the items from the Table without a change to the
common ground (cf. Farkas and Bruce (, )).
e classiﬁcation of disputes about taste in terms of their eﬀects on the conversa-
tional scoreboard gives an indication of the ways in which pragmatic discourse models
illuminate the dynamics of conversation. ere is a variety of discourse models that
work with richer conceptions of the conversational scoreboard. Many of these are
based on the notion of common ground. It is thus possible to integrate the current
model and its predictions for disputes about taste with more ﬁne-grained accounts of
the dynamics of discourse.
In particular, the model is compatible with the proposal by Farkas and Bruce () (see fotnote 
in section ..). Discourse models based on a notion of common ground further include Asher and
Lascarides (), Clark and Schaefer (), Clark (), Ginzburg (, ), Gunlogson (),
and Roberts (, ). I have been ﬁrst made aware of research on discourse models in pragmatics by
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. Believing Alike, Agreement, and Cognitive Signiﬁcance
With the sequenced worlds account developed into a fuller picture, it is now time to
take up a thread we left dangling in sections .. and .. eories of mental states
are in part designed to account for the state’s cognitive signiﬁcance: its connection to
the agent’s behavioural dispositions, its connection to other mental states (e.g. dispos-
itions to draw certain inferences), and to dispositions to accept certain sentence types
as true. is account will ﬁgure in the explanation and prediction of action. It explains
why subjects who believe alike act alike (given similar background beliefs and desires).
Consider Perry’s example (ignore Perry’s terminology):
When you and I entertain the sense of ‘A bear is about to attack me,’ we
behave similarly. We both roll up in a ball and try to be as still as possible.
(Perry, , )
Whatever a theory says about our cognitive states, it better carve out a similarity that
ﬁgures in a psychological explanation of our similar actions. Likewise, this similarity
must help explain why Hume and Heimson behave alike if they both believe of them-
selves that they are Hume. Believing alike in this sense is a matter of being in mental
states with similar cognitive signiﬁcance.
ere is a second sense of believing alike. Perry continues:
When you and I both apprehend the thought that I am about to be at-
tacked by a bear, we behave diﬀerently. I roll up in a ball, you run to get
help.
In this case, we also believe alike: we both believe that I am about to be attacked by
a bear. But as Perry points out, this similarity does not prompt us to behave alike.
Consider Heimson and his psychiatrist:
Suppose Heimson manages to convince his psychiatrist that he is right,
so that the psychiatrist also ascribes to Heimson the property of being
Hume. en Heimson and his psychiatrist share a common belief. Not
in the sense in which Heimson and Hume do—the psychiatrist doesn’t
believe that he himself is Hume—but in another, equally legitimate sense.
(Lewis, a, )
Tamina Stephenson’s () talk ‘e Pragmatics of Judge Dependence.’ Stephenson adapts Farkas and
Bruce’s model of discourse to make room for centered worlds content but does not address the dynamics
of (dis)agreements about matters of taste in any detail.
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Heimson and his psychiatrist believe alike without being disposed to similar behaviour.
ey agree that Heimson is Hume. Heimson and Hume do not agree about who is
Hume. Heimson believes that he (Heimson) is Hume. Hume believed that he (Hume)
is Hume and most likely had no beliefs about Heimson. Heimson’s and his psychiatrist’s
believing alike is a matter of being in agreement.
A theory of doxastic attitudes should give us an account of both of these notions
of believing alike or believing the same thing: having beliefs with similar cognitive
signiﬁcance and agreeing in belief. It should tell us what all those have in common
who behave alike (given similar background beliefs and desires), and it should tell us
what it is that subjects have in common who agree on something.
Here is how the sequenced worlds view of belief accounts for believing alike. As
before, the sequenced worlds view distinguishes between intra-conversational and inter-
conversational cases of believing alike. (e latter subsume cases of soliloquy and sol-
itary belief.)
In inter-conversational cases, similarity in cognitive signiﬁcance is explained by
sameness of diagonal content. In section .. we noted that agents in contexts of solit-
ary belief and soliloquy entertain centered worlds contents. ese contents correspond
to the diagonal content of the sentences agents use to express their beliefs. us, if
Hume and Heimson both believe that I am Hume, they each have a de se belief with the
diagonal content HUME. When you and I both believe that I am about to be attacked
by a bear, we both have a de se belief with the diagonal content BEAR.
(.) HUME : fhw; t; xi: x is Hume in w at tg
(.) BEAR: fhw; t; xi: x is about to be attacked by a bear in w at tg
is gives us the following account of believing alike as sameness of cognitive signiﬁc-
ance for inter-conversational cases:
C  (inter-conversational cases)
Two agents, who are not party to the same conversation, are in cognitively similar
belief states if their beliefs have the same diagonal centered worlds content.
Believing alike as inter-conversational agreement in belief, on the sequenced world
view, is explained with reference to horizontal content. We take our cue from I-
    in section .: Heimson, who believes that
he is Hume, and his psychiatrist, who agrees with Heimson that he (Heimson) is Hume,
are in belief states with the same horizontal content HEIMSON.
(.) HEIMSON : fhw; t; xi: Heimson is Hume in w at tg
To get centered worlds content, the index needs to be a triple of a world, time, and a single individual.
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For some cases in which subjects at diﬀerent times are said to agree we will again have
to take the temporal update of the horizontal content into account, so that we get the
following account of believing alike as agreement.
A (inter-conversational cases)
Two agents at t1 and t2, who are not party to the same conversation, agree in
belief if the Kaplan horizontal content of the agent’s belief at t2 is identical to
the temporal update at t2 of the Kaplan horizontal of the other agent’s belief at
t1.
We only give a suﬃcient condition for believing alike as agreement because sameness
of these two horizontal contents can account for many but not all cases. A temporal
case is this: Ben, who believes at t1 that it is sunny, and Anna, who believes at t1
that it is sunny now, presumably agree that it is sunny. But their horizontal contents,
given by our semantics for the sentences they would use to express their beliefs, are not
identical. A modal case is this: I believe that the author of A Treatise of Human Nature
was Scottish and you believe that David Hume was Scottish. Hence we agree. But on
standard semantics for deﬁnite descriptions and proper names the horizontal contents
of (the sentences we use to express) our beliefs are not exactly the same.
In intra-conversational cases, agreeing in belief is a matter of having beliefs with
the same sequenced worlds content.
A (intra-conversational cases)
Two parties to a conversation agree in belief if their beliefs have the same se-
quenced worlds content.
Again, we only give a suﬃcient condition for agreement because not all cases of agree-
ment are ones in which believers have the same sequenced worlds belief content. Con-
sider Heimson talking to his psychiatrist. Heimson believes de se that he is Hume. His
psychiatrist, having been convinced by Heimson, believes of Heimson that he is Hume,
a belief he would express by saying ‘Heimson is Hume.’ us, they agree. But they
do not share a sequenced worlds speech act content (unless Heimson also believes that
Heimson is Hume or his psychiatrist also believes that you are Hume). Given the con-
versational context hwc; tc; hHeimson, psychiatristii, Heimson believes HUME and
his psychiatrist believes HEIMSON’.
(.) HUME: fhw; t; hx1; x2ii: x1 is Hume in w at tg
(.) HEIMSON’ : fhw; t; hx1; x2ii: Heimson is Hume in w at tg
See also footnote  in section ...
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A simple ﬁx for this case would be taking the horizontal content as the object of agree-
ment, as in inter-conversational cases. But an account in terms of shared horizontal
content does itself not provide a wide enough notion of agreement. It too fails to pre-
dict agreement in all cases where two believers agree, as we have seen with the account
of inter-conversational agreement. Hence, we must content ourselves with a suﬃcient
conditions account of agreement and note that it does not predict agreement in all cases
where agents can plausibly be said to agree. Short of providing a full, necessary and
suﬃcient conditions analysis of agreement, we will stick with the above account that
gives center stage to S  SW – the diagonal content of interlocutors’
mental states and the information that gets passed from speaker to hearers.
Let us ﬁnally turn to believing alike as similarity in cognitive signiﬁcance for intra-
conversational cases. We observed in chapter , section ., that believing the same se-
quenced worlds content does not make for beliefs with similar cognitive signiﬁcance. If
Lingens, in the conversational context hwc; tc; hLingens, Ortcuttii, believes TIRED,
(.) TIRED: fhw; t; hx1; x2ii: x1 is tired of reading in w at tg,
and Ortcutt believes TIRED, they are not disposed to behave alike. To account for
the diﬀerence in their doxastic states, we introduced the notion of n-  
 . Lingens -believes TIRED, Ortcutt -believes TIRED.
Intuitively, Lingens self-and-group-locates in the content in a diﬀerent way than Ort-
cutt.
What, then, is believing alike as similarity in cognitive signiﬁcance in intra-conver-
sational cases? It is easy to see this in a simple example. Lingens and Ortcutt believe
alike if they both believe that I am tired of reading. In the conversation, this is for
Lingens to -believe TIRED and for Ortcutt to -believe TIRED.
(.) TIRED: fhw; t; hx1; x2ii: x2 is tired of reading in w at tg
TIRED is the -for- inverse of TIRED – TIRED but with the ﬁrst and second
center of each sequenced world swapped around. e account of believing alike as
similarity in cognitive signiﬁcance in intra-conversational cases is as follows.
C  (intra-conversational cases)
In a conversational context hw; t; hx1; : : : ; xnii, xi and xj are in cognitively
similar belief states if there is a sequenced worlds content such that xi i-believes
it and xj j-believes its i-for-j inverse.
For the notion of an inverse, see also section .
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is account must be given with a proviso, however. It provides us only with cognitively
similar belief states. Lingens and Ortcutt are not in exactly the same belief states,
according to C , when Lingens -believes TIRED and Ortcutt
-believes TIRED. To see this, it will be helpful to look again at the equivalence
between sequenced worlds belief and centered worlds belief that we stated in chapter
.
S      
An agent A n-believes a sequenced worlds content fhw; t; hx1; : : : ; xuii:
p(w; t; hx1; : : : ; xui)g in the conversational context hwc; tc; hy1; : : : ; yuii iﬀ
(i) A = yn 2 fy1; : : : ; yug
(ii) there are relations R1. . .Ru such that in wc at tc, yn is uniquely R1-related
to y1, . . . , and yn is uniquely Ru-related to yu (where Rn is the identity re-
lation) and yn’s standing in R1. . .Ru to y1 : : : yu establishes a conversation
between y1 : : : yu
(iii) A believes the centered worlds content fhw; t; xi: there are individuals
x1; . . . , xu such that x is uniquely R1-related to x1, . . . , and x is uniquely
Ru-related to xu in w at t, and p(w; t; hx1; : : : ; xui)g.
As we apply S       to Lingens’
-believing TIRED and Ortcutt’s -believing the content got from swapping the st
and nd centers in TIRED, we can see that Lingens and Ortcutt do not believe exactly
the same centered worlds contents – TIREDL and TIREDO – since the relation that
establishes a conversation between them need not be symmetric.
(.) TIREDL: fhw; t; xi: there are individuals x1; x2 such that x = x1, x is
addressing x2 and x1 is tired of reading in w at tg
(.) TIREDO: fhw; t; xi: there are individuals x1; x2 such that x = x1, x is
addressed by x2 and x1 is tired of reading in w at tg
e account C  ignores these diﬀerences. As a result, it can at
best be an account of believing alike as similarity in cognitive signiﬁcance – an account
of believing a similar thing.
e discussion shows that sameness of content, in intra-conversational cases, does not
make for believing alike as similarity in cognitive signiﬁcance. One might object that
the sequenced worlds view thus loses the motivation of Lewis’ (a) account of at-
titudes de se, which is to characterise states of the head in terms of the kind of attitude
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and its object. Two agents are in the same belief state in case their beliefs have the same
object. On the contrary, the sequenced worlds view captures cognitive signiﬁcance
in intra-conversational cases in terms of the object of the attitude (content), the kind
of attitude (belief ), and the way the subject is related to the content by that attitude (cf.
n-believing). On the view, content ‘ain’t in the head.’
I think that once the main motivation for the Lewisian view is properly understood,
the objection loses its bite. e motivation is ‘to characterize states of the head; to
specify their causal roles with respect to behavior, stimuli, and one another’ (Lewis,
a, ). Lewis thinks this characterisation is best done in terms of the object of
the attitude (content). But this seems to be a mere preference:
Mean what you will by ‘object of an attitude.’ But if you mean something
that is not determined by the state of the head, and that cannot do the job
of chacterizing states of the head by their causal roles, then I think you
had better introduce something else that can do that job. I would prefer
to reserve the term ‘object of an attitude’ for that something else. (Lewis,
a, )
So whence the preference for capturing cognitive signiﬁcance in terms of the attitudinal
object, i.e. the content? One advantage that objects of attitudes may have over that
‘something else’ is that they can smoothly be integrated into rigorous formalisations,
e.g. in Bayesian decision theory, of the common-sense psychology that describes the
causal roles of states of the head (cf. Lewis (a, -)). I take it that this is what
underlies Lewis’ motivation for characterising the cognitive signiﬁcance, or causal role,
of mental states in terms of the objects of attitudes. But if this is the motivation for the
self-location picture, the sequenced worlds view can happily be embraced without loss.
For the notion of n-believing a sequenced worlds content in a conversational context
can be translated into believing a centered worlds content, by S 
    . e resulting centered worlds contents can
then play the role that Lewis intended them to play in Bayesian decision theory. e
cost is only that sameness of the object of the attitudes – sequenced worlds contents –
is not what accounts for similarity in the states’ cognitive signiﬁcance. But this seems a
price worth paying if the objects of the attitudes are freed from the realm of unsharable,
incommunicable mental entities.
. Truth Ascriptions, Tense, and Predicates of Personal Taste
On the sequenced worlds view, horizontal and diagonal content each play an import-
ant explanatory role. But with two kinds of content in the theory, we may ask: Which
anks to Stephan Torre and Francois Recanati for pressing me on this point.
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of the two contents is the object of ordinary truth ascriptions? In answering this ques-
tion, I will ﬁrst need to state the relativist and nonindexical contextualist accounts of
the monadic predicate ‘true’ (x..). I will then look at inter-conversational truth
ascriptions and, in particular, at cross-temporal assessments for truth. As we will see,
sequenced worlds relativism includes relativism not only about taste but also about
time and worlds. In sections .. and .., I will explore some of the consequences
for cross-temporal truth ascriptions and the role of tense, and I will defend sequenced
worlds relativism about predicates of personal taste from some objections raised by
MacFarlane.
.. Monadic ‘true’
Let us start by reviewing the relativist’s and the nonindexical contextualist’s accounts
of the object-language, monadic predicate ‘true’ on the sequenced worlds framework.
We will see that the nonindexical contextualist view has some unhappy consequences.
ese will be important to keep in mind for the next section on cross-temporal truth
ascriptions and tense. Before turning to temporal matters, however, we need to answer
the question about the objects of ordinary truth ascriptions. I will show that in intra-
conversational cases, diagonal content is the object of ordinary truth ascriptions, and
in inter-conversational cases, it is horizontal content.
It is plausible that the ordinary language, monadic predicate ‘true’ is attributed
to contents. And doubtlessly ‘true’ is disquotational in the sense that the following
equivalence schema holds.
E e content that  is true iﬀ .
Relativists and nonindexical contextualists can both give a semantics of ‘true’ on which
E has only true instances. On the sequenced worlds view the semantics is
as follows.
(.) JtrueKc;i = q. q(i) = , where ‘q’ is a variable over contents
(.) Jpthat qKc;i = Jpthe content that qKc;i = hw; t; hx1; : : : ; xnii. JKc;i 
e semantic clause for ‘true’ says that ‘true’, as used at a context c, takes a sequenced
worlds content and maps it to truth just in case the sequenced worlds content is true at
‘q’ is thus a variable over functions of the semantic type hs; hi; he : : : he; ti : : :iii. e is the semantic type of
individuals, s stands for worlds, i for times (not to be confused with the index i in (.)), and t for truth
values; combinations such as et, or he; ti, stand for functions from the ﬁrst type (e) to the second (t).
e dots above indicate that the function may take diﬀerent numbers of arguments of type e, depending
on the length of the sequence.
e assumption that pthatq and pthe content thatq have the same semantic entry is here made merely
for simplicity.
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c and i. In the expression pthat q, ‘that’ combines with a sentence; the extension of
the whole expressions is the sentence’s intension (a content). Given the relativist deﬁn-
ition of T       ’ , for any context
c and perspective P, the equivalence schema is true at c and from P just in case ‘the
content that  is true’ is true at c and from P iﬀ ‘’ is true at c and from P. e latter
biconditional is necessarily true since the semantic value of ‘true’ maps a content to
truth at c and the index determined by P just in case the content is true at c and the
index determined by P. From a perspective P, one can truly say ‘It’s true that liquorice
is tasty’ just in case one can truly say from P, ‘Liquorice is tasty.’
Nonindexical contextualists can endorse the semantics for ‘true’ in (.). Given
nonindexical contextualism’s deﬁnition of T  , the equivalence schema
has only true instances because the left hand side is true in any context c just in case
the right hand side is true in c, which is guaranteed by the semantics of ‘true.’
As we have seen in section ., relativism and nonindexical contextualism come
apart in their accounts of assertion truth – more precisely, truth of sentences-in-context.
For convenience, and to facilitate the use of data, I will in this section speak of the truth
of assertions and will assume that the notion can be identiﬁed with truth of sentences-
in-context. I should add, however, that I share the well-known doubts both about
assertions, which as speech acts are a form of action, being bearers of truth and falsity
and about assertion truth being identiﬁed with the truth of sentences-in-context.
In addition to E, sequenced worlds relativists can endorse the following
plausible principles linking content truth and assertion truth/truth of sentences-in-
context.
(.) An assertion with content p is true iﬀ the content p is true.
(.) If a (declarative) sentence  in context c has content p, then  in c is true iﬀ
the content p is true.
ese principles ensure that assertion truth and content truth go hand in hand. When-
ever one can truly say of an assertion that it is true, one can say of its content that it is
true, and vice versa.
Nonindexical contextualists, however, cannot endorse (.) and (.) together
with E. For suppose Anna, to whom liquorice tastes good, asserts ‘Li-
quorice is tasty.’ By T  , it follows that Anna’s assertion is true. Anna’s
assertion expresses the content that liquorice is tasty. Call this content p. By (.), it
follows that p is true. But suppose also that Ben, to whom liquorice does not taste good,
also asserts ‘Liquorice is tasty.’ (He might be wrong about his own taste.) By T
Doubts about assertions being bearers of truth and falsity are voiced, for instance, by MacFarlane (,
-), doubts about assertion truth being identiﬁed with the truth of sentences-in-context by Kaplan
(, ).
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 , his assertion is not true. It also expresses p. us by (.), it follows that
p is false. Contradiction. e obvious solution for nonindexical contextualists is to
give up the link between content truth and assertion truth established in (.) and
(.) and to replace the principles with (.) and (.).
(.) An assertion with content p in context c is true iﬀ p is true at the index
determined by c.
(.) If a (declarative) sentence  in context c has content p, then  in c is true iﬀ
the content p is true at the index determined by c.
(.) and (.), together with E, have the implausible consequences for
nonindexical contextualism that we have noted several times. Suppose Sal, to whom
liquorice does not taste good, overhears Anna’s assertion of ‘Liquorice is tasty.’ Given
E and the fact that the content expressed by the assertion is false from Sal’s
individual perspective, he is then correct to assert ‘What Anna said is false.’ However,
by T   (identifying assertion truth with truth of sentences-in-context),
Anna’s assertion is true and Sal can correctly say ‘Anna’s assertion is true.’ (‘True’, here,
is the predicate deﬁned by T  , which is not a disquotational.) Hence
Sal is correct in asserting (.) and (.).
(.) What Anna said is false. But her assertion is true.
(.) Anna’s assertion is true. But still, what she said is false.
As noted in section ., nonindexical contextualists may argue that assertion truth,
just like truth of sentences-in-context, is a technical notion of truth, not one used
by ordinary speakers. Truth ascriptions by ordinary speakers are always ascriptions of
truth to contents. us one need not take sentences like (.) and (.) seriously as
empirical data. Rather they are consequences that semanticists have to, and can, live
with.
However, this way of dealing with consequences like (.) and (.) makes the
nonindexical contextualist view about PPTs and ordinary truth ascriptions empiric-
ally indistinguishable from relativism. I have throughout this chapter and the previous
chapter pointed out that sequenced worlds nonindexical contextualists can always ad-
apt features of their view to match relativism’s empirical predictions. If they want to
establish a theoretical alternative with empirical bite, however, nonindexical contextu-
alists will have to accept that the infelicity of assertions of (.) and (.) counts as
empirical data disconﬁrming their view.
is argument, and its consequences for nonindexical contextualism, can be found in a slightly diﬀerent
form in MacFarlane (, -).
See sections ., .. and .. above.
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Let us now turn to the objects of ordinary truth ascriptions. Ordinary monadic truth
is ascribed of contents. But on the sequenced worlds view, every assertion and every
belief has two contents – horizontal content and diagonal content. ese diﬀer in
truth-conditions. In consequence, it matters which content truth is ascribed of on a
given occasion.
We have seen a pattern emerge in this and the previous chapter. When prag-
matic phenomena such as eavesdropping, retraction, and disagreement are explained,
inter-conversational cases are distinguished from intra-conversational cases. In intra-
conversational cases, it is diagonal content that ﬁgures in the explanation of the phe-
nomenon. In explanations of inter-conversational cases, it is horizontal content. It is
thus no surprise that for ascriptions of monadic ‘true’, the same distinction is relevant.
If a speech act contentSW proﬀered in one’s conversation is up for evaluation, devices of
propositional reference such as ‘that’ in ‘that’s true,’ or ‘what you said’ in ‘what you said
is true,’ pick out diagonal speech act contentSW. In normal conversations, in which the
contents in the common ground are assumed to be true, explicit evaluations of asser-
ted contents go hand in hand with acceptance or rejection of the proﬀered content.
It would be positively bizarre to respond to an assertion by saying, ‘at’s false,’ and
subsequently take the proﬀered information for granted in one’s speech acts. Accept-
ance/rejection and judgments of truth/falsity can line up in this way because they have
the same object: diagonal speech act contentSW.
In inter-conversational cases, where ‘that’ picks out the content of an assertion that
is made in a diﬀerent conversation, or the content of a belief by someone not present
in the current conversation, it is the horizontal content of the assertion or belief that is
the object of truth evaluations. is is as it should be. In evaluating my own assertion
of ‘I am hungry’ for truth, I am correct to assess the diagonal content HUNGRYD from
my perspective.
(.) HUNGRYD: fhw; t; hx1; x2ii: x1 is hungry in w at tg
However, I would be wrong in assessing HUNGRYD for truth if I were eavesdropping
on someone else’s assertion of ‘I am hungry.’ In that case, I recognise that ‘I’ refers to
someone else – the speaker – and I judge the content true or false depending on the
speaker’s appetite. I do so if I judge the horizontal content HUNGRYH.
(.) HUNGRYH: fhw; t; hx1; x2ii: sc, the speaker in c, is hungry in w at tg
.. Cross-temporal Truth Ascriptions
In section ., we saw that there are at least two ways of implementing relativism about
matters of personal taste. According to the ﬁrst option, centered worlds relativism,
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contents are sets of centered worlds. e semantics’ index is a triple hw; t; xi consisting
of a world, time, and individual. In evaluations of contents for truth and falsity, all
of the coordinates in the index are determined by the assessor’s location – the index
just is the centered world representing the location of the assessor. Sequenced worlds
relativism is akin to centered worlds relativism, but substitutes sequenced worlds for
centered worlds.
According to the second option, most prominently advocated by MacFarlane, con-
tents are sets of triples hw; t; si of a world, time, and standard of taste; the semantics’
index is a triple hw; t; si; in evaluations of contents in context for truth and falsity,
the world and time coordinates in the index are determined by the context of use –
for instance, the context in which the sentence whose content is getting evaluated was
used – whereas the standard of taste is determined by the context of assessment. On
MacFarlane’s relativism, truth of sentences-in-context is deﬁned as follows.
MF 
A sentence as used in a context of use cU and assessed at a context of assessment
cA is true iﬀ the content expressed by  at cU is true at hwcU ; tcU ; scAi.
MacFarlane-style relativism, based on MF , is a form of nonindexical
contextualism about modality (worlds) and time. Recall from section . that (truth)
relativism about X and nonindexical contextualism about X need to diﬀer only in
their deﬁnitions of truth. For the relativist, the feature in the index that matters for
X is determined by the assessor(’s context). For the nonindexical contextualist, this
feature is determined by the context of use. In MF , the world and
time coordinates are determined by the context of use.
MacFarlane-style relativism must thus reject the plausible principles (.) and
(.) linking assertion and content truth because of times and worlds. It encounters
similar consequences regarding world and time that nonindexical contextualism about
taste encounters for taste. Suppose Sal says at noon, ‘It’s noon.’ His assertion is true by
MF . But suppose an hour later, he remembers his assertion. Given
E, he can then felicitously utter ‘at’s false.’ He can do so because the
temporally neutral content of his earlier assertion is not true at Sal’s current context of
use at pm. Yet Sal can also felicitously say at pm, ‘My earlier assertion is true.’ e
same implausible juxtapositions of assertion and content truth are thus felicitous:
(.) Sal: What I said is false. But my assertion is true.
(.) Sal: My assertion is true. But still, what I said is false.
Predictions of felicity for (.) and (.) are avoided by the ﬁrst implementation of
relativism, centered worlds relativism, and by sequenced worlds relativism. Note the
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explicit deﬁnition of truth of sentences in context, here given in MacFarlane’s termin-
ology of context of use and context of assessment.
E 
A sentence  as used in a context of use cU and assessed by individual x at
context of assessment cA is true iﬀ the content expressed by  at cU is true at
hwcA ; tcA ; xcAi.
E  makes assertion truth go hand in hand with content truth and thus pre-
serves principles (.) and (.) linking the two notions. Together with E-
 for ordinary truth ascriptions, it predicts that Sal can assert (.) at pm.
(.) Sal: My assertion is false, because what I said is false: It’s not noon.
It may strike the impartial reader that relativism about time is a step in the wrong direc-
tion. For although it avoids the divergence in ascriptions of assertion truth and content
truth, it retains the rather implausible consequence that Sal can felicitously call what
he earlier said false, despite its being true at the time of asserting. It may be pointed out
that the accounts of retraction and disagreement add to the unpalatable consequences.
e following claims by Sal and Anna at pm are predicted to be felicitous.
(.) Anna: What you said is false (now), but I don’t disagree with you.
(.) Sal: What I said is false (now), but I won’t take it back.
At the same time, relativism about time also has intuitive appeal. Egan remarks:
[I]t can be appropriate for listeners at diﬀerent times to attribute diﬀer-
ent truth values to one and the same utterance. One possible example
of this is when Blofeld says, at noon, ‘it’s lunchtime.’ Number , in the
room at the time of utterance, should agree that Blofeld’s utterance is true.
Bond, listening to the recorded conversation later that night, should prob-
ably—though I think the intuitions here are less clear—say that Blofeld’s
utterance is false (I don’t think Bond should say that it was false—only
that it is false, at the time when he’s evaluating it. It would, for example,
be appropriate for Bond to say ‘that’s false’ on hearing Blofeld’s recorded
utterance. Certainly, it would be appropriate for him to respond ‘no’ if
Felix asked him, ‘is that true?’ or ‘is what Blofeld said true?’). (, 
n.)
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If Egan is right, then there is intuitive appeal to the claim that (present-tense) cross-
temporal assessments of assertions and contents for truth are made with respect to the
assessor’s current time. To give another illustration, Sal and Anna are listening at noon
to a podcast of the morning news. e newsreader correctly announces that the truce
between Syria’s regime and opposition forces is still being observed. Anna, in possession
of more recent information to the eﬀect that ﬁghting has been resumed, says in response
to the announcement, ‘at’s false. ey’ve started ﬁghting again.’ Not only does her
remark seem apt, it also easy to see how remarking ‘at’s true’ could be misleading for
Sal, if Sal knew that Anna had more recent information.
e passage by Egan also suggests that truth ascriptions are tensed. us, while it
is felicitous for Anna to say, ‘at’s false,’ she would be wrong in claiming that what
the newsreader announced was then false. If Anna wanted to comment more com-
prehensively on the situation, she could perfectly say ‘at’s false. But of course, it
was true when the news were read. So the newsreader isn’t wrong.’ Relativism about
time is naturally combined with the following principles governing the tense of truth
ascriptions.
(.) An assertion with the content p made in the past was true iﬀ the content p was
then true.
(.) An assertion with the content p made in the future will be true iﬀ the content
p will then be true.
e tense in truth ascriptions also alleviates some of the oddity in our earlier examples
(.) and (.). Consider Anna’s and Sal’s rather natural reactions at pm to Anna’s
assertion of ‘It’s noon’ at noon.
(.’) Anna: What you said is false now. But it was true when you said it, so I don’t
disagree with you.
(.’) Sal: What I said is false (now). But it was true when I said it so I won’t take it
back.
ese are some of the considerations that speak in favour of temporally neutral con-
tents, relativism about time and the signiﬁcance of tense in truth ascriptions. No doubt
examples can be found in which ‘at’s true’ is naturally asserted in response to a tem-
porally neutral assertion made in the past. My intention here has not been to resolve all
problems for temporally neutral contents, but rather to draw out, and make plausible,
the consequences of assuming temporally neutral contents and an ordinary truth pre-
dicate governed by E, and to argue in favour of centered worlds/sequenced
worlds relativism over MacFarlane-style relativism on these assumptions.
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.. Tense and Predicates of Personal Taste
MacFarlane () oﬀers some empirical considerations in favour of his way of im-
plementing relativism about taste that draw on the role of tense in claims of tastiness.
To see what is at stake, let us ﬁrst make the assumption, common to both kinds of
relativism, that tense markers express intensional operators that shift the time coordin-
ate in the index. Following this tradition in intensional semantics will be convenient
and in agreement with the semantic system developed so far. But nothings hangs on
this choice. e following discussion could equally treat tense markers as object lan-
guage quantiﬁers. For simpliﬁcation, we will introduce three tense markers ‘’,
‘’ and ‘’ as stand-ins for English ‘-ed’ (for simple past tense, ignoring
aspect), ‘-;’ (for present tense), and the modal construction with ‘will’ expressing future
tense in English.
(.) J Kc;hw;t;hx1;:::;xnii =  iﬀ 9t0 such that t0 < t and JKc;hw;t0;hx1;:::;xnii =

(.) J Kc;hw;t;hx1;:::;xnii =  iﬀ JKc;hw;t;hx1;:::;xnii = 
(.) J Kc;hw;t;hx1;:::;xnii =  iﬀ 9t0 such that t0 > t andJKc;hw;t0;hx1;:::;xnii = 
(.) JOne year ago Kc;hw;t;hx1;:::;xnii =  iﬀ JKc;hw;t0;hx1;:::;xnii = , where t0 = t
–  year
MacFarlane’s arguments in favour of his relativism explicitly target Stephenson’s (a)
and Lasersohn’s () systems, but most of them also apply to Egan’s centered worlds
relativism and the sequenced worlds relativism defended here. Where the details mat-
ter, I will point out the diﬀerences. Otherwise I will use centered worlds relativism
for illustration. MacFarlane (, -) points out that in evaluations of claims
involving ﬁrst-personal, non-relativized uses of PPTs, the time coordinate of the index
‘plays a double role’ on Lasersohn’s and Stephenson’s relativism (as well as on centered
and sequenced worlds relativism):
It tells us not only what time-slice of the object to look at (which is im-
portant because objects can change their ﬂavors over time), but also what
time-slice of the judge to look at (which is important because judges can
change their tastes over time).
For quantiﬁcational and pronominal treatments favoured in linguistic semantics, see for instance Partee
(), Enc (), and Kusumoto (, ). For a philosophically oriented discussion, see Glanzberg
(). King () argues from quantiﬁcational treatments of tense to eternalist semantic content, but
Ninan (a, forthcoming) convincingly shows that quantiﬁcational treatments of tense are compatible
with temporally neutral semantic contents.
 Sequenced Worlds, Disagreement, Truth Ascriptions
Given E , ‘is cookie is tasty’ as used in cU and assessed by x in cA is true
just in case Jis cookie is tastyKcU ;hwcA ;tcA ;xcA i =  – that is, in case the time-slice of
the cookie (which is salient in cU ) at the time of cA tastes good to the time slice of x at
the time of cA.
In contrast, on MacFarlane’s view, the time coordinate plays only the ﬁrst role of
determining the experienced object’s time-slice. e standard of taste coordinate s is
independently and directly determined by the context of assessment. ere is no need
to determine a judge’s time-slice. Given MF , ‘is cookie is tasty’ as
used in cU and assessed at cA is true just in case Jis cookie is tastyKcU ;hwcU ;tcU ;scA i =
 – that is, in case the time-slice of the cookie (which is salient in cU ) at the time of cU
is tasty by standard of taste s. Note that what matters is not that t is determined by cU
rather than cA but the fact that t has no impact on the determination of the standard
of taste s.
e diﬀerence between MacFarlane’s relativism and centered worlds relativism man-
ifests in distinct truth conditions of past tense and future tense sentences involving
ﬁrst-personal uses of PPTs. On MacFarlane’s relativism, the past tense operator, shift-
ing the time coordinate to some time prior to the time of speaking, makes an earlier
time-slice of the object relevant for truth and falsity. On centered worlds relativism,
the past tense operator makes earlier time-slices of the object and of the experiencer, or
judge, relevant. MacFarlane has us consider the following situation.
(.) H---W
Suppose that one’s tastes change. At c1, one likes the taste of
Hen-of-the-Woods, while at c2 (one year later), one dislikes the taste—not
because the taste has changed, but because one’s reactions to it have changed.
(MacFarlane, , )
Both MacFarlane’s relativism and centered worlds relativism predict that at c2, one can
felicitously assert (.):
(.) Hen-of-the-Woods is not tasty.
In addition, MacFarlane’s relativism predicts that (.) is felicitously assertable in c2.
(.) Hen-of-the-Woods was not tasty a year ago.
Centered worlds relativism, in contrast, predicts that (.) is false from the perspective
of c2. Instead, (.) is felicitously assertable in c2 since, as stipulated, Hen-of-the-
Woods tasted good to the speaker at c1, a year before c2.
(.) Hen-of-the-Woods was tasty a year ago.
. Truth Ascriptions, Tense, and Predicates of Personal Taste 
MacFarlane admits that judgments about the felicity of (.) and (.) may diﬀer.
However, he points to three empirical predictions of centered worlds relativism that
are supposed to provide reason to reject the view in favour of MacFarlane’s relativism,
which does not make these predictions. I quote the passage from MacFarlane (,
-) in full:
First, it [Lasersohn’s and Stephenson’s forms of relativism] predicts that
(.) Hen-of-the-Woods will still be tasty in ﬁfty years
should entail
(.) Someone will be alive in ﬁfty years,
(I assume here that it is not the case that any dead creature likes the taste of
Hen-of-the-Woods, or any other food, while dead.) But this entailment
seems dubious.
Second, it would seem odd to say:
(.) Last year Hen-of-the-Woods was tasty, but this year it isn’t. It has
exactly the same ﬂavor this year that it did last year, but after my
mushroom tasting class I now ﬁnd it unappealing.
By contrast, it would not be at all odd to say:
(.) Last year Hen-of-the-Woods was tasty to me, but this year it isn’t.
It has exactly the same ﬂavor this year that it did last year, but after
my mushroom tasting class I now ﬁnd it unappealing.
But the judge-in-index view [of Lasersohn and Stephenson] would not
predict a diﬀerence in acceptability here.
ird, endorsing [(.) Hen-of-the-Woods was tasty a year ago] does not
sit well with saying that an assertion in c1 of
(.) Hen-of-the-Woods is tasty
must be retracted in c2. It would be odd (at the very least) to say:
(.) Last year I asserted that Hen-of-the-Woods was tasty. And last
year Hen-of-the-Woods was tasty. Still, my assertion was not
accurate and must be retracted.
 Sequenced Worlds, Disagreement, Truth Ascriptions
In reply to these points, let me start with three cautionary remarks. First, not all predic-
ates of personal taste are alike in their embedding behaviour under tense. Some PPTs,
such as ‘tasty,’ which are ascribed of objects, exhibit all of the features of individual-
level predicates (ILPs) in the sense of Carlson (), which express permanent and
tendentially stable properties. Other PPTs, such as ‘fun’, which are ascribed of events,
satisfy most of the tests for ILPs, but exhibit some of the behaviour of stage-level predic-
ates (SLPs), which express transient and episodic properties, in sentences with temporal
modiﬁers. Consider the following contrasts.
(.) a. SLP: Ben was drunk yesterday / last month / a year ago.
b. ILP: Ben was tall yesterday / last month / a year ago.
(.) a. is roller coaster ride was fun a few seconds ago.
b. is lasagne was tasty a few seconds ago / a minute ago.
(.) a. SLP: When Ben is in the pub, he is drunk.
b. ILP: When Ben is at home, he is tall.
(.) a. [Anna, during a roller coaster ride:] When this ride is slower, it is fun.
b. [Anna, while eating her lasagne:] ? When this lasagne is saltier, it is tasty.
In (.) and (.), the sentences in (a) with an SLP allow temporal modiﬁcation,
while the sentences in (b) with an ILP do not. In (.) and (.), ‘tasty’ patterns
with the ILP in (.) and (.), and ‘fun’ patterns with the SLP. at is, the sen-
tences in (.a) and (.a) ascribing fun are acceptable, while the sentences in (.b)
and (.b) ascribing tastiness are not. Note, however, that (.b) has an acceptable
reading on which ‘this lasagne’ refers to a kind – perhaps a brand of frozen lasagne.
However, the relevant contrast between ILPs and SLPs is found in predications to par-
ticulars. Even for standard examples of ILPs, kind readings such as the following are
acceptable: ‘When ﬁremen are tall, they’re better at their job.’
 For the distinction between individual-level predicates like ‘intelligent’ and stage-level predicates like
‘available’, and a variety of tests, see Chierchia () and Kratzer (). It should be noted that the
distinction is not assumed to be made in the lexicon once and for all. In many cases, setting up a pertinent
context allows for SLP-readings of otherwise individual-level predicates (Kratzer, , -). Moreover,
the decision between a state being ‘stable’ rather than ‘transient’ is often diﬃcult, since these notions are
vague.
e case of tastiness is no exception. Taste properties that determine tastiness supervene on physical
properties of food. ese may change – for instance, milk gets sour after a while as a result of fermentation
processes – and thus change the tastiness. Moreover, the context can be set up in a way that allows for
‘tasty’ to behave like a stage-level predicate. In (.b) below, we may stipulate that lasagne drastically
changes in taste as it cools down extremely quickly, giving (.b) a much more acceptable reading. By
all grammatical tests (see, e.g. Chierchia (, -)), however, ‘tasty’ classiﬁes as an individual-level
predicate (see Pearson (forthcoming, x.)).
. Truth Ascriptions, Tense, and Predicates of Personal Taste 
A possible explanation of the behaviour of ‘fun’ under temporal modiﬁers, which
preserves the thesis that ‘fun’ is an ILP, may be that fun is predicated of a temporal part
of the event rather than the whole event in (.a) and (.a). For our purposes,
it is only crucial to note that ‘fun’ shows a diﬀerent behaviour from ‘tasty’ in certain
constructions with temporal modiﬁers. Consequently, we should understand MacFar-
lane’s arguments and the data to follow to be representative only of ‘tasty,’ not of PPTs
in general.
My second cautionary remark is that most extant accounts of PPTs treat ‘tasty’ and
‘taste good’ as semantically on a par. However, when embedded under tense, judgments
of (in)felicity may on occasion diﬀer in strength. We will see an example in response
to MacFarlane’s arguments below.
ird, the cases of PPTs embedded under past or future tense that distinguish
centered/sequenced worlds relativism and MacFarlane’s relativism are cases in which
it is stipulated that the food is the same but the speaker’s perspective has changed. In
many of these cases, judgments tend to vary across subjects and are often not very clear.
is may be due to the fact that our opinions, or the lack thereof, about the metaphys-
ics of taste and taste experiences are relevant to the cases. I invite the reader to test their
judgments on (.).
(.) [Situation: Jim just had an operation that gave him back his sense of smell. As
a result, he now likes the taste of foods which he used to think tasted bland or
even bad, his wife’s cooking included. Jim is euphoric. He says to his wife Allie
after dinner:]
Jim: ? Allie, your dishes were always tasty!
I should thus note that the observations to follow must be understood as merely a
tentative and preliminary discussion of the interaction of PPTs with tense. Let me ﬁrst
reply to the three points MacFarlane makes and then present some data that favours
the centered/sequenced worlds approach.
First, while the entailment of (.) [‘Someone will be alive in ﬁfty years’] by (.)
[‘Hen-of-the-Woods will still be tasty in ﬁfty years’] is far from obvious, explicit denial
of the existence of any beings who could taste Hen-of-the-Woods after asserting (.)
is also odd.
(.) a. ? No one will be alive in  years. But Hen-of-the-Woods will still taste
good.
b. ? Even if no one will be alive in  years, Hen-of-the-Woods will still taste
good.
See, e.g., Lasersohn (, -) for relevant discussion
 Sequenced Worlds, Disagreement, Truth Ascriptions
‘Tasty’/‘taste good’ seem to be diﬀerent from ‘poisonous,’ for example. It is plausible
to think that a particular kind of mushroom is poisonous even when it does not in fact
poison anyone. It seems much less plausible that a kind of mushroom tastes good even
when it does not taste good to anyone.
Second, the diﬀerence in assertability between (.) and (.) seems marginal,
and further reduces when ‘tasty’ and ‘tasty to me’ are replaced by ‘taste good’ and ‘taste
good to me’
(.’) Last year Hen-of-the-Woods tasted good, but this year it doesn’t. It has
exactly the same ﬂavor this year that it did last year, but after my mushroom
tasting class I now ﬁnd it unappealing.
(.’) Last year Hen-of-the-Woods tasted good to me, but this year it doesn’t. It has
exactly the same ﬂavor this year that it did last year, but after my mushroom
tasting class I now ﬁnd it unappealing.
ird, note that MacFarlane’s objection based on the oddity of (.), repeated below,
does not in fact apply to the centered/sequenced worlds view (nor in fact Lasersohn’s
and Stephenson’s view, as they presumably do not predict that (.) must be retracted
in c2).
(.) Last year I asserted that Hen-of-the-Woods was tasty. And last year
Hen-of-the-Woods was tasty. Still, my assertion was not accurate and must be
retracted. (MacFarlane, , -)
According to MacFarlane, ‘accurate’ is the property an assertion has at a context of
assessment cA iﬀ the content it expresses is true at the context of use cU and cA. I
prefer to use the predicates ‘correct’ or ‘true’ rather than ‘accurate’ here, so I will assume
a reading of (.) on which one of these predicates is substituted for ‘accurate’. en
we can see that, contrary to MacFarlane’s claim, centered/sequenced worlds relativism
does not predict the felicity of (.). Given principle (.) about past tense truth
ascriptions, (.) is odd because ‘my assertion was not correct/true’ is false. It is false
because in c1, the context in which the assertion of ‘Hen-of-the-Woods is tasty’ was
made, it was true.
A wider look at the interaction between PPTs and tense reveals that in many cases,
centered/sequenced worlds relativism makes intuitively correct predictions where Mac-
Farlane’s relativism does not. Consider ﬁrst three cases of past tense uses. Assume once
more the situation given in H---W. In this situation, it would be odd to
say in c2
To reiterate the point made in section .. about the truth-aptness of assertions, I do not believe that
assertions are bearers of truth and falsity. However, where we ascribe truth to them explicitly, assertion
truth boils down to truth of sentences-in-contest.
. Truth Ascriptions, Tense, and Predicates of Personal Taste 
(.) Hen-of-the-Woods is not tasty, and never was.
Centered/sequenced worlds relativism predicts that (.) is false since there was a time,
c1, when Hen-of-the-Woods tasted good to the speaker. On MacFarlane’s view, (.)
is perfectly assertable. As long as Hen-of-the-Woods does not change in taste, Hen-of-
the-Woods past and present is not tasty by the single standard of taste of the speaker at
c2.
Consider next (.).
(.) [Situation: Sal grew up in Ethiopia but left the country at age . As an adult,
he is talking to Anna about his childhood:]
Anna: Did you eat injera, the Ethiopian ﬂatbread?
Sal: Yes, we had injera all the time. It was tasty. Of course, I don’t know
whether I would like it today.
Sal’s reply seems perfectly ordinary. But on MacFarlane’s view, that is surprising. For
his assertion of ‘It was tasty’ is true at Sal’s context of assessment cA just in case the
past time-slices of injera are tasty by Sal’s current standard of taste at cA. But Sal goes
on to express ignorance about whether or not the injera he used to have would please
him now. So it is surprising that Sal would at the same time express judgments, by his
current standards of taste, about the tastiness of the injera.
ird, consider (.).
(.) [Situation: Guests at a dinner party have been served bottles of the same
dessert wine throughout the whole dinner.]
Guest: is sweet dessert wine tastes good now, but it didn’t when we drank
it with the main course.
(.) seems to be a perfectly felicitous assertion to make in the situation. is is
predicted by centered/sequenced worlds relativism. But on MacFarlane’s relativism, it
is not. If the wine did not change its taste properties during the course of the dinner,
then by the speaker’s current standards of taste, it either did and does taste good or it
did not and does not taste good.
As a ﬁnal piece of data in favour of centered/sequenced worlds relativism, consider
a case involving a future ascription of tastiness.
(.) [Situation: Beavis and Butthead are about to smoke a joint. ey both know
about the appetite-enhancing eﬀects of marihuana. And they both know that
they dislike the taste of muesli.]
Beavis: is muesli is going to be so tasty later.
 Sequenced Worlds, Disagreement, Truth Ascriptions
Beavis’ claim seems felicitous. But given that Beavis’ gustatory standard at the time
of speaking are such that muesli is not tasty according to it, MacFarlane predicts that
(.) is not a good thing for Beavis to say. In contrast, it is felicitous on centered/
sequenced worlds relativism in case the future time-slice of the muesli will taste good
to the future time-slice(s) of Beavis (and Butthead).
ese observations are not conclusive. But short of a fully worked out theory of
the interaction between PPTs like ‘tasty’ and tense, they lend support to semantic views
on which the tenses have an eﬀect on the judge’s standards of taste.
. Modality, Transworld Assessments, and Predicates of Personal Taste
Modality raises parallel issues for MacFarlane’s relativism and centered/sequenced worlds
relativism, which I will treat brieﬂy here. MacFarlane’s relativism is a form of nonin-
dexical contextualism regarding worlds, whereas centered/sequenced worlds relativism
is a form of relativism about worlds. is has consequences for judgments about coun-
terfactual assertions – assertions that could have been made but were not in fact made.
MacFarlane must reject principles (.) and (.) connecting assertion and content
truth, and must accept that a sentence like (.) is true.
(.) Suppose the moon was made of cheese and I said ‘e moon is made of
cheese.’ at assertion is true, but what it would say is false.
On centered/sequenced worlds relativism, (.) is false. It is false because both the
assertion and its content are false at the assessor’s world (assuming that the assessor is
in the actual world). A plausible principle for transworld truth ascriptions is (.).
(.) An assertion with the content p made under counterfactual circumstances
would be true iﬀ the content p would be true under those circumstances.
(.) licenses true assertions of sentences like (.).
(.) Suppose the moon was made of cheese and I said ‘e moon is made of
cheese.’ at would be true. But of course it isn’t in fact true.
MacFarlane’s point about the double role of the time coordinate on centered/sequenced
worlds relativism but not on his relativism also applies to the world coordinate. On
the former view, the world coordinate determines the worldly location not only of the
experienced object but also of the judge. We can thus expect diﬀerences in the views’
predictions for PPTs embedded under modal operators. For instance, MacFarlane’s
relativism does not predict that the counterfactual in (.) is true.
(.) If no sentient beings had ever existed, nothing would be tasty.
. Modality, Transworld Assessments, and Predicates of Personal Taste 
However, on plausible assumptions about the semantics of counterfactuals, centered/
sequenced worlds relativism has (.) come out true. is may not chime with
intuitive judgment and, as MacFarlane (, ) points out, may play into the
hands of opponents who wish to object to relativism on the grounds that it makes
the property of tastiness implausibly mind-dependent. is point must be conceded.
Centered/sequenced worlds relativism is, whereas MacFarlane’s relativism is not, com-
mitted to the truth of (.) and whatever metaphysical consequences one may or may
not derive from it.
Moreover, given a standard semantics for alethic modals, centered/sequenced worlds
relativism is committed to the truth of (.).
(.) It is impossible that [wine is tasty, even though no one likes it.]
Centered/sequenced worlds relativism predicts that the unembedded ‘wine is tasty, even
though no one likes it’ is necessarily false since there is no centered world hw; t; xi
such that no one in w at t likes wine and wine tastes good to x in w at t (assuming
that someone’s liking wine requires that wine tastes good to that person). Whatever
one’s judgments about (.), it seems a strong metaphysical commitment coming
from semantic theory. But notice that opting for MacFarlane’s relativism does not help
avoiding potentially implausible metaphysical commitments. Consider the assertions
in (.a) and (.b).
(.) G
Situation: As a matter of fact, Sal ﬁnds pure glucose powder extremely tasty.
Sal asserts:
a. It is necessary that glucose is tasty.
b. It is necessary that glucose is tasty to me.
MacFarlane’s view predicts that Sal can felicitously assert (.a) but not (.b). Gluc-
ose has its chemical composition necessarily. In all possible worlds, glucose is CHO.
So in all possible worlds, glucose has the same chemical composition that makes for
its taste (other factors being due to the tasting subject). So given Sal’s actual standard
of taste (which is such that glucose counts as tasty), glucose in all possible worlds is
tasty by the standards salient in Sal’s context of assessment. Hence (.a) is true at
I will not here provide a relativistic semantics for counterfactuals. It seems plausible to assume that it
will involve quantiﬁcation over/shifting of entire centered worlds, not merely possible worlds. Perhaps
Stephenson’s (b, ch. ) semantics for indicative conditionals will serve as a good starting point.
is example is from a brief discussion by Lasersohn (,  n.), where the point is made that the
unembedded ‘Wine is tasty, even though no one likes it’, while false, is not necessarily false, as predicted
by Lasersohn’s view.
 Sequenced Worlds, Disagreement, Truth Ascriptions
Sal’s context of assessment. (.b), however, is false at any context of assessment be-
cause whatever the standards in that context, there is some possible worlds in which
glucose is not tasty by Sal’s standard in that world: it is not necessary that Sal ﬁnds
glucose tasty. But both (.a) and (.b) seem equally implausible. In contrast, the
CW/SW view predicts that both (.a) and (.b) are false (from any perspective
hw; t; xi). (.a) is unassertable because it is false from Sal’s perspective h@, t, Sali.
ere is some possible world w0 in which glucose fails to taste good to Sal in w0 at t.
I leave it to further inquiry to decide which relativistic semantics incurs which
metaphysical consequences. With many alethic modals and counterfactuals, it seems
that judgments track not merely linguistic intuitions of felicity, but more theoretically
founded metaphysical judgments. It would seem that commitments to some form of
mind-dependence, while accompanied by less than favourable judgments of counter-
factuals (.), may after all ﬁt the relativist’s outlook rather well.
. On Content
e sequenced worlds account of eavesdropping, retraction, disagreement and truth
ascriptions required a fuller development of the common ground model of commu-
nication sketched in chapter  and revealed a more complex overall view of content
in thought and talk. On the view, two distinctions take center stage. e ﬁrst is the
distinction between horizontal content and diagonal content. e second is the dis-
tinction between intra-conversational and inter-conversational pragmatic phenomena.
As a rule of thumb, horizontal content explains inter-conversational phenomena and
diagonal content explains intra-conversational phenomena. Table . below provides
a summary of the roles of horizontal and diagonal content.
e sequenced worlds view is thus a form of content pluralism – a form of con-
tent dualism, to be precise. It shares this feature with many other views. What
distinguishes the sequenced worlds view from these views, however, is the way that
explanatory roles are divided up between horizontal and diagonal content. e view’s
association of diagonal content with intra-conversational phenomena and of horizontal
content with inter-conversational phenomena is pretty natural on a reasonable and
widespread understanding of content. On this way of understanding contents, they
are, or determine, truth conditions. But in asking, of a particular assertion, What are
the assertion’s truth conditions? we need not be asking for the unique truth conditions
of that assertion. As Perry (, ) writes,
See for example Perry’s () view on which there are multiple levels of content that a single utterance
expresses, Chalmer’s () two-dimensionalism, Higginbotham’s () view on which there is reﬂex-
ive content and content on which the reﬂexive tense and modal information is discarded, and Stanley
(a,b, ) who distinguishes between communicated content and the content of modal evaluations.
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Table .: Roles of Horizontal and Diagonal Content
Diagonal content Horizontal content
 speech act content/communicated con-
tent/information (ch. )
 object of intra-conversational, simul-
taneous truth assessment (xx.&.)
 object of inter-conversational truth as-
sessment (xx.&.)
 object whose temporal update is re-
tracted in intra-conversational retraction
(x.)
 object whose temporal update is re-
tracted in inter-conversational retraction
(x.)
 object of intra-conversational disagree-
ment (x.)
 object in inter-conversational disagree-
ment (modulo temporal update) (x.)
 object of intra-conversational cases of
believing alike as agreement (x.)
 object of inter-conversational cases of
believing alike as agreement (modulo
temporal update) (x.)
 object of believing alike as simil-
arity in cognitive signiﬁcance (inter-
conversational cases) (x.)
[T]he concept of ‘truth conditions of an utterance’ is a relative concept. . .
Instead of thinking in terms of the truth conditions, we should think about
the truth conditions of an utterance given various facts about it. . . talking
about the content of an utterance is an oversimpliﬁcation.
What are these background facts relative to which an assertion has truth conditions?
ey are the facts that a competent hearer must know in order to understand the as-
sertion. For instance, she must know the language of the assertion, which words are
involved, their lexical meaning, and the syntax of the asserted sentence. Given these
facts – language, words involved, their lexical meaning and syntax – the assertion has
the truth conditions of diagonal content. How so? Suppose someone says, ‘is is Mt.
Tallac.’ Given just these background facts and assuming that the speaker speaks truth-
fully, you will receive the following truth-conditional information: that the speaker
is in a context in which the demonstrated object is Mt. Tallac. In some sense, this
information is about the context – the situation the speaker (and hearer) is in. On
the sequenced worlds view, this is the content communicated in conversation: Con-
versation is the project of self-and-group-location, of locating the group in a shared
situation. at the shared situation is one in which Mt. Tallac is the demonstrated
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object is potentially very useful information.
When we retrieve information from assertions made in conversations of which we
are not members, we do not assume that we share the situation with the speaker. We
are not engaged in the joint project of locating ourselves. And while it may be useful to
gain information about what situation the speaker is in, what we typically want to know
from her assertion is what, given the speaker’s situation, is true of the world. If I read in
an old newspaper – say the edition of  May  – ‘Today elections are being held in
the UK,’ it is surely useful to know that on the day the newspaper appeared, elections
were being held. But my main interest is not under which conditions the sentence can
be truly asserted. Rather, I want to know, given that the sentence was uttered on  May
, under which conditions it is true. I want to know the horizontal content that
elections were held on  May . ese are the assertion’s truth conditions given the
facts that determine the language, words involved, their lexical meaning and syntax,
and the context of utterance. e information given by the horizontal is about what else
has to be true – given these facts.
. Conclusion
Let me summarise. Chapter  started from two plausible assumptions, the Lewisian ac-
count of attitudes as self-location and the Lockean picture of communication as transfer
of information from speaker’s to hearer’s head. It was argued that these views can be
reconciled on a conception of content in terms of sequenced worlds.
Chapters  and  located the sequenced worlds view of content and communica-
tion in the debate between contextualism and relativism about predicates of personal
taste. It was shown that the sequenced worlds view is compatible with nonindexical
contextualist as well as truth relativist pragmatics. e discussion of crucial pragmatic
phenomena such as eavesdropping, retraction, and disagreement exposed some of the
shortcomings of nonindexical contextualism and thus presented an argument in favour
of sequenced worlds relativism. In order to account for these pragmatic phenomena,
the common ground model of communication sketched in chapter  was developed
more fully. e resulting view is a form of content dualism. Both horizontal content
and diagonal content play important roles in our cognitive and communicative lives.
It remains to be said that the sequenced worlds view developed in chapters 
through  on the basis of ideas by Ninan (b) and Torre () is incomplete. An
important question, for instance, is whether the view sits comfortably with a plausible
semantics of standard attitude verbs. Likewise, its relationship to mainstream semantic
accounts of attitude verbs that are taken to give rise to ascriptions of de se attitudes
– such as ‘Ben expects to win the race’ or ‘Sal wants to become president one day’
– requires attention. ese questions are important, but they go beyond the current
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investigation, whose focus has been the role of content in communication. ey will
have to be left for future work.
At the same time, the sequenced worlds view promises interesting applications bey-
ond the perspectival attitudes we looked at here. For instance, it may be fruitfully ap-
plied to other linguistic expressions that have received relativistic treatments, in partic-
ular epistemic modals (Egan et al., ; Egan, ; MacFarlane, a; Stephenson,
a). Moreover, the view may oﬀer an interesting account of ‘audience-sensitive’
assertions such as the billboard inscription ‘Jesus loves you,’ which is plausibly under-
stood as addressing each reader individually. e sequenced worlds account oﬀers the
prospects of an account on which an explosion of content – a diﬀerent content for each
reader – is avoided. I leave it for future work to develop the details and to evaluate the
advantages of these applications.
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